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A STUDY OF SPINOZA





Woodburytype.

SPINOZA.

From the Original Portrait at Wolfenbüttel.

A STUDY OF SPINOZA

BY

61321

JAMES MARTINEAU, LL.D., D.D.

PRINCIPAL OF MANCHESTER NEW COLLEGE, LONDON.



“Der pantheistischen Mystik ist wirklich Gott Alles,
Dem gemeinen Pantheismus ist alles Gott.”—ROTHE.

WITH A PORTRAIT

SECOND EDITION REVISED

London

MACMILLAN AND CO.

1883

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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

IN preparing a reissue of this volume I have taken careful account of every criticism, private or published, which promised me help in rendering it more accurate and complete. A few corrections have consequently been introduced into the Biography. But I have not seen reason to modify any of the interpretations which repeated study and long reflection had led me to put upon the Philosophy.

I hope that the Index of Subjects and Index of References now added will be acceptable, the one to the literary reader, the other to the student of Spinoza's writings, in his comparison of related passages and his determination of doubtful doctrine.

LONDON, *May* 19, 1883.

613 21



PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

I SHOULD hardly have undertaken to write this little book, had I foreseen the appearance of Mr. F. Pollock's comprehensive and masterly volume on the same subject. Happily the contrasted scale of the two saves me from the danger of comparison ; while a sufficient *raison d'être* may be found for both in the different points of view which they carry with them through criticisms seldom much at variance.

From some want of skill in compressed exposition, I could not bring my account of Spinoza within the limits prescribed for the volumes in Professor Knight's "Philosophical Classics," for which series it was intended. As it has therefore to appear on its own account, I have tried to give it greater completeness by adding a chapter on the biblical criticism contained in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*.

The recent appearance of Van Vloten and Land's authoritative edition of Spinoza's extant writings has enabled me to concentrate upon it most of the references which else would have been dispersed over many separate works. It is true that only the first volume has as yet been published. But, through the ready kindness of Dr. Land, I have been furnished with the numerical arrangement of the Correspondence in the second volume; so that it is only for the Memoir by Coler that I have been still obliged to refer to Paulus's edition.

I am indebted to the kindness and special learning of Mr. Joseph Jacobs for an introduction to some of the critical writings which have been useful to me, particularly those of Joël, Van der Linde, and Land; and sincerely thank him for thus enlarging my acquaintance with the more recent Spinozistic literature.

Hearing from my friend, Mr. Serjeant Simon, M.P., that the Library at Wolfenbüttel contained a fine oil portrait of Spinoza, I obtained permission, through the kind intervention of Mr. James Sime, to have a photographic negative of it sent over for reproduction in suitable size for this

volume. It is a pleasure to record my warm acknowledgments to the Librarian, Dr. O. von Heinemann, for his courteous response to my application. The engraving prefixed to some copies of the *Opera Posthuma*, 1677, was taken from this portrait; not, it will be seen, with any eminent success.

LONDON, *July* 27, 1882.

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SPINOZA.

PART I.—LIFE.

CHAPTER I.

YEARS WITHIN ISRAEL—1632-1656.

ON the Houtgracht at Amsterdam may still be seen the house of Michael d'Espinoza, the tradesman, in which his son Baruch was born, on the 24th of November 1632. The event was doubtless piously acknowledged at the neighbouring Portuguese synagogue; from their connection with which the family, though probably Spanish, was supposed to have come from the western side of the Peninsula. To the history of an Israelitish household and the special genius of its members, few things are less material than its native land. The Jew, in himself the most exclusive of mankind, has been turned, by the cruel reaction of events, into the most cosmopolitan. The world, impatient of a select and stereotyped race, has for ages compelled him to be ever on the move; to lodge anywhere and settle nowhere; to learn all languages and bear all climes; to take up and to lay down the usages and interests of every

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people with which he mingles. Externally flexible to each variety of civilisation, he inwardly appropriates the features of none ; so that his characteristics, determined mainly by inheritance, have only the faintest local colouring ; and to know his country gives you hardly any preconception of himself.

Some factors, however, in the thought and character of Spinoza were certainly supplied by the home of his ancestors and the vicissitudes of Europe during the two preceding centuries. Spain has been called the Paradise of Jews : and if we looked no farther than the Moslem kingdom of Grenada, the phrase might be excused. Throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries they found there a legal protection and religious sympathy which Christendom refused them : their industry was welcomed ; their gains respected ; their worship and their schools unmolested. It is no wonder that they flocked with eagerness to so rare a shelter ; that in its genial air their intellectual activity expanded, and pressed into the new fields of poetry, science, and philosophy, to which they were invited by the Arabian literature and the libraries of Cordova and Grenada. The tolerant influence was felt throughout the whole Peninsula. The wealth and energy of the Jews were too valuable to impoverished nobles and helpless princes to be surrendered to Moorish use : in spite of clerical hatred and persecuting laws, the grandees and rulers of Leon and Castile contrived to commit their exchequer to Jewish financiers and their health to Jewish physicians, and to sell protection to Jewish residents, on the

plea that, as infidels, these people were not subjects of the State, but personal slaves of the territorial lord. Whether under the pretence of servitude or the reality of liberty, the family of Israel rapidly grew in numbers, opulence, and culture: nor do the ages of their dispersion show a more brilliant period than that which in Spain preceded the expulsion of the Moors. Rodriguez de Castro compiles from it a list, by no means complete, of more than a hundred rabbinical writers, in Spanish, in Arabic, in Hebrew, on mathematics, astronomy, and medicine; on grammar, literature, and history; on morals and philosophy;—a memorial, no doubt, mainly of forgotten labours, but dignified by the names of Maimonides, the Kimchis, Chasdai Kreskas, and Isaac Abarbanel.¹

It was an interlude of treacherous repose; which only gathered and decorated more and nobler victims for the sacrifice. The sovereigns (Ferdinand and Isabella) who drove out the Moors set up the Spanish Inquisition, and commissioned Torquemada, Deza, and Lucero, with the appliances of confiscation and the rack, of banishment and the stake, to make good Catholics of all the Jews. The faithful fled: the faithless succumbed, and transferred their moral taint from the synagogue to the church: the weak feigned conversion, but held to their first love, though under a disguise sometimes maintained to the third generation. It is impossible for whole multitudes to live out a lie

¹ Bibliotheca Espanola, tom. i., as cited and supplemented by J. M. Jost in his *Geschichte der Israeliten*, 7ter Theil, pp. 436-441.

and look like innocents : and it was from these "New-Christians," whose steps were dogged by the spies of the Inquisition, that regiments of prisoners were brought to the bar and hurried to the dungeon and the fire; more than 2000 perishing at the stake in the province of Seville within a single year.¹ In Portugal, these cruelties began later and remained lighter.² But throughout the Peninsula no Israelite could either reside in the country without renouncing his religion, or quit it without forfeiting the chief portion of his goods. So long as the two monarchies were separate, some hope might be found in flight across the border; for at the hour when persecution was awake in the one, it might be asleep in the other. But during the union of the crowns under the three Philips, the monotony of tyranny left no relief from despair.

Happily for the world that tyranny tried its strength upon a very different land, occupied by a race in itself of tougher fibre, and recently quickened by fresh religious faith and an imperative consciousness of independent moral life. The experiment, pursued through decades of agony, was doomed to defeat. In the Low Countries, the rack broke its victims by thousands; but was itself broken and destroyed by an indomitable people. For eighty years (1567-1647), with the exception of a twelve years' truce (1609-1621), they sustained the war which threw off the yoke of Spain. Early in that long struggle,—in 1579,—while as yet

¹ Jost, *Geschichte der Isr.*, vii. p. 77.

² Graetz, *Geschichte der Juden*, ix. 246-263.

there was no talk of political separation,—the Northern Provinces had agreed, in the “Union of Utrecht,” that every citizen “should remain free in his religion, and that no man should be molested or questioned on the subject of divine worship.”¹ Was ever north-wind so refreshing as that which bore these words to the skulking and hunted heretics of Spain? It was not long before this vision of religious peace began now and then to freight an unnoticed ship with fugitives from the Tagus or the Douro to the Rhine. The first Jewish colonists sailed from Oporto, probably in 1593, and after various adventures settled in Amsterdam; but, as their reversion from Catholicism exposed them to suspicion, no right of public worship was conceded to them till 1598, when a room was fitted up for them as a synagogue in the house of Samuel Pallache, the Jewish ambassador from the kingdom of Morocco. On the death of Pallache, six years after, this provisional arrangement ceased, and the first synagogue was built, to which the family of Spinoza was attached, and of which the teacher of his boyhood, Saul Levi Morteira, was sole president from 1616 to 1639, and then till 1660 as colleague with two other Rabbis from later congregations amalgamated with his own.²

Whether Michael d’Espinoza was among the young

¹ Motley’s *Rise of the Dutch Republic*, part vi. ch. i. sub fine.

² The earliest accounts of the Jewish settlement in Amsterdam are not perfectly consistent. For a critical notice of them, see Graetz, ix. Note 10. Comp. his narrative, ix. pp. 513-517, with Jost’s *Geschichte des Judenthums*, 3te Abth. pp. 197-199, where the consul receives the name *Pacheco*.

people in that first emigrant ship is not known. But the family connection with the oldest synagogue renders it highly probable; the second synagogue being the chief receptacle of later arrivals, especially of *Spanish* refugees. The name of the family pretty clearly refers it to the province of Leon, which contains no fewer than five towns bearing (with distinctive additions) the name Espinoza. Lying in different directions round the city of Burgos,—a considerable Jewish centre,¹—and being not remote from the frontiers of Portugal, these places are among the most likely sources of early escape by the western sea. An incidental evidence of this, with a still closer definition of locality, is furnished by the fact that at *Espinoza de los Monteros* (about 50 miles north of Burgos) the Jews, in return for protection once afforded them, paid to the rangers of the district an annual tax of 12 old maravedis on every copy of the Law in their synagogues.² Here probably was Michael's early home; and the Amsterdam tradition that he was Portuguese is sufficiently explained by his port of embarkation and the prevailing complexion of his synagogue. That the family became known thenceforth by the topographical appendage to their domestic name is only what we find in numerous other instances, *e.g.* Aquinas, Oliveyra, de

¹ Paul, a native and bishop of Burgos, through whose influence the "New-Christians" were removed in 1412 from all offices of honour and trust, on the ground that their change of religion was hypocritical, was himself a converted Jew, with the name of Solomon Hallevi. Jost's *Geschichte der Israeliten*, 7ter Theil, p. 62.

² *Op. cit.* 6ter Theil, p. 323.

Barrios, d'Aguilar, de la Vega, Leon, Pereira, de Lara ; all of which are personal names given by locality, and, except the first, within the range of Jewish experience.

It was no home of religious peace on which the refugees had alighted. They had taken advantage of large professions of toleration which were never meant for them, or indeed for more than a victorious majority of the persons who made them. They found themselves in an uncongenial community, which gave them no rights of worship or of citizenship, but which, pre-occupied with its own dissensions, left them in the security of indifference and contempt. They slipped unnoticed into settlement and fell into the habits of their race, by the passive connivance of a local magistracy, chiefly drawn from the more tolerant Arminian party in the State : and when the general question of their treatment was referred in Holland to a Commission of the Estates, they were already in occupancy ; and it was wisely resolved to let each city admit or exclude Jewish residents as it preferred ; only, if admitted, they were not to be obliged, as in other countries, to wear any distinctive badge. The Remonstrants (the Broad Churchmen of that day) have been charged with intolerance towards the Jewish colony, because they complained that, in Amsterdam, all sects, non-Christian as well as Christian, themselves alone excepted, were free to worship God according to their conscience.¹ But the inference which they draw

¹ See Graetz, ix. p. 526. Liberty of conscience was imperfectly appreciated by all parties in that generation. But the Arminians

from this inconsistency is not, that the synagogues should be closed ; it is, that Remonstrant churches should be allowed. And it is a fair argument to say, "What we ask from you requires a less stretch of liberality than you have already shown to be agreeable to your sense of right."

A generation sufficed to overcome the first difficulties of settlement in a new country : the industry, the enterprise, the conduct of the Jews, and not less their hatred of Spanish tyranny, secured them respect from their neighbours : and when Baruch Spinoza was born, there was nothing to hinder his regular training in the faith and culture of his people. Beyond the life of the home and the synagogue, there was open to the boy a Jewish High School, affording an education ascending through seven classes.¹ After passing through

opened the way to a better understanding of it : and it is perverse to hold them up to odium as its unworthy violators.

¹ Graetz, x. 9. This brilliant writer maintains in a note an opinion which he has not ventured to interweave with his text, viz. that Spinoza himself was a native of Spain and lived there till he was fourteen years of age. This he infers from the following reference, in a letter of Spinoza's, to a contemporary Jewish martyrdom : "*Ipse enim inter alios quendam Judam, quem fidum appellant, novi, qui in mediis flammis, quum jam mortuus crederetur, hymnum qui incipit—Tibi, Deus, animam meam offero canere incepit, et in medio cantu exspiravit*" (Ep. 76). This *auto-da-fé* of Judas the Faithful is known to have taken place at Valladolid on the 25th of July 1644 : so that, as a witness of it, Spinoza must have been still in Spain. Surely, a strange critical judgment ! (1.) Spinoza's birthday being November 24, 1632, his age in 1644 would be twelve, not fourteen. (2.) If we render "*Ipse novi*," "I myself *knew*," it does not follow from his knowing the man that he was present at his execution ;

the elementary stages, he would come under the influence of two teachers in succession, whose repute extended beyond their country and their time.

The younger of these, Manasse ben Israel (who would be forty-two when Spinoza was fourteen) was a native of Amsterdam, the son of a Portuguese exile and confessor; and had acquired, by the manifold relations of his family, in addition to his literary and sacred duties, the command of ten languages. His accomplishments as a linguist threw him into frequent intercourse with foreigners, and favoured the growth of an ease and tact and winning demeanour for which he became remarkable. There was something in his personality which kept every anti-Jewish prejudice at a distance: and when (in 1655) a negotiator was wanted to win from Cromwell and the Parliament permission for Jewish settlement in England, he was selected as the most persuasive envoy, and by his influence with the Protector opened here a new asylum for the outcasts. Quick of perception, pliant in sympathy, never indiscreet unless from vanity, he was a

if it does, must we apply the same inference to the "*alios*" among whom he stands? (3.) To bear this rendering, "*Noveram*" would be required: "*novi*" can only mean "*I know*" a man, *i.e.* the case of a man (among others), who did so and so. As this Judas was a near friend of R. Manasse ben Israel of Amsterdam, it is probable that Spinoza did personally know him, and was in the way of first-hand testimony to the incidents of his martyrdom. (4.) Even an assertion of Spinoza's personal presence at Valladolid in 1644 would not justify us in wiping out and reconstructing the tradition of his previous twelve years. Graetz, x. Note 1.

diplomat without insincerity; while the tone of his religious feeling touched many a chord in a Puritan heart, attuned as it was to the strain of Hebrew piety. Well read, though not profound as a scholar, he was most in his element as a preacher; his familiarity with the Scriptures and the Talmud seldom drawing him into criticism or philosophy, but furnishing endless lessons for the outer and inner life of men. He delivered his first sermon at fifteen. He died at Middelburg in 1657 on his way home from the English mission. Of his numerous writings only one has gained more than contemporary influence; but from the *Vindiciæ Judæorum* Moses Mendelssohn drew the materials for his defence of Judaism four generations later.

More eminent for Hebrew scholarship and more limited to it, was the senior Rabbi, Saul Levi Morteira, the leading Talmudist of Amsterdam. He had come thither in 1616 on a curious errand. In his native Venice he had become attached as a pupil to an eminent medical practitioner, Elias Montalto, who afterwards became physician to the French Queen, Mary de Medici, and remained in attendance on her wherever her Court might be. On one of her journeys, the physician was taken ill and died at Tours. For a Jew (as he was) there was no burial rite possible in France. So the queen had his body embalmed, and sent it, under escort of his son, his uncle, and Morteira, by way of Nantes, for interment at Ouderkerk, near Amsterdam. The young Morteira, then only twenty, having left a favourable impression, was induced by

his people to remain and undertake the synagogue service: and thus an accidental visit inaugurated his long career.¹ The local consideration which he enjoyed must be attributed to judgment and character in practical affairs: for both his preaching and erudition were commonplace enough; and the numerous Spanish MSS. which he left did not appear, even to friendly eyes, worthy of publication.

The characteristics of these two men would place the young Spinoza in very different relations to them. The sympathetic nature of Manasse would **take** the side of the boy's feeling, **and keep** him simply receptive; and if the biographers pass this teacher's name in silence, it is because of such quiet growth there is nothing to tell. Morteira's mental habits were sure to convert this docility into antagonism. Fond of the forms, but incapable of the spirit of philosophical thought, he could not fail to start more problems than he could solve; while his dogmatic temper would but fix the difficulties which he attempted to beat down. It is no wonder that, under such a master, the clear-witted boy of fifteen found matter for many puzzling questions in his Hebrew Bible and his Talmud; and met with answers more disturbing still. He had caught from his straightforward father an abhorrence of pious pretences, and could not be imposed upon by critical excuses and evasions: and when he got nothing better to help his perplexities, what could a modest and retiring youth do, but keep his difficulties to himself,

¹ Graetz, ix. 525; x. 10, Note 2.

in reserve for future and private scrutiny? Reticent for a while on biblical subjects, he gained a knowledge of Italian, probably from the Venetian Morteira; of French, perhaps from Manasse ben Israel; and of German, most likely from the same German acquaintance under whom, at a later time, he began the conquest of Latin.

These studies suffice to account for three or four years of suspended application to theology; especially if at the same time he served his apprenticeship to the art—of grinding optical glasses—by which he was to earn his bread. While he still lived in his father's house, not only filial deference, but the very presence of his mother and two sisters, would prolong his sympathy, or postpone his breach, with the domestic religion, and hold him content with neutral and secular pursuits. He would go with them to the synagogue; he would not desert the historic festivals. But that the thirst for Gentile culture was growing in him was indicated by his feeling the want of Latin, the great medium of intellectual intercourse in Europe. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries even the higher Jewish schools made no provision for the study of Greek or Latin.¹ Their most accomplished authors, though often wielding with ease the living languages of their time, rarely wrote in Latin, unless to dedicate

¹ Jost, speaking of the improved schools instituted by Jacobson and others about 1809, says, "Merkwürdig ist, das bei fast allen diesen Leistungen die eigentliche classische Vorschule vermisst wird. Griechen und Römer waren den meisten dieser Männer nur aus Uebersetzungen bekannt, und deren Geist ist in sie nicht gedrunge." Th. ix. 151.

a book or treat of some medical subject. There was even a religious distaste for classical scholarship, as the foster-mother of heathen admirations: and one of Spinoza's schoolfellows under Morteira, named Moses Zacuto, looked back upon his acquisition of Latin as a sin, and imposed upon himself a forty days' fast to wash the language from his memory and the stain from his conscience.¹ The opposite feeling of Spinoza, awakened by increasing acquaintance with Christian neighbours, foreshows the direction of his mind.

He could not, however, long acquiesce in a mere suspense of faith. Rabbinical authority having failed him, he determined to see for himself; and during some years (1650-1654) repeatedly read the Hebrew Scriptures and their most approved interpreters. Working silently and living blamelessly, he was passing through the most momentous crisis of his inner history. To what precise state of mind he was brought by the first collapse of his early theology, it is impossible to say: for even if, with Avenarius,² we date the two Dialogues incorporated with his Treatise on God and Man as early as 1651-2, nothing can be inferred from their crude and confused sentences, except that his philosophy was yet unformed. The incompleteness, however, was all on the affirmative side of his convictions: the rapid gathering of rabbinical clouds and bursting of thunders on his head clearly show the range and decisiveness of

¹ Graetz, x. 170.

² Ueber die beiden ersten Phasen des Spinozischen Pantheismus, v. Richard Avenarius, p. 105.

his negative conclusions. Naturalism had taken the place with him of the Supernatural; Reason, of Revelation; prediction by determinate causes, of imaginative visions by Prophets; Necessity, of Design; and the reckoning of human consequences, of threats from Divine anger. The Israelites, though having their function in the world, ceased to be a "covenanted people;" their annals were no more "sacred" than other history; their "Scriptures" fell back into the mass of ancient literature. He knew that he must be treated as an apostate. But having in him a good deal of the esoteric temper, and believing that, for the mass of men, the religious "imagination" did something of the work of truth, he was not eager to precipitate his exile; and still held his peace, so long as he ingenuously could.

Meanwhile, some new friendships opened to him which threw some side-currents into the main stream of his thought. From his honest biographer, the Lutheran pastor, Coler of the Hague, we learn that Spinoza, some time before his final alienation from the synagogue, had made acquaintance with several liberal-minded Christians, and become familiar with their modes of thought. Following the hint, that some of these were Mennonites,¹ we too may make some nearer acquaintance with them, and through them with the man who found their society congenial to him.

The earliest disaffection towards the mediæval Christianity assumed the form, not so much of doctrinal

¹ B. de S. Opera, Paulus, ii. p. 603.

rebellion, as of moral protest against the life which was deemed venial by the Church. It expressed the shock of conscience, the disappointment of spiritual aims, and the resolve to escape the slavery of worldly usage and accept the rule of a devout simplicity. This feature is more or less conspicuous in all the religious movements precursory to the Reformation, in those of the Albigenses, Wiclif, Savonarola, Tauler, and "the Friends of God;" and emphatically in that of Luther's independent contemporary, Menno Simons the Frieslander (born in 1492), from whom the Mennonites of Holland and their offshoots in other countries derive their name. He was ordained as a Catholic priest in 1516, and in the neighbourhood of Franeker exercised his functions for twenty years, but with a mind increasingly alienated from them by study of the Scriptures and of the Reformers' writings. Especially was he drawn towards the spiritual side of the Anabaptist gospel: and joining the professors of it in 1536, he visited, in their service, the chief maritime towns as far as Dantzic, organising or reviving their societies, and everywhere inducing them to repudiate the appeal to the sword which, under the misguidance of Rothman and John of Leiden, had been so fatal to their followers in Münster. He wrote in defence of his peace principles against John of Leiden, and entirely separated himself with his associates from the war-party, with which, in fact, he had little in common beyond the disapproval of infant baptism. The characteristics which his spirit transfused into his followers resembled partly those of the Herrn-

hüter, and partly those of the Society of Friends. Owning no priesthood, and no authoritative confession of faith, they left room for wide variations of teaching, which the rigorists amongst them could not, and the liberal would not, prevent. But amid all divergencies they were united in their scruple against oaths, their refusal to take arms or to accept civic office, their austere simplicity of habit, their brotherly equality, and the quiet plainness of their prayers and preaching. It attests the force of character in them, that even the unsparing impetuosity of Napoleon paused on the threshold of their communion in the Vosges and respected their right of exemption from the conscription. And if he refused to listen to the same plea in Holland, it was because they had ceased to present a united front of resistance to military claims, and their larger societies were not disinclined to yield.

Proscribed by the Emperor Charles V. in 1540, and first admitted to rights of association by William the Silent in 1581, these people sustained their religious life in private for forty years ; and, having to dispense with regular pastors and public services, provided the more assiduously for the domestic training and personal instruction of their members, one by one. An independent intelligence and freedom from clerical narrowness thus became diffused through the whole body, which came out of its exile better than it went in.

Eighty years later, a precisely similar cause produced, upon a smaller scale, a similar result. The Synod of Dordrecht, in 1618-9, played for the Calvin-

ists the part of the Catholic Emperor of the previous century: it excommunicated the Arminians, and put an interdict upon their worship: it consummated its labours by laying the head of the noblest living patriot—Oldenbarnevelt—upon the block, and consigning the most accomplished of living scholars—Grotius—to prison. It occurred to four brothers, van der Kodde by name,—all of them farmers,—that, if pastors and churches were not to be allowed, they could do without them. They might be driven away from “this mountain” and shut out of “Jerusalem;” but God was a Spirit, as near as before. The preachers might be silenced and banished; but the truth which they preached could not go into exile with them: belonging to the nature of things, it might still be found by those who stay among the dykes as by those who take ship upon the sea. So these brothers gathered a fellowship of the proscribed Remonstrants around them for mutual help in the Christian life, with nothing to disturb the equality of all except the diversity of gifts.¹ Their conferences were not churches (*ἐκκλησίαι*), but “*Collegia*,” and so escaped the penal laws; and the members were “*Collegianten*.” This small

¹ It is a doubtful point whether the Collegianten are to be regarded as a branch of the Remonstrants or of the Mennonites. They are claimed for the latter by the historians of the sect; and, on their authority, by the late Mr. Robert Barclay in his interesting volume—“The Inner Life of the Religious Societies of the Commonwealth,” p. 89. And it is certain that, if they did not bring with them at their origin, they soon adopted several of the Mennonite characteristics, *e.g.* adult baptism by immersion, and objection to oaths and military service. On the other hand, their first appearance in 1619, in imme-

flock, eyed by no official watch-dogs, spread over wider pastures than usually belong to any ecclesiastical fold. Freer in thought and more intent upon character than sects professionally governed, it had much the same catholicity that the more liberal Mennonites had brought out of persecution : and so much did their affinities draw them together, that by the end of the last century the younger and smaller body had melted away into the larger.

The tradition of Spinoza's friendships within both these communions is confirmed by significant facts. Among these it may seem strange to reckon the publication, by a Collegiant, John Bredenberg, of an *answer* ("enervatio") to Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise.¹ But so pervaded is the book with the philosopher's own conceptions as to betray the hand of an ally, and suggest that the seeming attack is a masked defence.² More certain is it that the correspondent to whom Spinoza addressed four of his published letters, and who was his local agent when he had quitted Amsterdam, was Jarrig Jellis, an active Mennonite.³ Moreover, it

diate sequence upon the Decrees of the Dordrecht Synod, can hardly be an accidental coincidence ; and turns the balance of probability in favour of Baur's and Hagenbach's derivation of them from the excommunicated Remonstrants. See Ferd. Chr. Baur's *Kirchengeschichte* ; der neueren Zeit. IV. p. 431, and Hagenbach, ap. Herzog's *Encyklop. Collegianten*.

¹ Trendelenburg, *Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie*, iii. p. 280.

² See a curious account of his book in Bayle's *Dictionary*, Art. Spinoza, p. 2774 ; Bredenberg, however, insisted on his belief in free-will, human and divine.

³ Epp. 39-41, 44.

was in the Baptist Orphan-house, formerly belonging to the Collegiants at Amsterdam, that autographs were found, twenty years ago, of unpublished or partially published letters of Spinoza.¹

What was it that attracted Spinoza to these simple-minded Christians at this crisis of his inward history? Not any help which they could give to his biblical doubts or his speculative problems: for they were plain tradesmen, without erudition or philosophy. Still less, any conversion to their faith: for the undermining of Judaism was, with him, the prevention of Christianity. But the inwardness of their religion, which set it free from the letter of history and law, and made it a simple relation between the finite and infinite mind, was a welcome relief from an exclusive ritual and incredible traditions. Their pure ideal of duty, their fraternal union, their tolerance amid intolerance, and not least the political fidelity they had shown to the wise and heroic upholders of the Republic, moved him to admiration and sympathy. How deeply his usually calm nature was stirred by the orthodox fury which, a generation before, had silenced the truest counsellors of the State and shed the blood of her noblest citizens, is evinced by the allusions in the following passage:—

“Men are so made as to resent nothing more impatiently than to be treated as criminal for opinions which they deem true, and charged as guilty for just what wakes their affection to God and men. Hence, laws about opinion are aimed not at the base but at the noble, and tend not to restrain the evil-minded but

¹ Van Vloten, B. de Sp. Supplementum ad Op., Pref. i. and p. 293.

rather to irritate the good, and cannot be enforced without great peril to the Government. Moreover, such laws are absolutely useless ; for those who hold the proscribed opinions to be sound, will not be able to obey the law ; while those who reject them as false, take up the legal sentence against them as their right, and so glory in it, that the Government cannot abrogate it when it would. . . . How much better would it be to restrain the passion and fury of the crowd, than to set up unavailing laws, violable only by the lovers of virtue and culture, and to hedge in the commonwealth till it cannot bear its free-souled men ? What evil can be imagined greater for a State, than that honourable men, because they have thoughts of their own and cannot act a lie, are sent as culprits into exile ? What more baneful than that men, for no guilt or wrong-doing, but for the generous largeness of their mind, should be taken for enemies and led off to death, and that the scaffold, the terror of the bad, should become, to the signal shame of authority, the finest stage for the public spectacle of endurance and virtue, in a supreme example ? For men conscious of rectitude do not dread death like the wicked : they shrink from none of your punishments, their mind being wrung by no compunction for any base deed : they deem it not punishment, but on the contrary an honour to die for a good cause, and for liberty, a glory. What kind of example, then, do you set up by shedding such men's blood,—for acts of which the weak and dull know nothing, which are hateful only to the factious, and lovely to the good.”¹

With sentiments like these, Spinoza found those obscure Dissenters preoccupied and inspired : and in forming friendships among them, he followed an intense fellow-feeling. That a youth of two-and-twenty, on the eve of an estrangement from all that was dear in the past, should be drawn, in feeling after new associates, by the simple charm of piety, truthfulness, and

¹ Tract. Theo.-Pol. c. xx., Van Vloten and Land, I. 607-8.

charity, and should not miss it, however hidden in the shade, marks the clearness of his moral nature.

During the same years he fell in with a companion of a very different kind; a certain Van den Ende, half doctor, half schoolmaster, who undertook to push Spinoza on in his Latin, in return for help in teaching his pupils. By this arrangement he became a resident usher in the master's house, and was brought under the influence of a vigorous, accomplished, but reckless mind. Van den Ende was a scientific materialist, without theology; and with so active an aversion to the beliefs he had renounced, that though his connection as preceptor with the rich families of Amsterdam counselled him to silence, his prudence could not always hold out against the inward urgency of his satire and contempt. Even a few instances in which his conversation broke bounds would suffice to alarm the vigilant decorum of Dutch Protestantism. Cried down at last by a clergy more easily fluttered by sallies of wit than by assaults of argument, he was obliged to change his residence; at first, apparently, to Antwerp; but, in 1671, to Paris, where in the following year Leibniz found him at the head of a boarding-school in the Faubourg St. Antoine.¹ From either too much science or too little pliancy, he made no way as a

¹ See his *Théodicée*, P. iii. § 376. In this paragraph Leibniz mixes up incidents of different date; his intercourse with Spinoza at the Hague in November 1676; and his acquaintance with Van den Ende at Paris in 1672-3. This Dutch name was there translated into *Franciscus* (*François*) *a Finibus*.

medical practitioner; but he had great gifts as a teacher, which for a while served him well in Paris as before in Amsterdam. He had given his daughters a learned education, qualifying them for partnership in his school. Spinoza read Latin with the elder; and Leibniz found a younger sister¹ able to converse in that language.

Again, however, he was his own enemy. He had carried to the metropolis of the "Grand Monarque" a strong attachment to the Republic with which France was at war: and his rash tongue found him favour with the disloyal, and marked him out as a likely subject for the solicitations of the disaffected. He was persuaded to join in a conspiracy for delivering Quillebœuf to the Dutch, and raising an insurrection in Normandy, in the hope of relieving Holland by such a diversion. No public motive actuated his accomplices. Two *roués*, one, the Chevalier de Rohan, of social rank, and the other, Latruaumont, of military,—with fortunes wrecked by their vices; one "*femme galante*," the Marquise de Villiers Bordeville; and an officer, Préault, too young to be characterised,—had formed the plot, from various promptings mostly of the Catilinarian kind. Suspicion being roused by Rohan's large drafts on London, the English Government set Louis on the watch. The conspirators were seized, Latruaumont being fatally wounded in the process: the rest were executed in front of the Bastille November 27, 1674;

¹ In its connexion we may fairly put this construction on the phrase "*une jeune fille*."

the chief carnifex undertaking the high-born folks, but contemptuously delivering the schoolmaster into the hands of his subordinates. It was the last time that men could teach him to know his place; and the opportunity was not to be lost.

So tragically did the man disappear from the scene who befriended Spinoza and gave him a home through several anxious years. What influence Van den Ende had upon his young friend we have no means of defining. The curt statement,—chiefly French,—“he taught him atheism,” does not accord with the facts, as we shall see. But in Van den Ende’s house he first drew breath in a *scientific* atmosphere, and strongly felt both the attraction and the perplexities of the ultimate problems of natural knowledge. The doubts which had hitherto set him at variance with his Hebrew masters were concerned with historical and traditional theology, and the rabbinical metaphysics that upheld it. He now saw the beliefs which had been undermined within him assailed by weapons from a different armoury, and with the peculiar scorn and daring which, from Epicurus downward, has characterised the materialist school. Too modest to be infected, too clear to be overpowered, by mere confident dicta, he would at least be roused by Van den Ende’s sceptical raillery to see for himself what the physical sciences had to say on the questions which he had approached from another side. His studies would take a new direction; and, turning from the spoken thoughts of men in the literature of religion, would try to read the silent language

of the cosmical order respecting its own source and essence.

With this wakening of scientific curiosity his anxiety for a more thorough command of Latin had a natural connection. Descartes had become the Choregus of intellectual reform in Europe, and drew after him such of the younger spirits as could follow the precision of his analysis and grasp the largeness of his results. In the university lecture-rooms, in the learned societies,—nay, even in Church synods,—he was expounded or refuted or proscribed ; and, if you could not talk about him, you were as benighted as the impossible modern that should never have heard of Darwin. But Descartes wrote his two great works—the *Meditations* and the *Principia*—in Latin ; and though, at the date we have reached in Spinoza's life, both were accessible in French, yet at Amsterdam the local Elzevir editions held their exclusive ground. Latin was still the general language of philosophical literature. It had been resorted to by Descartes and his correspondents in the objections and answers, which form a necessary commentary on his *Meditations* ; and translations were intended for only the special circulation of the less learned in each country. At a time then when the recent death of the philosopher (in 1650) had rather revived than laid to rest the partisan interest with which, a few years before, his doctrines had agitated Holland, it is no wonder if Spinoza was eager to read, think, and write with ease in the language of the master of sciences.

Auerbach has painted¹ with much psychological truth, the charmed surprise of the delicate youth,—a gentle-minded Jew, transplanted from the strict and tasteless Hebrew home, to the free-thinking physician's house, and introduced in one room to a museum of science, in another to paintings by great masters ranging in subject from undraped beauties of the Greek mythology to the homely but tender effects of the Dutch landscape. If the change came to him as a new birth, quickening dormant admirations and detecting unsuspected affinities of thought, his mood would be favourable to other susceptibilities; and we might well, with the novelist, believe the tradition that Spinoza gave his heart to the daughter of the house,—the Olympia of the tale, the Clara Maria of fact. As she is known, however, to have married another, there is an uncomfortable gap between the beginning and the end of the relation. And how should rumour fill it up better than by telling that the successful Diedrich Kerckkrinck, a fellow-scholar of Spinoza, made up for want of genius by abundant wealth, and being a handsome fellow into the bargain, easily cut out the olive-faced philosopher by the bribe of a pearl necklace and a good address.² But here romance, not for the first time, gets itself into a scrape by neglect of dates. Dr. Van Vloten, provokingly

¹ Spinoza, ein Denkerleben, von Berthold Auerbach. See especially 9, 10.

² See Sebastian Kortholt's preface to the book *De tribus Impositoribus* (Lord Herbert of Cherbury, Hobbes, Spinoza), 2d edn.

turning to the register of this marriage on February 5, 1671, finds that the bride was then 27 years of age, and could not have been more than 12 in 1655, the reputed time of the rivalry for her hand.¹ Moreover, as Kerckkrinck (then 32) was 7 years younger than Spinoza, they are not likely to have been simultaneous pupils of Van den Ende at an age when they could stand in each other's way. It is possible enough, however, that they may have played the part of lover to the young lady *successively*; for, though Spinoza was no longer in the city after 1656, he was within an easy walk of it on the Ouderkerk road for five years more.² He would not fail to keep up his intimacy with the Van den Ende family; and nothing could be more natural than that the friendship begun in a common love of Virgil and Cicero should turn, at the ages of 17 and 29, into love of each other. But the lens-grinder was penniless, and sure to remain so: he soon removed to a distance, and became absorbed in a more ideal love-suit—to immortal truth: and if the mortal maiden left him to the pursuit, and, after ten

¹ Supplementum ad B. de Sp. Opera, p. 290.

² Trendelenburg places the removal to Rhijnsburg in 1660 (Historische Beiträge, iii. 279). But the first trace of his presence there is the opening letter (dated Aug. 26, 1661) sequent on the personal visit of Oldenburg to him. Moreover, there is nothing to invalidate the statement of Lucas and Boulanvilliers (see their text, as corrected by Paulus, B. de S. Opera, ii. 615, note), that *two years* were spent at Rhijnsburg: and from the 13th letter we learn that he was removing his furniture thence in April 1663. We thus detain him near Amsterdam till 1661. Coler erroneously postpones his removal till 1664.

patient years, gave her hand to one who was both able to offer her a home and did not forget that matrimony is the crown of love, we can hardly accuse her of worldly fickleness. If Spinoza ever indulged more glowing dreams, he accepted his loneliness with a calm content, taking no notice henceforth of womankind. It is curious, even in the case of a philosophical correspondence, to read through eighty modern letters without a greeting to a lady or the mention of a child. The scanty references, in his *Ethics*, to this side of human life are not so ideal as to make us wish for more.

The changed direction of Spinoza's tastes and studies could not escape the notice of his rabbinical instructors; and the jealousy it would excite may be illustrated by a parallel case of which the story is told in the Talmud. After the Macedonian conquests had opened the East to Hellenic civilisation, it soon became the ambition of the younger Orientals to acquire the culture of the conquerors; and in the second century B.C., the "Greek wisdom" (*Sapientia Ionica*), passing from Egypt into Palestine, obtained a hold on the Jewish mind; and, exciting a distaste for the rigour of "the Law," called forth from the Rabbis repeated prohibitions. Under these conditions, a nephew of the Rabbi Ismael asked his uncle, "Is it permissible for me, who have learned the whole sacred Law, to make a study of the Greek wisdom?" Then his uncle impressed upon him the saying (Josh. i. 8), "'Let not the Book of the Law depart out of thy mouth, but meditate therein day and night.' Now find, if you can, an hour that belongs to

neither day nor night; and *that* you may devote to the 'Greek wisdom.'"¹ In the middle of the seventeenth century, the conservative synagogue looked with similar suspicion on the "Latin wisdom," which carried in it not only the heathen thought of past ages, but the rising sciences and new philosophy of the present.

This feeling approached Spinoza first in the inquisitiveness (probably prompted) of two companions, who, on the pretence of doubts of their own, wormed out of him several heretical opinions; as, that the Scriptures identify the *soul* with *life*, and treat it as *mortal*; that they regard *spirits* or *angels*, not as realities, but as *phantoms*; that, in calling God *great*, they attribute to Him *extension*, *i.e.* *body*. He soon had reason to repent of his confidences. His conversations were reported to the chiefs of the synagogue. He was summoned before them, to meet his companions as witnesses against him, that he had derided the Jews as ignorant of Physics and Theology, and praised their Law as a piece of adroit management of unruly men. The real breach was too wide to be bridged by verbal explanations. Assertions of innocence on the one side, warnings, bribes, menaces, a conceded term for recantation on the other, were alike unavailing; and not till all had been tried, either in private or in the court,² was he at last, on the 27th July 1656, formally

¹ Tract. Menachoth., fol. 99, as quoted by A. F. Gfrörer, in his *Philo und die jüdisch-alexandrinische Theosophie*, ii. 351.

² The bribes were private, the threats in court. He had been offered 1000 gulden a year if he would hold his peace and show himself in the synagogue now and then.

excommunicated. The ban sets forth that, "Whereas the heads of the Church Council have for some time past been aware of Baruch de Espinoza's evil opinions and doings, they have tried by various methods and promises to withdraw him from his evil ways; but as they have been so little able to effect any improvement in him that they have daily become more aware of his dreadful heresies in act and word, and his outrageous ways of going on, and as they have had many trustworthy witnesses who, in his presence, have given evidence proving these things, they have decided, after full investigation, in the presence of the learned Rabbis and with their assent, to anathematise the said Espinoza and cut him off from the people of Israel. Herewith accordingly they place him under anathema, as follows." Then comes the curse, invoking on him God's unrelenting and pursuing wrath, and forbidding any one to hold commerce with him by speech or pen, to enter the same house with him or come within six feet of him, to do him any kindness, or read anything of his.¹

Before the publication of this amiable document from the synagogue pulpit, Spinoza had quitted Amsterdam. The proceedings against him had excited to fury the intolerance of some zealot, who thought that a dagger would be quicker than a curse, and struck at him on his exit from some public place, either theatre or synagogue.² Seeing the assailant, he evaded the

¹ For the document in full see Van Vloten, *Supplem.*, 290.

² Bayle says the former; Coler, correcting him, the latter. Graetz adheres to Bayle, on the ground that Spinoza was excommunicated on

blow, and escaped with only his mantle pierced; but warned of his danger, he left the city, and took up his abode with a Collegiant friend, who lived two or three miles out on the Ouderkerk road. In place of a protest in person against the ban, he presented a defence in writing, which is no longer extant as a whole, though parts of it are probably incorporated with his Theologico-Political Treatise. The fact that its language was *Spanish*, though addressed to a Portuguese synagogue, deserves remark as an additional indication of his father's native land.

account of his never coming to the synagogue. But Coler was, on this point, careful and apparently well informed.—Bayle's Dict. Hist. et Crit. iii. p. 1767; B. de S. Opera, Paulus, ii. p. 604; Graetz, x. 176, note.

CHAPTER II.

TO AND AT RHIJNSBURG—1656-1663.

OF Spinoza's life during his five years in his friend's country-house nothing is directly recorded beyond the fact that he prosecuted his optician's work and, by private aid in disposing of his lenses, earned an adequate livelihood. But we are not without indirect means of reading the inward history of this period. It was distinctively the time of his mastery of Descartes. Everything tended to make this his immediate end. He had won his Latin. He had crossed the threshold of the exact sciences, pure and applied, and felt the fascination of their method. He was now the intimate associate of Arminians, whom the Synod of Dordrecht had thrown into alliance with Descartes by anathematising both; and with the particular section of the Arminians which, in virtue of its thorough resilience from tradition upon the inner reason, was known as "Cartesian." This sympathy between the new philosophy and a school of Christian theology had indeed no deeper root than the party relations of the time; but these sufficed to give it great intensity. The Calvinists dreaded and hated Descartes' commendation of universal doubt as the condition of

finally clear conviction; and resented his defence of freewill, as incompatible with their doctrine of absolute decrees. Of these two characteristics, the first had no alarm for the Arminians, especially of the left wing, who believed in an intuitive or rational apprehension of God; and the second was a welcome support to the chief ground of their "Remonstrance." They could console themselves for their exclusion from every divinity chair in the universities, if in the adjacent lecture-room a Cartesian professor expounded, in the name and language of philosophy, the essence of their principles to a crowd of enthusiastic youths. To this anomalous combination of conflicting teachings Descartes himself attributes the bitterness of his orthodox opponent, Voetius, the Rector of Utrecht¹: "His great animosity towards me is due to there being a Professor at Utrecht who teaches my philosophy (Leroy); and his disciples, after a taste of my way of reasoning, have such a contempt for the common one as to ridicule it without disguise. This has excited an extreme jealousy of him on the part of all the other Professors, of whom Voetius is the chief; and they daily importune the magistracy to prohibit this way of teaching."²

The more the liberal theology developed itself, the more marked became its alliance with the new philosophy. The principle which Cocceius (Johann Koch) laid down purely in the interest of scholarship, that

¹ For a lively account of their controversy, see Mahaffy's *Descartes*, ch. ix.

² *Lettre au R. P. Mersenne* (1642); Cousin's *Desc.* viii. p. 613.

the interpreter must go to the Scriptures with a mind divested of all dogmatic assumptions, was little else than a particular case of Descartes' rule of seeking truth by thinking away our preconceptions; and he was accordingly denounced as professing a theology "quam vere *αὐτοδίδακτος* a nullo præceptore hauserat." It was an unconscious concurrence, however, for he was then unacquainted with the writings of Descartes. But his pupils at Leiden, Heidan and Burmann, became pronounced disciples and advocates of Cartesianism, as inseparable from their distinctive theology. And so well understood became this alliance, that it was a favourite object of controversial reproach: "*διπλοὺν κάππα*" (double stars), says Alberti of Leipzig (1678), "Cartesianismus et Coccejanismus, Belgis hodie molesti, nobis suspecti."¹

Under the roof of his Collegiant friend Spinoza would be in contact with both these factors of the rising *Zeitgeist*; and was certainly surrendered to it with the zeal essential to one who was to modify it from its own interior. He became the leading spirit of a little band of Cartesians, chiefly medical students or practitioners, including his subsequent correspondents, Simon de Vries, Dr. John Bresser, and Lodewijk Meyer, known as the editor of his posthumous works. At first these friends probably held simply the attitude of learners towards Descartes, and discussed his doctrines and method with each other only as an aid to their

¹ Das akademische Leben des 17ten Jahrhunderts, von Dr. A. Tholuck, ii. 230.

clearer apprehension. But in this process the critical spirit could not fail to awake. The keen eye of Spinoza for every weakness would mark the points which needed strengthening. And if, as is probable, he already began to give lessons to private pupils in the new scientific method, he would become conscious, in expounding it, of whatever difficulty it left unsolved. His first essays at independent speculation would naturally address themselves to the remedy of such felt defects ; they would work out special problems, recasting the reasoning, or filling the lacunæ, of an accepted philosophy, without pretending to be the draft, or even the materials, of an original system.

Specimens of such exercises have been fortunately preserved to us, though they were unknown to the editor of his posthumous works, and have slept in the dark for nearly two centuries. Probably as a parting legacy to his group of friends, when he was leaving the neighbourhood of Amsterdam, he wrote a "Short Treatise on God, on Man and his well-being," which would serve them as a text-book of his thoughts upon the greatest themes. As it was not printed, and, with the maturing of his convictions, rapidly passed into a mere preliminary study for his final work, it dropped out of sight and remembrance, till in 1852 a vestige of it came in the way of Edward Boehmer of Halle, a man who well knew how to follow the tracks of lost treasures. He had already remarked that a certain compend of doctrine, with enclosed geometrical proof, contained in Spinoza's second letter to Oldenburg, did not accord

with anything in his published writings, and must have been taken from some other draft of his intellectual scheme; and he may therefore well have been on the look-out, during an autumn ramble in Holland, for some missing remains of the philosopher. In the shop of a literary bookseller (Friederich Müller) he found, attached to a copy of Coler's "Life," *an abstract* of the suspected Treatise. The contents being thus known, it became easy to identify a Dutch manuscript, purchased by Müller at an auction shortly after, with the Treatise itself.¹ It professed to be, like Spinoza's Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy which accompanied it, a translation from the Latin original: and its Latinisms make the profession superfluous. It can be traced to the hand of John Monnikoff, city surgeon of Amsterdam, in the middle of the last century. In 1862 it appeared in print, edited by Van Vloten, accompanied by a re-translation into Latin, and by some recovered portions of Spinoza's correspondence, as well as by his treatise on the Rainbow which, appearing anonymously ten years after his death, had never been recognised as his, but treated as lost. On this "Supplement" of Van Vloten is based the greater part² of the critical literature which the "Short Treatise" has called forth. But afterwards another Dutch manuscript was found, which has come down from the latter half of the seventeenth century, and which reflects the original text in a superior translation. There is fair evidence that it was the property, and perhaps the work, of William Deur-

¹ Supplementum, Præf.

² *i.e.* All before the year 1869.

hoff, in his youth a contemporary disciple of Spinoza's. In deference to the higher authority of this manuscript, Professor Schaarschmidt, deeming the earlier text unsatisfactory, re-edited the Treatise with a lucid and scholarly introduction,¹ and afterwards furnished it with an admirable German translation.²

In order to give this recovered Treatise its true significance, we should regard it, not as the first draft of a projected work, but as the first landing-place of his mind in its independent advance. To a large extent it is a reproduction of Descartes, in its ontology, its conception of method, and its psychology and classification of the passions. But there are marked deviations which, though few, are of supreme importance. He adopts the Determinist theory. He makes the Actual and the Possible co-extensive, and so identifies Nature and God. And the human phenomena he interprets on the principles of automatic naturalism. All these are in fact but different aspects of one thorough-going change; and are separately mentioned only because they alter the soil and the fruits of different fields. The wonder is that so vital a modification should make so little show, and leave the Treatise with still so Cartesian a look.

¹ B. de S. "Korte verhandeling van god, de mensch en deezelfs welstand;" tractatuli deperditi de deo et homine ejusque felicitate versio Belgica. Ad antiquiss. cod. fidem edidit et præfatus est Car. Schaarschmidt. Amstel. 1869.

² B. de S. kurzgefasste Abhandlung von Gott, dem Menschen und dessen Glück. Aus dem Holländischen in's Deutsche übersetzt und mit einem Vorwort begleitet von C. Schaarschmidt, Prof. in Bonn. 2d Aufl. Berlin, 1874.

In its structure it is not quite homogeneous. Two dialogues are incorporated in it, which are evidently earlier pieces, awkwardly patched in. And it is followed by an appendix, which is a distinct document; and is probably a first attempt to throw the scheme of doctrine into "geometrical" form. It is doubtless a little later than the Treatise; written, however, before he had fully conceived the conditions of his attempt: for starting with axioms, he gives no definitions; without which (as he soon became aware) the essence of "geometrical form" is missed.¹ All these constituent elements of the "Short Treatise" as published must be prior to the second letter, September 1661; they record, therefore, the engagements and mental history of the previous four or five years. They present Spinoza to us in his transition from the Cartesian position to his own; and imply, by the occasion of their production, that he was already gathering a school around him which looked up to his authority, and, when out of reach of his voice, needed his written word.

In the repose of his country retreat, when the stress of his necessary studies was over, Spinoza would be at liberty, in the intervals of severer application, to indulge and improve the taste for *drawing*, which was a source of refreshment to him through life. With no more elaborate materials than chalk and charcoal, he threw off portraits of his friends and of the many distinguished

¹ See Trendelenburg, *op. cit.* iii. 301, 309; and Sigwart, *op. cit.* 136-144; and Avenarius, *op. cit.* Anhang, especially p. 86, Note 135; and Ginsberg, *Ethik des S.*, Einleitung, pp. 28-29.

men who crossed his path. One, less slightly executed, Coler had seen, in which the artist represented himself in the costume of Masaniello, the insurgent leader of the Neapolitan populace. Is it fanciful to see in this the cast of his political admirations? The story was but ten years old : that it dwelt upon his imagination at least shows that his attention was alive to the vicissitudes of the Spanish monarchy. It was more than a century after, that Meissner turned to account the dramatic elements of that historical episode.

AT RHJNSBURG.

Among the apocryphal additions to Coler's memoirs of Spinoza is a statement that the Rabbis followed up their anathema by charging him with blasphemy before the municipal magistrates, and pressing for a decree of banishment against him. To get rid of them, the magistrates refused to act without the opinion of the Protestant clergy. To this body, accordingly, the Jews, suppressing their hatred out of greater hatred to Spinoza, applied themselves with such success as to carry back into the city court a common requisition for the expulsion of the accused, though neither clergy nor magistrates thought the charge made good. The sentence, however, was passed, and was the occasion of his retreat with his Collegiant friend. This story, unsupported by personal or documentary evidence, has every internal mark of fiction. The Amsterdam magistrates were eminent for their firm guardianship of every citizen's rights. No law can be cited under which the alleged

charge could be brought. If it existed, it would give the clergy no voice in the case, but must be executed by the civil power. The alleged offence included no overt act of public speech or writing, and was evidenced only by the hearsay of private conversation. And the sentence is said to have been passed by a tribunal conscious of its injustice. Some of these improbabilities would be lessened if the incident were transferred to the close of his sojourn near his native city, and made the occasion of his removal. By that time he had become the centre of a club of ardent young men, heated with the "new wine" of heretical opinion, and not unlikely to commit him by rash use of written as well as oral teachings of his. If, in their alarm, the friends of these young men raised the plea that, under his influence, a new and dangerous *sect* was in process of growth, it would not be wholly without plausibility, or out of character with the temper which was already aiming at the legal suppression of Cartesianism.¹ The magistrates, who would not act on the prompting of a Jewish anathema on an unknown youth, might listen to complaints, reaching them from families of influence, against one who, in spite of his retired habits, was in effect becoming an heresiarch and spreading disaffection to the religion of the land.

But it needs no civil process to explain Spinoza's

¹ The Leiden Edict of final proscription against the Cartesian philosophy, for resistance to which the venerable Heidan was deposed from his chair, was not passed till 1675. But it had been preceded by earlier edicts restricting the liberty of teaching the doctrines of the school.

removal from the neighbourhood of Amsterdam. The change probably originated with his host and friend; who, as a Collegiant, found it agreeable to go and live among members of the same religious body at Rhijnsburg, near Leiden. Their central institution was at this village; and their presence was so marked a feature of the place that they were as often called Rhijnsburgers as Collegiants. To Spinoza their freedom of mind and simplicity of habit were congenial; and he simply shared the movements of his companion; though perhaps not sorry, on his own account, to place at a greater distance his embarrassing relations with his family and the lost friends of his early life.

The two years at Rhijnsburg, though wholly uneventful, were probably among the most fruitful in his mental history. At their beginning, his intellectual relations to Descartes, clearly defined on the subject of determinism, were otherwise in a very unsettled condition; at their end, had attained their final exactness. In this interval, his speculative system was wrought out in its full proportions in his mind, so as to bring ontology, physics, ethics, politics, into one organism. And to reach this comprehensive result was impossible without the consciousness that what he had to propound was a new and original philosophy, which it was his life-work to impart as a *κτῆμα εἰς ἀεί* for the world. The matter on which he was still not clear was the best *method* and order of exposition. His mind was made up that geometry afforded the true model of cogent consecutive reasoning: and he would throw his

scheme of thought into propositions, linked into a close chain of deduction. But from what list of primary assumptions to make the start, and how to divide it between axioms and definitions, and by what means to render the definitions fruitful without turning them into something more than definitions, was as yet by no means determined, and was subject to frequent reflection and experiment with him. His "Short Treatise," its Appendix, his Correspondence, and his Ethics, all exhibit (within the compass of three or four years) different modes of handling the same conceptions for the purposes of proof. To rid himself of this wavering, by a deliberate *study of Method*, was the principal aim of his reading and meditation at Rhijnsburg.

He had a pupil living with him there to whom he gave lessons in the Cartesian Natural Philosophy. For his text-book he chose the second part, with some sections of the third, of Descartes' *Principia Philosophiæ*; omitting the metaphysical prelude contained in the first as unsuited to the mediocre capacity which he had to reach.¹ But the same consideration induced him to set aside, in the books which he expounded, Descartes' analytical way of resolving concrete facts

¹ The anonymous pupil was probably the Albert Burgh who, afterwards becoming a Roman Catholic, addressed to Spinoza the letter (No. 67) of September 5, 1675, in hope of converting him,—a curious specimen of arrogant commonplace and sacerdotal vulgarity. It met with a short and trenchant reply (No. 76). From Rhijnsburg (February 1663, Suppl. p. 297), Spinoza speaks of him with dislike and distrust, though with hope that he will outgrow his flightiness and his preference of novelty to truth. Meanwhile, there is no one against whom he is more on his guard in the expression of opinion.

and picking out of them the properties he wanted, as he went along ; and to substitute the synthetic order, fore-announcing what he intended to treat as fundamental, and advancing thence to the series of inferences implicitly involved. The one procedure might be good for the discoverer ; the other was the instrument for the teacher ;—and not for him alone, but for any one who would rigorously *test* alleged discoveries. He therefore recast his text-book into the form of geometrical deduction : and this exercise, with his experience of its didactic value, probably fixed his ideas of Method, and gave shape to his project for his own philosophy : the more so, because he was persuaded to apply the same transformation to the first book of the *Principia*, and found that its metaphysics yielded to the process not less readily than the doctrine of bodies.

These abstracts of Descartes were published with his name in 1663, with an appendix of “Metaphysical Thoughts,” containing many useful explanations of difficult terms, and some lines of reasoning which seem to open the way to his own philosophy. Yet they perplex us by presenting still an elaborate defence of Freewill, which he is said to have long renounced. His editor, Meyer, excuses him by saying that, in teaching his pupil, he felt bound to sink his personality and remain the mere representative of Descartes. But if so, it is strange that these “Thoughts” should stand as the recognized indication of philosophical advance from Descartes to Spinoza.¹

¹ In his relations with his Rhijnsburg pupil, and the publication

Of the two years which led up to this publication we should know nothing, were it not that here his correspondence comes into play ; and, in spite of its impersonal character, gives many a glimpse into the course of his mind and work. Its opening exhibits him in relations of amity with a man so remote from him in genius and disposition, that one is more surprised at the number of letters which passed between them than at a certain *malaise* and guardedness that pervades the whole set.

Heinrich Oldenburg of Bremen had come over to

arising out of them, it is difficult to acquit Spinoza of resorting to something like the Catholic "Disciplina Arcani." The origin of the book he explains (Ep. 13) by saying that it was mainly prepared for dictation to a youth "whom he did not wish openly to instruct in his opinions"—a phrase which seems to imply that he did not mean to guard against an indirect infiltration of his doctrine. He cautions his confidants at Amsterdam (Suppl. p. 297) on no account to communicate his opinions to this youth. His concealment goes beyond the limits of mere reserve : in the *Cogitata Metaphysica* (which doubtless give his elucidations of the dictated propositions) he is no longer the mere mouthpiece of the *Principia*, but constructs arguments of his own on behalf of Freewill which (according to Meyer) he did not believe. Whatever his obligation to represent, without criticising, Descartes, it did not require him to leave a false impression *in propria persona*. But neither is he consistently faithful to Descartes : his metaphysical annotations introducing new divisions and independent discussions, which belong to his own philosophy. His reticence therefore seems to be a mixed result of conscientiousness towards his pupil and personal prudence. The extreme value which he set upon the latter is excused by the intolerance of his age ; but it abates the interest of his character, to come across the frequent sentiment, "*Hoc hominum commune vitium est, consilia sua, et si tacito opus est, aliis credere.*" Tract. Theol.-Pol., V. VI., and Land, I. p. 603.

this country as consul for his native city in the time of the Protectorate. His acquaintance with Milton, then Latin Secretary to the Council, was probably official in its origin, but pushed into personal intimacy by art, in which Oldenburg was evidently an adept. On losing or quitting his office, he removed to Oxford for the sake of access to the Bodleian Library, and supported himself for several years as private tutor, first to Lord Henry O'Bryan, and then to Lord William Cavendish. Here he established friendly relations with a group of remarkable men, who, under the auspices of Wilkins, held, at Wadham, meetings of their "Philosophical" or "Invisible College" for scientific discussion; Dr. Seth Ward and Dr. Wallis, Savilian Professors of Astronomy and Geometry, Wren, Boyle, and Hooke; and when this club received from Charles II. its incorporation as the "Royal Society," he was appointed second or acting secretary with Dr. Wilkins, and edited its "Transactions" till 1677. For this position he must have been indebted to his personal and social, rather than his intellectual qualities. He had scientific knowledge enough to see the papers of others through the press. He could make himself useful to Boyle by turning his essays into Latin. He could send any remarkable memoir in the "Transactions" to the continental centres of science, and invite in return the newest information of what was doing there. But neither in his original papers nor in his published correspondence is there any indication of high intelligence or large attainments. He was

fond of the society of able men, and content to be poor for the sake of it; but would hardly have passed for more than a scientific gossip, had it not been for the punctual industry with which he ordered the business of the new society, and relieved its president and members by innumerable small services.

Being on the Continent in the summer of 1661, Oldenburg went out from Leiden to Rhijnsburg on purpose to see Spinoza. What could attract him to the retreat of a student as yet silent and unknown? We might suppose that, being curious about microscopes and telescopes, he sought him merely as a working optician, were it not that the intercourse of that visit was immediately continued by letters, in which there is no mention of lenses, but the whole range of Spinoza's metaphysics comes into discussion.¹ He must have heard a rumour of the genius of Spinoza from some private observer who could give him access to the recluse: and there is reason to conjecture that Huyghens was the medium of introduction. On the one hand, he was in friendly relations with Spinoza, both as a zealous student of Descartes, and as engaged, for some years past, in the same art of perfecting the form and surface of lenses. And on the other hand, he not only was well known to Oldenburg's English friends, by his discovery of one of Saturn's moons, by his application of the pendulum to timepieces, by his measurement of the areas of curves (reported by him direct to Wallis), but was in this very year on a scientific visit

¹ Ep. 1, 2.

to London, and attending the meetings of the Royal Society. Whenever Huyghens and Spinoza met, their first talk was of Oldenburg,¹ as would be natural if his friendship were a common property, in which the elder had granted a partnership to the younger.

If he presented himself at Rhijnsburg with such credentials, it is the less surprising that Oldenburg seems to have completely broken down Spinoza's usual reticence, and drawn from him the freest statement of opinion "on God, on infinite extension and thought—their agreement and difference,—on the nature of the union of the human soul with the body; and further, on the principles of the Cartesian and the Baconian philosophies."² It was perhaps pleasant to meet with so good a listener as this visitor from England; on whose part he knew himself secured against plagiarism by honourable character, though he did not yet know that he was also secured by speculative incapacity. The subsequent correspondence shows that the two minds never met, and never could meet, in discussing the ultimate problems of philosophy; and that the Rhijnsburg intercourse, with all its frankness, had given Oldenburg no insight whatever into Spinoza's meaning.³ By degrees, they get to understand their inevitable misunderstandings: the philosopher withdraws his confidences, and the secretary

¹ Ep. 26.

² Ep. 1.

³ See especially Ep. 31, written four years after, with plenty of explanation between. Yet Oldenburg, in urging Spinoza to publish his system of thought, feels "assured that he intends to advance nothing against the existence and providence of God: and if these are safe, Religion is unshaken, and philosophical speculation is easily defended."

his hortatives to take heart and publish ; and the intercourse, effusively begun, dies off into coolness and commonplace. The letters, however, which represent it have considerable biographical interest.

From the very first of them we learn that among the subjects discussed at Rhijnsburg was the relative value of Descartes and Bacon as intellectual guides ; and from the second we obtain Spinoza's estimate of their defects, centering for the most part in a false doctrine respecting the nature and causes of *error*. This is the first appearance of Bacon's name in the memorials of Spinoza's studies : and it carries on it the marks of recent reading. If his attention was concentrating itself on questions of *Method*, he could no longer dispense with a knowledge of the *Novum Organon* and the *De Augmentis* : for if they were right, the geometric path which he was tracing would lead him quite astray. The necessities of his work compelled him to settle accounts between the rival tendencies of the time in the conduct of the understanding ; and engaged him closely with Descartes' *Discours de la Methode* on the one hand, and Bacon's *Novum Organon* on the other. He was so far dissatisfied with both, as to project and commence a treatise of his own, *De Intellectus Emendatione*, at which, after laying down its main lines at Rhijnsburg, he worked at intervals through life without completing it. It is far more Cartesian than Baconian, and insists upon self-evidencing ideas, and secure deduction from them, as the only way to truth and safeguard against the errors of limited experience.

1

This fragment, unlike the earlier "Short Treatise," bears obvious traces of acquaintance with Bacon,¹ though his name is never mentioned: and as it was sufficiently advanced in 1662 for its speedy publication to be contemplated and urged,² it affords some insight into Spinoza's studies during these unwitnessed years. In saying that they were spent in reading little and thinking much, Coler, it would seem, has chronologically misapplied a general characteristic of the philosopher's life. Never again, it may be suspected, was he so occupied with books as during his residence at Rhijnsburg.

The band of young disciples at Amsterdam would not allow his removal to sever their connection with him: and from a letter of the most devoted of them, Simon de Vries, we learn the important fact that already Spinoza was sending to them, piecemeal, sections of his *Ethics* as they were written. At the meetings of their Society, each member in turn read the newest manuscript and stated how he understood it: and if among the rest inconsistent interpretations arose, reference was made to the Master for a solution of the perplexity. They are puzzled about the nature of Definitions, and wonder whether, by inference from them, you can alight on any reality. They do not see that it is the nature of finite substance to

¹ Sigwart has collected the most striking of these, *op. cit.* p. 157, note.

² Ep. 11, itself dated by Oldenburg, April 3, 1663; but replying to Ep. 6, written by Spinoza near the end of 1661, probably November.

have many attributes, and want a proof of it. They cannot manage to conceive of Thought without ideas, and beg for help in the process. And Lodewijk Meyer is in sore difficulty about the doctrine of the infinite and of its alleged indivisibility. Spinoza patiently answers all their doubts, in ways to be hereafter noticed. The one thing that concerns us here is the biographical fact, that by February 1663 he had communicated at least the first seventeen Propositions of the *Ethics* to his confidants at Amsterdam.¹

At Rhijnsburg, therefore, he was at work upon both his *De Intellectus Emendatione* and his *Ethica*, the former taking the lead, and containing repeated promises of the latter as its own proper fruit. In these promises, as Sigwart has pointed out,² there are traces of a larger design than he ever executed,—a design embracing *the whole* of his “philosophy,” the Physical side as well as the Ethical. Thus both the works now projected and commenced remained fragmentary, though the second formed a whole of reduced scope. In no small degree they must have interfered with one another. The first was intended as an *Organon*, laying down the principles of Knowledge and order of Discovery to which the structure of the second should conform. But in Spinoza’s school less than in any other is it possible thus to prefix a Logic to its Metaphysics:

¹ See Ep. 8. The Nos. cited do not agree with the final arrangement of the “*Ethica* :” the “3d Scholium of Prop. viii.” is now the Schol. to Prop. x ; and the “Scholium to Prop. xix.” is the present Schol. to Prop. xvii.

² *Op. cit.* p. 158.

and he found his exposition of the rules of knowing already bespeaking the things known; so that if he had completed his theory of Method, he would have told, in the process, the substantive truth which was professedly waiting to take shape from it. Except to a mind preoccupied by his metaphysical conceptions, his "Emendation" can bring no conviction, and afford guidance only by its incidental lights. To this organic inseparability of form and matter Avenarius ascribes the unfinished state of the "Emendation" treatise. Spinoza "had to break off," because, when he came to define the intellect, he could not do it without resort to his metaphysical system for which he was only preparing the way: and "this difficulty forced him to see, that a doctrine of the intellect could not be a prelude to his metaphysics, inasmuch as it can arise only as their result."¹ Certain it is that, after having both undertakings in progress together, and setting his hand now to one of them and now to the other, the earlier and more forward one was outstripped by the later, and dropping at last out of the race, never reached the goal.

¹ Avenarius, *op. cit.* p. 49.

CHAPTER III.

AT VOORBURG—1663-1670.

IN April 1663 we find Spinoza removing his furniture to the village of Voorburg, about two miles from the Hague. He did not himself settle there till June; but visited Amsterdam, to make arrangements for the publication of his Geometrical Proof of the Cartesian Principia, and his Metaphysical Thoughts.¹ He engaged Meyer to revise the style and to write a preface, disclaiming for the author more than a partial assent to the doctrines of Descartes which he expounded. He gives an interesting measure of his rate of work when he tells us that it took him two weeks (apparently during his visit) to reduce the first part of the Principia to geometrical form.

It is perhaps vain to speculate on his motive for changing his place of residence. But there are some indications of a desire to place himself within reach of powerful protectors who would secure him from harm in the contemplated publication of his philosophy; and such protectors he would have in the brothers De Witt at the Hague. This is what he means when he tells

¹ Ep. 13.

Oldenburg that he has friends influential in the State, who may guard him against danger; and that, if they cannot, he will hold his peace. Joan de Witt was near the climax of his power. He had honourably closed one war with England, and was not yet threatened by the next. Her favour to the House of Orange he had bought off by promising to withhold support from the family of the Stuarts. He had brought the finances of Holland into order. He had maintained the edicts of toleration, and stretched to the utmost the legal liberties of the press. He had put heart into the Republican party by exhibiting, in the provinces where it prevailed, a ten years' proof of its splendid capacity for rule. But for all this there was something precarious in his strength. It was deficient in the material weight of popular support; and, to preserve its ascendancy, needed the zeal and vigilance of every class in the State distinguished by political insight and just desires. Among the minorities, ruled less by passion than by ideas, on which the hegemony of Holland and its Grand Pensionary rested, Spinoza's school, though inconspicuous, was intellectually too important for him to be indifferent to its disinterested aid. At this very time a book was preparing (to appear eighteen months after¹) which, erroneously ascribed to Spinoza, came not improbably from within his circle, and effectively served the purpose of a party pamphlet against the opponents of the

¹ Lucii Antistii Constantis De jure Ecclesiasticorum Liber singularis, etc. Alethopoli, apud Cajum Valerium Pennatum, 1665.

Republic. It insists on the supremacy of the civil power, and denies to the clergy all rights except such as are assigned them by law; and protests against their attempts, either by ecclesiastical edicts or by pulpit denunciations, to excite disaffection, and subject the State to the Church. The design of the argument is to rebuke the factious agitation of the Calvinistic clergy, especially in Zealand where they were dominant, against De Witt and his proposed suppression of the hereditary Stadtholderate. This book Leibniz,¹ relying on the initials of its pretended author—L.A.C.—attributed to a well-known Republican writer whom he himself had met—(Jacques) De la Court, *i.e.* Van den Hoof (or Hoven)—and whose active pen Joan de Witt himself was believed sometimes to aid.² The republican spirit was hereditary in his family. His grandfather, on the death of William II. of Orange in 1650, had a medal struck representing the lifeless body stretched upon the ground, with the motto beneath it "Liberty for ever!" Whether the book is due to Van den Hoven, or, as others have thought, to Lodewijk Meyer, it speaks with the voice of the Spinoza school, and illustrates its close relations with the policy of the De Witts.

The literary labours of Spinoza at Voorburg were likely, he was well aware, to array against him a force

¹ *Théodicée*, §§ 375, 376.

² Especially in his *Aanwijzing der heilzame en politieke gronden van Holland*, 1671, previously (1669) published under the title, *Interest van Holland*. In some of his books the title-page carries his *Dutch* initials, V. D. H.

of passionate resistance, and to need the safeguard of some high protection. The seven years which he spent there were divided in pretty equal sections between his two chief works—the Ethics and the Theologico-Political Treatise—with some preliminary attention to the unfinished piece on Method. The Ethics he continued to compose in Latin, and to send in portions to Amsterdam, for his disciples to study and translate into Dutch. In that circle was a young physician, Dr. Joan Bresser, under whose advice, in the spring of 1665, he had treated himself for an attack of tertian ague. During a visit to Amsterdam in April, Spinoza had (by invitation) called upon him, but found that their movements had crossed, for he was absent at the Hague. Returning thither with the expectation of falling in with him at Voorburg, and of receiving from him “the conserve of red roses” which he had prescribed, he was mortified to learn that Bresser had gone home without taking any notice of him. This inattention, relieved by no written apology, elicited from Spinoza a letter (one of the recent discoveries) singularly characteristic of his fine temper. Without disguising his hurt feeling, he is so far from running it into any estrangement that he makes it the occasion of proposing a regular and intimate correspondence. He encourages Bresser to believe himself capable of greater things than his self-distrust permits him to imagine; and assures him that his confidences shall be safe in the freest interchange of thought with him. And then, as if to crown this expression of

generous trust, he proposes to send him, for study and translation, the additional portion of the Ethics which is now in readiness. If he cannot undertake it, it shall go to De Vries. He had not intended to forward the manuscript till it was completed; but as it takes longer to wind up than he expected, he will make two parcels of it.¹

The first parcel, he says, goes as far as the eightieth proposition of the third part. The third part, as we now have it, contains only fifty-nine propositions; but, as Trendelenburg has remarked, the fourth is really continuous with it, and the separation of the two was probably an afterthought, induced by the inconveniently high number to which the propositions ran. If so, he had advanced as far as IV. xxi.² As he evidently felt himself within sight of the end, and would hardly send off the last sheets of what he had written, we may reasonably conclude that the remaining ninety propositions would be finished within two or three months. In that case the work would be off his hands by August 1665. For the letter which he is writing,

¹ Ep. 28. The receiver of the letter is indicated only by the initials, J. B.; but there can be little doubt that they belong to Joan Bresser.

² Trend. Beitr., iii. pp. 294-5. To recover the original scheme of the Ethics, the reduction of the present number of books must probably be carried still further. Spinoza never mentions a higher number than three in speaking of the parts, as they arise in the execution of his plan; and, it would seem, his first design was to expound in succession the doctrine of Being, the doctrine of Knowing, the doctrine of Character. The expansion of the last under his hand occasioned its distribution into three parts. The first mention of five parts is by Oldenburg, July 22, 1675. Ep. 62.

though undated, fixes itself to the previous May by two internal marks of time—viz. the statement that, since his April visit to Amsterdam,¹ he has waited three weeks in vain to hear from Bresser; and an allusion to the renewed war with England which had been declared at the end of February, with an expression of impatience that the fleet should put to sea and face the naval battles which opened on the 3d June.

With this conclusion, that the great work on which Spinoza's reputation rests, begun in 1661, was already complete before the autumn of 1665, it well accords that in September Oldenburg² twits him with having turned from philosophy to theology, to treat of "angels and miracles and prophecy"—in evident allusion to his having taken in hand his Theologico-Political Treatise. For the next four years his industry was concentrated upon this work—a disproportioned time if measured by the product of the previous equal term, but not if we allow for the difference between an achievement of genius and a result of study. His Ethics depended only on his powers of thought, spontaneously moving on the lines or off the lines traced already by Descartes. His Treatise deals with a vast ancient literature and history, and involves a continued criticism of the opinions of others on a cyclopædia of unsettled questions. Its theological discussions carried him back to his Hebrew studies of ten years before,

¹ The time of this visit is determined by Ep. 27, compared with Ep. 24, of March 27, which he received just before starting for Amsterdam.

² Ep. 29.

and obliged him to turn again, with a fresh eye, to the text of the Pentateuch and the "burdens" of the Prophets, and compare them with the notes stored in his portfolio ever since he was "cut off from Israel." He had to blow the dust from his Maimonides and make sure, by reperusal, that his strictures did him no wrong. Some slight trace of his return at this time to Jewish studies may perhaps be found in his simultaneous correspondence with the tiresome Blyenberg. For the most part, no serious stress can be laid on the evidence of Spinoza's indebtedness to rabbinical philosophy for his characteristic conceptions. But one telling example of coincidence is certainly produced in the doctrine that "good" and "evil" have no objective reality, but are merely relative to our feeling; and that "evil," in particular, is nothing positive, but a *privation* only, or *non-existence*. It is Maimonides especially who, insisting on this theory, contrasts the relativity of "good and evil" with the reality for all minds of the "true and false."¹ And in the early spring of 1665 Spinoza dwells with the strongest emphasis on the same doctrine in connection with the same illustration, from the story of the Fall.² This, it is true, antedates a little the commencement of his Treatise; but his reading for it may well have preceded its composition and run parallel with the last stage of the Ethics.

¹ See Maimon. More Nebuchim, 1 Theil, cap. 2, as quoted by Dr. J. M. Joël in his Essay Zur Genesis der Lehre Spinoza's: Breslau, 1871, pp. 44, 45.

² Epp. 19, 21, 23.

The political chapters of the Treatise, though depending more on speculative faculty than on learning, could not have been produced without considerable reading. Its theory of the State is evidently a modified reproduction of Hobbes, whose book "*De Cive*" was well known in Holland, having appeared there in its final form in 1647.¹ And the knowledge of Machiavelli, which is shown in a later criticism² upon him, must doubtless have been gained before treating so largely of the principles of government. Whatever studies were subservient to the definite shaping of Spinoza's political doctrine are most fitly referred to this time. The only passage in the Ethics (IV. xxxvii. Sch. 2) which, expounding the same theory of society, is parallel to the chapters on Civil Life in the Theologico-Political Treatise,³ occurs only a few pages beyond the packet of manuscript which he despatched to Bresser in May 1665. And the simultaneous publication of the pseudonymous "*Liber singularis*" of "*Constans*," in advocacy of the same principles, affords another indication that, in the Spinoza circle, the application of philosophy to politics had become, for the moment, a prominent, if not a paramount, subject of interest.

It is natural to ask how it was that Spinoza, after finishing his Ethics, left it to sleep the years away in manuscript, and turning his back upon it threw himself immediately into another work, which he gave to the

¹ The collected *Opera Philosophica*, published in Amsterdam, did not appear till 1668.

² *Tract. Polit.*, v. 7, V. VI. and *Land*, I. p. 304.

³ *i.e.* Chaps. xvi. xvii. part.

world as soon as he could complete it. It was not in obedience to the precept—

“Si quid . . .

Scripseris, in Mæci descendat judicis aures,
Et patris et nostras, nonumque prematur in annum,
Membranis intus positis :”¹

for the readers to whom he communicated what he had written were not philosophers or critics whose judgment he could value as a check to his own, but young disciples who called him “Master,” and whose difficulties taught him nothing but patience in removing them. It may be taken for certain that he intended immediate publication, subject only to the condition,—which he did not expect to fail him,—that by preserving the anonymous he could avoid the risk of odium and persecution. As he approached the closing section, he would become anxious to determine this remaining doubt; and a motive is thus supplied for his April visit to Amsterdam. There he would be able to consult all the friends who had read the manuscript: there he could confide his purpose to the publishers most likely to give it success: there he would ascertain whether his papers had passed too freely from hand to hand for the authorship to remain a secret. The result, we may well believe, awakened his fears, and sent him back with a resolve to open his assault upon public errors from another side, and by a work which, never leaving his own desk during its progress, should be brought home to him by neither indiscretion nor treachery.

¹ Hor. de Arte Poet. 386-9.

This resolve received its completion in 1669 ; and in the following year the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* appeared, without the author's name, and with the announcement on the title-page of a pseudonymous printer (Henr. Künraht) and place of publication (Hamburg). The excitement which it occasioned, both of admiration and of antipathy, is evidenced by its rapid reissue under fictitious titles, representing it now as an historical and now as a medical book ; and by its synodical condemnation as early as April 1671, along with the *Leviathan* of Hobbes and other works, as a Socinian production, and its consequent proscription by the States-General of Holland, Zealand, and West Friesland.¹ The fate which it thus encountered Spinoza had always contemplated with dread, and done his utmost to avoid. Having heard in February 1671 from a certain Professor N. N., that a Dutch translation of the book was about to appear, he wrote in eager alarm to Jarrig Jellis, begging him to ascertain the facts and stop the proceeding, as neither he nor his friends would relish the interdict which would be sure to follow.² Either the rumour was false, or the

¹ For the Edict, see Van der Linde, *Bibliografie*, p. 2, and Pollock's *Spinoza*, App. B.

² Ep. 43. Dr. Van Vloten conjectures (*B. de Spin.* 81, note, ap. Pollock, 33) that Spinoza's informant was Christopher Wittich, the Cartesian mathematician and theologian. As he was promoted thence to Leiden exactly at this time, he may have visited Spinoza in connection with his removal. He was not likely to have been in the secret of the authorship ; but may have talked about the book as a current topic.

prevention successful; for no Dutch translation was published before Joh. Heinr. Glasemaker's in 1693.¹ For the clergy, however, Latin is no disinfectant, and cannot quench the scent of heresy: what were they there for, but to detect and denounce such poison under every disguise?

We return from the external history of this Treatise at its origin to notice a few incidental variations of Spinoza's life during its production. It was impossible for him to correspond with the secretary of the Royal Society without receiving the latest scientific news, and being drawn into the active polemic of the day between retreating theories and advancing discoveries in physics. Oldenburg overwhelms him with complimentary messages from Boyle (who never takes the trouble to speak for himself), and, what is worse, with his treatises on saltpetre, on fluidity, on the elasticity of air, on chemical transformations, on the thermometer and the microscope; and expects in return not only his criticisms upon them, but his aid in their continental circulation. In a long discussion which thus arises respecting the difference between nitre and nitric acid,² it is rather humiliating to find that the only point on which Boyle and Spinoza are at one is a false assumption, viz. that the characters and behaviour of these bodies are explicable by the size, shape, and motion of their component atoms,—in other words, that all qualitative differences

¹ De rechtzinnige Theologant, of godgeleerde staatkundige verhandelinge. Te Hamburg. By Henr. Koenraad. (Fictitious place and name.) 1698.

² Epp. 5-7, 11.

are resolvable into quantitative. In attempting their explanation on this principle, they at once diverge; in spite of their common aversion to the mediæval or Aristotelian treatment of natural phenomena, Boyle has not yet freed himself from abstract preconceptions and gone fully over to the method of induction; and Spinoza has adopted new ones from Descartes, which prevent his even trying to quit the path of deduction. They argued together in vain. Each grew impatient with what was best in the other. Spinoza was acute in his reasoning: Boyle was strong in his experiments. But Boyle found Spinoza's reasoning irrelevant; and Spinoza declared Boyle's experiments superfluous. The discussion is obsolete, except as forming a curious illustration of the past logic of science.¹

¹ The assumption that quantitative variation could indefinitely change the qualities of bodies left the alchemist doctrine some lingering hold on Spinoza's mind. "I called," he says (Ep. 40), "on Mr. Vos [Isaac Vossius, afterwards Canon of Windsor] about the business of Helvetius [John Fried, physician at the Hague]. He laughed outright, and was amazed that I should ask him about such nonsense. Without caring a straw for this, I went to the workman himself, Brechtelt by name, who had tested the gold. He told a very different story from Mr. Vos; declaring that in the process of fusion and precipitation the weight of gold was increased by the amount of the weight of silver thrown into the crucible to get the precipitate; so that he firmly believed there was something singular in this gold which had turned his silver into gold. Nor was he alone in this belief: but several other persons present at the time found that it was so. I then went to Helvetius himself, who showed me both the gold and the crucible, still filmed over inside with gold, and told me that he had flung hardly a quarter of a grain of barley or mustard into the melted lead. He added that he meant soon to publish the whole story;

Not less interesting is it, from the calm level of our present doctrine of fluidity, to contemplate another disturbance of philosophic equilibrium, occasioned by the tube of Torricelli. Around this innocent instrument the battle between the "plenists" and the "vacuists" was brought to its crisis. It was no new fact that a phial of water would remain full when inverted with its mouth dipped below the surface of a water-bowl, or that in a siphon the liquid could be made to run up hill. This could surprise no one who understood Nature's aversion to a vacuum: for what else could the water do, if vacuum was to be avoided? To be consistent, then, it would behave in the same way were the phial 100 feet high, or, as Father Mersenne imagined and believed, were the siphon to arch over a mountain. But now it appeared that if your tube was forty feet above its dip, the water became mutinous, and left Nature with six feet of vacuum; and, as Torricelli showed, mercury was worse, and stopped short at thirty inches. As the difference of weight between the two liquids is inversely proportional to the different height of their columns, it seemed unquestionably a case of two equivalent counterpoises to the same atmospheric pressure.

To complete the apparent discomfiture of the "plenists," Boyle's improved air-pump enters the field.

and further related that a certain man (the same, he supposed, that had invited him) had done the same thing at Amsterdam, of which you have doubtless heard." The leaning of the reporter's mind is here pretty evident.

When the inverted phial in its water-bowl is put under the receiver, and the air pumped out, down goes the counterpoise, as the sustaining pressure is lifted off; and with it the spirits of the plenist sink. Yet, rather than surrender, he addresses himself persuasively to the air-pump, and contrives, as Oldenburg reports, to bring it over to his side. While the water falls in the phial, air-bubbles rise into its place at the top; and these, no doubt, it is that by their elasticity push it out: if you get rid of them, the phial will remain as full as ever. The vacuists accept the test: by repeated use of the pump they throw off all the air entangled in the water, which they then return into the phial and bowl, and once more shut up under the receiver. The assistant pumps, and the vacuist watches for his triumph; but the water, unwilling to descend, keeps the phial and declines the bowl; and the plenist wins the game.¹

Of such contest was the theatre of the Royal Society the scene. What does Spinoza think of it? Oldenburg asks. As we have not his answer, we can only wonder whether, with his Cartesian objection to a vacuum, he was satisfied with the Torricellian defeat; or, with his calm discernment, suggested that perhaps the air-pump leaked!

Spinoza's occupation in his workshop naturally kept his attention awake to both the achievements and the defects of the telescope; and his intercourse with Huyghens informed him of the new conquests by

¹ Ep. 14.

which the Italian astronomers, especially Giovanni Cassini before his removal to Paris, were crowning the discoveries of Galileo. In reading his letters we find ourselves at the wonderful moment which first showed and measured the transit of Jupiter's satellites over his disc, or their eclipse within his shadow. And we hear from Huyghens himself the news that the strange appendage to the body of Saturn, which, to Galileo's eye, had given the planet at one time a "trigeminum corpus," at another something like "horns," is seen through his object-glass of 22-feet focus, to cast a shadow on the disc "as if from a ring." Spinoza is delighted with this first determination of the form; and yet misses its true character, cheated perhaps by the name "handles" (*ansæ*), which the two side-pieces of the planet had obtained. He always thought, he tells us, that Descartes was hasty in treating these appendages as *planets* from not observing that they are *in contact with Saturn*. And so it appears that though in 1665 the two "horns" had joined hands and made one belt, it still sat close upon the planet's waist, and was but as an equatorial sheet thrown out by the play of the globe itself. This mistake of Spinoza's is the more remarkable, because his informant Huyghens had already determined the ring to be at a distance at least equal to its own breadth from the planet, and defined the ratio of their diameters to be that of 9:4.¹ In truth, Spinoza's physical knowledge does not seem to have been so accurate or so large as his opportunities

¹ *Systema Saturnium* Hag. Com. 1659.

would lead us to expect. The reflective tendency of his genius did not permit him to pause with long patience upon the analysis of concrete facts, but hurried him away into the region of large conceptions (generals that had never been generalised), whence, as he believed, he could see them brought to the birth.

From this languid interest in the details of contemporary science it arises that Oldenburg asks in his letters far more questions than Spinoza answers. Even of his neighbour Huyghens he seems, when pressed to say what is thought about the escapement timepiece, to have nothing to tell. Yet no more startling addition had been made in that generation to the resources both of knowledge and of the arts. Ever since Galileo had shown that small oscillations of a pendulum were equal in their times, they had been used as measures in many an observatory; but for this purpose it was necessary to have an attendant to produce, to watch, to count them, to convert himself, in short, into a living clock. The contrivance which enabled them to maintain, to count off, and to register themselves, at once gave them marvellous precision, and made them applicable to unimagined uses, especially the determination of longitudes, even at sea. The invention had been rendered publicly famous at the Hague in 1664, by a lawsuit which made good the claim of Huyghens against an impudent pretender to priority. And in foreign countries it was evidently known that his investigations were still in progress and promised more. For as early as 1665 Oldenburg is eager to

hear of his "new kind of pendulum, superior in exactitude," and not yet, it would seem, made the subject of report. This can refer only to his cycloidal pendulum from the isochronism of which, whatever its arc, he had expected great things; though the treatise¹ in which the properties of its curve were determined did not appear till 1673. Yet the only answer which Spinoza can send from the spot is this:—

"The said Huyghens has been and still is entirely taken up with polishing lenses, and has fitted up for the purpose a workshop which is neat enough. But what good it will do, I do not yet know, and, to say the truth, do not much care to know. For I am satisfied from experience that in spherical moulds the free hand will polish better and more safely than any machine. About the success of his pendulums and the time of his removal to France, I have no present information to give."²

A similar reticence is observable with regard to the comet of 1664-5, of which Oldenburg, with a fresh letter about it from John Hevel on his desk, sends an eager notice; and to which he recurs about three weeks later, when the constitution and the path of the comet, pronounced to be parabolic by Hevel, had become the subject of controversy between him and Auzout. Assuming his correspondent's interest in the question, Oldenburg promises to communicate the result of the discussion as soon as it emerges. Spinoza's reply makes no mention of the subject, neither thanking him for his report nor welcoming his promise.³

¹ *Horologium Oscillatorium, Parisiis*, containing also the method of finding the centre of oscillation.

² Ep. 33.

³ It is, however, right to state that Oldenburg's first mention of the

In these notices of discovery respecting the pendulum, and Saturn, and the comets, one thing strikes the reader who observes their date. It is perhaps unreasonable to expect from the explorers of other planets any eager eye for the proceedings on our own. But when we remember what was passing in the streets of London, and on the Northern Sea, during the summer and autumn of 1665, it is strange to see how slight a vestige it has left on the correspondence of its witnesses or participators. In the plague-stricken city whence Oldenburg wrote, ten thousand victims perished in a week; but apparently the visitation would have elicited no remark, had it not, by interruption of business, delayed the arrival of a book, and suspended the regular meetings of the Royal Society. The subsidence of the pestilence "by God's grace" is interesting to the zealous secretary from its promise of resumption for these meetings. On the maritime war raging between England and Holland he spends a few

new comet and of Hevel's "Prodrumus Cometicus" upon it occurs in his reply to a *missing* letter (September 4, 1665) of Spinoza's, which *may* have started the subject by inquiries from the Voorburg side. This possibility is rather favoured by a remark in Oldenburg's second letter, viz. that no one thinks the comet's movements explicable on Descartes' hypothesis; a remark which might certainly be spontaneous, but would more naturally be elicited by a correspondent's prior question. Spinoza was at this time somewhat anxiously pondering Descartes' laws of Motion, to which (with the exception of the sixth) he still adhered, not, it may be suspected, without a little misgiving; and so far as any new physical phenomenon promised him a test of their validity, it was interesting to him. But the interest was metaphysical rather than scientific.

moralising words:—"We are in daily expectation of a second naval battle, unless your fleet should have again withdrawn into port. This bravery (about which you hint that you are at issue with one another) is animal, not human; for if men's actions were under guidance of reason, they would not thus tear each other to pieces."¹ The "second naval battle" here mentioned did not come off that year, being prevented by a storm at sea. But the previous one, 3d June, was among the most terrible on record; eighteen ships of the Dutch were captured or burned; their commander Opdam, with all his crew, was blown up in his "Eendracht;" and seven thousand of their men were slain or taken prisoners. During the fight a single shot, sweeping the deck of the "Royal Charles," carried off at a stroke Lords Falmouth and Muskerrey, and Boyle, a nephew of Oldenburg's scientific friend, covering the Duke of York with their blood. For one who writes from the midst of so critical a struggle, and who "believes that all Europe will be involved in war during the next summer," it seems but a flat summing-up of the situation to say, "Let us serve God with a pure mind, and cultivate solid and useful philosophy."²

This prophecy of universal war was not fulfilled, though the symptoms of the moment gave it some support. Both the belligerents, feeling their maritime equality, were canvassing all round for alliances to turn the scale. England had induced the Bishop of Münster to invade Overijssel with a disreputable army

¹ Ep. 31.

² Ep. 32.

of 20,000 men. This act was now moving Denmark to make common cause with Holland, and therefore her rival Sweden to take the other side, and transport an army over to Bremen (then Swedish), in aid of the Bishop's operations. But in October 1665, the further spread of the conflict through minor States was arrested by Louis XIV., who replied to the solicitations of both parties, first by fruitless proposals of peace, then by espousing the Dutch cause, compelling the evacuation of Overysse, buying off Sweden by a guarantee against Danish attack, neutralising Brandenburg by alarm for its territory of Cleves, and so leaving England in complete isolation. Oldenburg, himself a Bremener, perceived how the area of the war was widening; and writing at the moment (October 12) when the Parliament at Oxford, dissatisfied with the peace proposals, was providing for a continuance of the struggle, he saw the evil not only prolonged but magnified; failing to observe that, by the interposition of one great power in place of several lesser, the equilibrium was so disturbed as to accelerate the return to repose. After another terrible year, in which London was kept on the stretch of dismay and suspense, now by her own great fire, and now by desperate battles at sea, whispers were heard of overtures for peace: in six months more it was forced upon the Dutch by Louis XIV., and upon the English by the shameful financial incapacity of Charles's Government, which left the Medway and the Thames exposed to the incursions of De Ruyter's fleet, and led an indignant nation to prefer a decent peace

to a mismanaged war. To secure the public safety, the treaty of Breda was signed in May 1667; and, to appease the public anger, Clarendon was impeached and banished in December.

Slight as were Oldenburg's allusions to the international crisis of the autumn of 1665, they were in the form of direct questions, apparently quite artless. Yet Spinoza's answer passes them by in silence, content to speculate on the psychology of an intelligent worm hypothetically imprisoned in the human blood. Whether his suppressed letters, if we had them, would remove the impression of political nonchalance, or even reveal an attitude of dissension between the two friends, can never be known. But it deserves remark that precisely here there occurs a gap of ten years in their published correspondence; and that its remaining portion is stiff and curt compared with the earlier. For half this interval the Theologico-Political Treatise (1670), from which Oldenburg never quite recovered, may be answerable, but the earlier half of the blank needs some other explanation.

CHAPTER IV.

AT THE HAGUE—1670-1677.

WITH the completion of his two great literary projects, Spinoza's need of seclusion was much abated, and the motives which had brought him to the vicinity of the Hague urged him now into the city itself. His best-known friend, Huyghens, had five years before been tempted away to Paris by Colbert. But others there were, united with him by political or philosophical sympathy, who regretted the distance of his lodgings, and pressed him to become their neighbour. When we hear that, even at Voorburg, he was constantly sought out by distinguished foreigners anxious to converse with him, we are at a loss to account for a reputation so wide in an author who had produced only an annotated compend of a previous philosophy. But the thirst of that age for new thought and knowledge was keen; the intellectual republic was at once small and cosmopolitan, and by academical converse, or a tacit freemasonry of appreciation, originality often found an unsolicited recognition. At the Hague he would be within a morning call for visitors from other lands; at the

centre of government, whence public affairs are best seen; among the *élite* of every profession; with the choicest books and newest inventions ever at hand. His removal into the city was probably facilitated by a life-pension which (from an unknown date) was secured to him by Joan de Witt. It was not easy in wandering through those handsome streets to discover a lodging suited to his modest wants; but at last a house on the Veerkay, announcing rooms on the second *étage*, invited him by its well-kept look: the interior confirmed the wholesome impression, and the demeanour of the widow van Werve, who led him upstairs, and told him the terms, made him think he should be in good hands. But she would not have him unless she might board him: so he taxed his purse a little more, and shook himself free from all housekeeping cares.¹

After the lapse of a generation, the widow's house was occupied by Coler, the worthy Lutheran minister, who became Spinoza's biographer. He used as his study the single back-room which held the philoso-

¹ The tradition that Spinoza's first lodging at the Hague was in the house of the widow van Velden (Elsje van Houwening, the heroine of Grotius' escape) must, it seems, be dismissed as apocryphal, though handed down to us by Coler, who reports himself as an occupant of the same house (Paulus, Sp. II., p. 617). In the first edition of this volume I had adhered to the tradition on the warrant of a paper in the Transactions of a local Historical Society (Vereeniging ter beoefening der geschiedenis van's Gravenhage), in 1867. But more recent and careful investigation has deprived us of this pleasant little bit of romance. See Ned. Spectator, 1871, p. 122 seqq. and 156 seqq. For this correction and reference I am indebted to the kindness of Professor Land.

pher's bed, and books, and tools of work. No house, once made memorable, passes down without its traditions; and to these we owe the scanty notices remaining of the widow's lodger. Though it was the pleading of friends that had brought him into town, the chief thing that struck observers seems to have been his loneliness of habit. Even for his meals he would often not quit his room, and for two or three days together would see no one. In part this may have been due to a discouraging experience of the cost of living at the Hague: for the necessity of retrenchment drove him next year to remove into a house on the Paviljoensgracht at the back of the widow's, occupied by a painter, Van der Spijck, whose wife would allow him to provide his own meals, and save something by their frugality. Here he spent the last five and a half years of his life, endeared to his host and hostess by his sweet temper and quiet friendly ways, but declining all social visits beyond the house, though graciously receiving the calls of visitors entitled to seek him.

It is not easy to give account of his studious time during his residence at the Hague, especially when we hear that he so closely filled it as now and then not to go out of doors for three months together. For it yielded, so far as appears, no literary fruit except the unfinished Political Treatise and the footnotes prepared for a revised edition of the Theologico-Political Treatise. These do not presuppose any large amount of reading, nor would their production cost the active mind of Spinoza three months' labour. It is probable

that his feeble health was beginning to tell upon his power of intellectual achievement,—upon its quantity, though not upon its quality; and that the languid moods which insisted upon relief from strain became more frequent. His renewed intercourse with Oldenburg cost him, it would seem, but five or six letters. But in one or two directions new personal relations were opened to him which prevent these closing years from being a mere blank.

In the empire of continental thought, the dynasty of Descartes was succeeded by that of Leibniz: and it is interesting to come upon the moment when both are visible together, the one culminating, and the other just appearing above the horizon. We are placed there by a letter, of October 5, 1671, from Leibniz to Spinoza,¹ sent with a copy of his "Notice of the Progress of Optics," and commending to his attention other recent essays on the same subject. On this field they could move together, each with appreciation of the accomplishments of the other: and Leibniz was too well bred and adroit to touch needlessly on deeper differences. These, however, come out clearly enough in letters to other correspondents, especially in those to his revered teacher Professor Thomas of Leipzig. His first mention of Spinoza occurs in one of these letters, April 30, 1669, where he says:

"I venture to assert that of the Cartesians there is scarcely one who has made any addition to the master's work. Clauberg

¹ Ep. 47.

at least, Raëus, Spinoza, Clerselier, Heerbord, Tobias Andreæ, Henry Régis,¹ have done nothing else than paraphrase their master.”²

This of course refers exclusively to the geometrical demonstration of Parts I. and II. of Descartes’ *Principia*.³ But we have also Leibniz’s judgment of the Theologico-Political Treatise, formed whilst the authorship was yet undisclosed. Writing to Thomas on December 23, 1670, he says :

“I have lately seen a Leipzig syllabus, doubtless yours, in which you have treated as it deserves an unbearably freethinking book on ‘Liberty in Philosophising.’ The author seems a follower, not of the Politics only but of the Religion of Hobbes as drawn in his *Leviathan*,—a work sufficiently declared to be monstrous by its very title. For Hobbes has overlaid the whole contents of the *Leviathan* with the seeds of that precious criticism which this man has dared to apply to sacred Scripture.”⁴

A year later, he has discovered the authorship, and tells his correspondent, January 31, 1672 :

“The author of the book on ‘Liberty in Philosophising,’ of which your syllabus contains a short but neat refutation, is

¹ Henri de Roy, Professor of Medicine at Utrecht ; and not, as I had at first supposed, the eminent Cartesian, Pierre-Sylvain Régis of Paris.

² *Die Philos. Schriften von G. W. Leibniz*, herausgeg. von C. J. Gerhardt, i. 16.

³ The same opinion, however, is repeated after acquaintance with all Spinoza’s writings. In a letter of February 15, 1697, to the Abbé Nicaise, Leibniz remarks : “We may say that Spinoza has only developed certain seeds of Descartes’ philosophy ; so that I believe it really important for religion and piety to amend this philosophy by retrenching the errors blended with its truth.”—Gerhardt, ii. 563.

⁴ *Ibid.* i. 34.

Benedict Spinoza, a Jew (my Dutch friends write me word) separated from the synagogue for his monstrous opinions; but a man of universal reading, and especially eminent in optics, and in the construction of very fine telescopes.”¹

Among the “Dutch friends” who had revealed the authorship of the Treatise was Spinoza himself; who, in return for Leibniz’s presentation, had asked his acceptance of a copy.² Other letters, no longer extant, must have passed, and have fixed the two correspondents in a relation of mutual respect on the scientific side and mutual suspicion on the theological. For, three years later, when a young admirer of Spinoza, having made Leibniz’s acquaintance in Paris, asked leave to show him the manuscript of the *Ethica*, the request was refused, on the ground that though his letters could come only from a man of great accomplishments, yet not enough was known about him to encourage such confidence, and there was doubt about the motive of his journey from Frankfort to Paris. This expression of distrust, with the corresponding criticism from the other side on the Liberty of Philosophising, marks the opposite position of the two men in the deepening conflict of European thought. Leibniz early testified his aversion, intellectual and moral, to the negation of religious belief which met him everywhere in educated society. After expounding his doctrine that the *Motion* of a body is its *continuous creation*, he adds:³

¹ Gerhard, i. 39.

² Ep. 48 (November 9, 1671).

³ Phil. Schriften, i. 26.

"I venture to affirm that no effectual resistance can ever be made to Atheists, Socinians, Naturalists, Sceptics, except from the ground of this philosophy, which I really believe to be the one God-given plank to the worn-out world, whereon the wise and pious may save themselves amid shipwreck from the rush of atheism. Small as, from short experience, my knowledge is of learned men, it always horrifies me to think how many I have come across who are at once men of parts and atheists. There is now flitting about from land to land that unpublished book (I trust, with Naudé, never to be published)¹ of Bodin's—large enough at all events—which he calls 'Secrets of Transcendent Things,'² and in which he appears as the professed enemy of the Christian religion. Vanini's dialogues are a trifle in comparison. I have read it attentively, and thank God from my heart that he has so fortified me by this philosophy (wherein it would be ingratitude did I not own my large debt to you), as to make his attack quite easy to repel."

Leibniz had given effect in 1668 (*æt.* 22) to the convictions here expressed by writing a brochure on the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. After passing from hand to hand in manuscript, it was appended by Spizel to a printed letter of his (addressed to Antony Reiser of Augsburg) on "the uprooting of atheism," with the heading "*Confessio naturæ contra Atheistas.*"³

The conservative tendency in Leibniz led him into

¹ It was published in 1857. Edited by L. Noack.

² The title is *Colloquium heptaplomeres, de rerum sublimium arcanis abditis*. The book contains six dialogues, conducted at the house of the Catholic Paul Coronæus, at Venice, by seven interlocutors, representing respectively the Jewish, Mohammedan, Pagan, Lutheran, Calvinistic, and Naturalistic types of belief. The plan is thus similar to that of Dr. Kalisch's "*Path and Goal.*"

³ It is found in the *Phil. Schriften*, Gerhardt, iv. 27.

personal relations which no Dutch republican was likely to approve. He accepted the patronage of the Freiherr von Boineburg, late Chancellor to the Elector of Mainz, and was supposed to throw himself into the project of that able minister (a convert to the Romish Church) for reuniting Catholics and Protestants in Europe. Like all schemes of union, the plan involved not only mutual concession on the part of the approximating central sections, but joint repression of the extremes: and for this purpose a rigorous censorship of the press was proposed, which the bolder spirits could not contemplate with patience. Negotiations and correspondence on this subject had been active since 1660: and it had become clear that the only chance for the scheme was to be found in the support of Louis XIV.'s Government. This gives the key to Spinoza's mistrustful question—"What takes Leibniz away from Frankfort, and what is he about in Paris?" No; he will not show his *Ethics* to a man whose mission it may be to get it suppressed.

This suspicion, however natural, does not appear to have been merited; and to Spinoza's correspondent it either came too late, or seemed too groundless, to withhold the manuscript from the eye of Leibniz. And when in the next year the two men were brought face to face in the little lodging at the Hague, all reserve, it is evident, must have melted away: for Leibniz himself has left this record of his visit:

"In passing through Holland I saw Spinoza and conversed with him often and very long. He has a strange metaphysic,

full of paradoxes. Among other things he believes that the universe and God are in substance the same, that God is the substance of all things, and that created things are but modes or accidents. But I observed that some professed demonstrations which he showed me are inexact."¹

In the interview thus described Spinoza must have been communicative and Leibniz attentive ; and though the judgment recorded by the writer is one of independent dissent, it cannot fairly be called either incompetent or illiberal. The genius and disposition of the two men were very different. But the charge against Leibniz, of insincere and time-serving depreciation of Spinoza, has no real foundation.

With the story of Leibniz's relation to Spinoza is closely linked that of a more intimate connection, unsuspected till the publication of Van Vloten's Supplement. The request to let Leibniz see the manuscript Ethics came from Dr. G. H. Schuller, a physician of the Amsterdam circle ; not on his own behalf however, but in the name of a friend, already admitted to Spinoza's confidence and correspondence, the Freiherr von Tschirnhaus, then in Paris.² As the letters now identified as his contain the most acute of contemporary criticisms, we must say a few words of this energetic nobleman.

Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus, of Kieslings-

¹ Letter to Galloys. ap. Einleit. zu Briefw. Spin., Gerhardt, i. 118.

² See the newly-found letter, 79, and p. 315 of Van Vloten's Suppl. The name is there given as *Schaller* ; but in his correspondence with Leibniz, 1677-8, he invariably signs himself *Schuller*.—Gerhardt, i. 116, note.

wald in Lausitz, was sent, at the age of sixteen, to study at Leiden in 1667, and there probably laid the foundations of his friendship with some of the young men of the Spinoza school. Within a year, however, war broke out between France and the allied Governments of Holland, England, and Sweden; and Tschirnhaus entered himself as a volunteer in a regiment of which a near connection of his own was colonel. After eighteen months' service his father withdrew him from military life, not indeed to resume his university studies, but to visit foreign countries, and make himself familiar with their languages¹ and arts. He seems to have spent some years in this itinerant education, and though he did not decline the courtly society to which his rank gave him admission, he chiefly sought, in every city, the men of science and invention from whom he could learn something. In 1674 we find him in Holland, associating with Schuller at Amsterdam, and through him entering into correspondence,² if not into personal acquaintance, with Spinoza, and admitted to the study of the manuscript *Ethics*.³ In

¹ French, however, was not very familiar to him; for Colbert, employing him in 1675 as mathematical tutor to his son, regarded it as an advantage to the youth that, from this cause, the lessons would have to be in Latin. Ep. 70.

² Epp. 57, 58 (October 1674).

³ Ep. 59 (January 5, 1675), expresses his obligations to the *Lemmata* of *Eth.* Part II., which have solved for him some difficulties in *Physics*. That he had met Spinoza before this letter was written is evident from the words, "*Præsens* mihi indicasti methodum quâ uteris in indagandis needum cognitis veritatibus."

the following summer he is in London, in constant intercourse with Boyle and Oldenburg. In one of his letters thence he tells Schuller that these friends were possessed by the strangest impressions of Spinoza's character, which, however, he had succeeded in entirely correcting, apparently by presenting to them the Theologico-Political Treatise, which had caused the mischief, in some new light, which secured it their high appreciation.¹ So deeply engaged was he among the English mathematicians and physicists that for three months nothing was heard of him by his Amsterdam correspondents; and as, just at that time, the cruisers of France (still at war with the Low Countries and the German Emperor and Spain)² were constantly capturing English ships on the pretence that they were Dutch, and had no right to hoist the British flag, Schuller half attributed his friend's silence to some disaster on his way to France. But in November the best tidings of him arrive from Paris. On Spinoza's recommendation he has struck up a friendship with Huyghens,—afterwards fruitful in a most interesting correspondence,—and through him has won the confidence of the great minister, Colbert. He has fallen in with a man of distinguished learning and versatile accomplishments, free from the ordinary theological prejudices,—one Leibniz,—and been drawn into intimacy with him by

¹ Ep. 63 (July 25, 1675, Schuller reports the letter to Spinoza).

² These two allies had taken the place of Sweden and England, both of which had gone over to France; England, however, making a separate peace with Holland at the beginning of 1674.

their common desire to define and perfect intellectual method. It was on this first enthusiasm of friendship, eager for complete interchange of thought, that Spinoza's mistrustful reservation of the *Ethics* brought an ineffectual chill. Tschirnhaus, however, hardly needed the manuscript as a basis for discussing its contents with his friend ; for he was fresh from a critical correspondence with Spinoza (during the London visit), in which he had laid before him a summary of his doubts, and received to each an exact reply ; and now in Paris was resuming the literary debate, with the advantage of the master's latest explanations (May to July 1676). And for this mastery of the *Ethics* he had been prepared by a previous exchange of letters (October 1674 and January 1675), on "Necessity of Nature," and on the "Method of Search and Discovery." His report it undoubtedly was which thoroughly kindled the curiosity of Leibniz, and induced him, on his way to Hanover in November 1676, to visit the philosopher of the Hague.

All this had passed while Tschirnhaus was no more than five-and-twenty, and had yet to earn the renown which gives an historic interest to his correspondence. It was a trial of metaphysical strength between the youth and the veteran—coming off in the first act of one life, in the last of the other. The survivor, passing with equal zeal into a different field, distinguished himself by a series of brilliant achievements on the border-land between pure scientific discovery and invention in the ancillary arts. Among the phenomena

noticed and resolved by modern optics few are more interesting than the caustic curves formed by the intersection of rays reflected or refracted at different angles by a spherical surface, and meeting each other elsewhere than on the axis. It was Tschirnhaus that in 1682 expounded the facts and supplied their theory to the French Academy of Sciences ; which acknowledged his Memoir by receiving him as an Associate. In following up his experiments on light, he devised means for casting and polishing lenses of unheard-of size, and applied them, not simply for visual purposes, but also as burning-glasses. One of these, a foot in diameter, which he brought to Paris, was reported on by a committee of the Academy in 1699, and presented by the Duke of Orleans to that learned body. But in the Saxon factories, which the Elector enabled him to set up, he afterwards doubled and tripled this diameter, with effects truly startling, though not precise enough for the astronomer's requirements. His workshops he used as chemical laboratories too, and connected his name with at least two memorable inventions in the skilled arts—a new mode of obtaining phosphorus, and the method of so combining siliceous and argillaceous earths as to produce porcelain, hitherto a Chinese monopoly. The Meissen China manufactory had its origin from this discovery. Throughout his investigations Tschirnhaus never ceased to watch the mental processes which helped or hindered him, and so to mature the study of *intellectual method* in which Spinoza had been his first guide. He gave the results in his

Medicina Mentis, published in 1687 as a sequel to his *Medicina Corporis* of the previous year. The influence on the book of Spinoza's fragment on the Improvement of the Intellect was remarked by Tenne-
mann, before the personal relation between the authors was known; and now the silence of the latter respecting his debt to the earlier is often treated as an ungrateful concession to the odium popularly attaching to Spinoza's name. If it is so, it is a solitary instance of ungenerous weakness in the life of Tschirnhaus. His letters—those to Huyghens especially—leave the impression of a singularly open and noble character. He was almost passionately fond of the ancient geometry, and tried to uphold its adequacy for all the feats of the new calculus of infinitesimals, and this preference is not without relation to a certain lucid simplicity of mind, like that which led Berkeley to a similar result. Though he did wonders with his manipulation of the older methods, it was a vain struggle against not only James Bernouilli, but the exigencies of ever new problems pressing for solution; and it is to be regretted that, after so many triumphs, his last scientific enterprise (he died in 1708) should be one which was sure of defeat.

The retired life of Spinoza, once penetrated by such intellectual associates, could no longer keep him in the shade. His name was on the lips of travelled men who mingled in the society of universities and academies of science, and were in the van of every speculative advance. Nor did the anonymous title-

page of the Theologico-Political Treatise long protect him from the enmity and admiration which the book was fitted to excite. Among the persons of influence whom his reputation attracted and his opinions did not repel was the Elector Palatine, Karl Ludwig, brother to that Princess Elizabeth whose interest in philosophical studies had been evinced by her correspondence with Descartes. In 1673 he offered Spinoza an appointment as ordinary professor in the Philosophical Faculty of his Heidelberg University; and in communicating his invitation through Professor Joh. Ludwig Fabricius, imposed no restriction on his liberty of teaching beyond the general understanding that he ~~would not~~ use it for disturbing the religion publicly established. Accustomed to the unqualified freedom of a lonely mind, he shrinks from the risks of so indefinite an obligation; and, conscious that his gift is rather for the advancement than for the teaching of philosophy, he declines the honourable duty reserved for him, and with graceful acknowledgment of the Elector's liberality avows his resolve not to quit his tranquil life.¹

The seclusion which he so much prized did not prevent his feeling a keen interest in the political struggles of the time, nor exempt him altogether from the sacrifices they involved. A republican in principle and a personal admirer of the De Witts, he had always belonged to the "Loevestein party," and had approved of the "Perpetual Edict" by which the office of Stadtholder, vested for three generations past in the Orange

¹ Epp. 51, 52.

family, was declared for ever abolished. During the admirable administration of Joan de Witt, this act of exclusion affected only a child, of whom moreover he was himself the guardian and educator; and the time was unfavourable to the opposite and larger party who desired a permanent head to the State. The foreign relations of the country, while under republican direction, had favoured alliance with France, as naturally sharing the Dutch jealousy of Spain on the one side and England on the other. Thus, the three characters—latitude in Religion, republicanism in Government, Gallicanism in international Policy—were blended in the popular conception of the Grand Pensionary and his friends. The turn of events in 1672 brought all these principles into sudden discredit, and armed their opponents with formidable power. A torrent of invasion burst upon the country from the side of France: one of the “Great Monarch’s” foremost demands was the extension of equal religious liberty to the Catholic Church: while the helpless surrender of frontier towns and fortresses, the scarce-resisted crossing of the Rhine, the occupation of provinces by 120,000 soldiers, approaching within a few leagues of Amsterdam, revealed the defenceless condition into which the land had fallen under its citizen administration, and raised an irresistible cry for a military leader, who might arrest the ruin of the State, and restore the memories of William the Silent and Maurice. In response to this demand the Perpetual Edict was rescinded, and their descendant William III., now twenty-

two years of age, was invested with the same powers, under the same name, that had before broken the yoke of Spain.

A passing reminder will sufficiently recall the tragedy to which this reaction immediately led. Cornelius de Witt, besieged in his house by a raging mob, refused at first to sign the repeal of the constitutional edict; but, when convinced that by yielding nothing, he would only bring on civic chaos at the cost of his own life, he affixed his name with the qualifying note V. C. (vi coactus).¹ The passion of the hour still bidding high for gratification, a wretched perjurer offered to swear that Cornelius had suborned him to assassinate the Prince: and the terrorised court, in the utter absence of evidence, with a notorious criminal for its only witness and a stainless public benefactor at its bar, condemned the accused to perpetual exile, consigning him meanwhile to prison at the Hague. This sentence, inadequate were he guilty, shameful were he innocent, redoubled the fury it was intended to appease. By the verdict his life, it was said, was forfeited; and if the judges did not take it, the justice of the people must step in. The excitement of the city increased, and reached its height on the 27th August, while Joan de Witt was visiting his brother's cell. The prison was forced by the heaving crowd; the grand heroic pair faced it, side by side; were beaten, kicked, and torn to death; their bodies were dragged through

¹ The mob leaders found out the meaning of the initials: and his friends, without consulting him, saved him by scratching them out.

the streets, clothed in rags, and gibbeted by the feet ; till at last, when the demons of the city, spent with their carnival, were asleep, the police authorities dared to creep forth at midnight, and gave the murdered brothers a silent burial.

Spinoza habitually looked at the storms of human life from a cold and quiet height. But here were the surges breaking at his feet, sweeping what he deemed noblest away, and delivering back to the wild waste the land reclaimed for liberty and right. For once his equanimity gave way, and on hearing the news he burst into a passion of tears. Nay, he resolved to denounce the crime on the spot where it was committed ; and prepared a handbill which he was about to post up by night in the dangerous precincts of the prison ; but was saved from the rash act by Van der Spijck's precaution in locking the house door and refusing exit.

Not long after that fatal day Spinoza again braved the ill-humour of faction by an act of less intelligible motive. The headquarters of the French army of invasion during the winter of 1672-73 were at Utrecht ; and among the troops that were stationed there under Condé and Luxemburg was a Swiss regiment, whose colonel—named Stoupe—was theologian as well as soldier. He had been a Protestant minister, and had lived in London as pastor of the Savoy Chapel during the Protectorate. Whilst on military service in Holland, he addressed to a fellow-citizen—a professor at Berne—a series of letters describing the varieties

of religion among the Dutch.¹ Several pages are devoted to an account of Spinoza, of his considerable personal following, and of his Theologico - Political Treatise: and the Dutch clergy are reproached with having left unanswered a book so mischievous as to lie under interdict and suppression by the Estates-General. The whole tone of the notice is one of genuine evangelical aversion towards a negation of all religion, though credit is given to Spinoza for rare learning and intellectual strength.

Yet this Stoupe, while at Utrecht, entered into correspondence with Spinoza, and invited him thither, not in his own name only, but in that of Condé also, who was no less anxious to see him, and would recommend him for a pension from Paris, on the easy condition of his dedicating some book to the King. The invitation was accompanied by a safe-conduct pass, and was accepted by Spinoza. At Utrecht he was received by Luxemburg in place of Condé, who had been suddenly called away; and he was urged to remain till the Prince's return. The delay proved too long for this: and the visit ended with no known result, beyond a disclaimer on his part of any wish for the proposed pension, and, on the other side, a most favourable impression from his natural politeness and simplicity.

It was easier for the French Marshal to give a safe-conduct into headquarters than out of them; and on his return Spinoza found the Hague more dangerous

¹ La Religion des hollandois, Représentée en plusieurs lettres écrites par un Officier de l'Armée de Roy, à un Pasteur et Professeur en Théologie de Berne, 1673.

than Utrecht. His journey had become known and was the subject of angry suspicion. "What business had any good citizen in the camp of the invader? Was he not a client of the De Witts; and had they not sold the country to the French, on whom they had always leaned? Did they call him to headquarters for nothing? A man who goes to and fro between them and us can be no better than a spy." So threatening became the popular murmurs that Van der Spijck feared an attack of rioters upon his house: but Spinoza reassured him by saying that plenty of the chief people of the country knew what his errand to Utrecht had been; and ~~that~~ if any mob came to the door, he would go straight out to them and let them treat him, if they chose, as they had treated the De Witts; adding, "I am a good republican, and have never had anything in view, but the good and glory of the State."¹ His heroism may well be believed, though it was not put to the expected proof.

It can hardly be denied that the public displeasure at this visit was far from unnatural. It is difficult even now to divest an act so questionable of all political significance. If Stoupe had been an enthusiastic adherent instead of a downright enemy of Spinoza's opinions; if Spinoza had been easily accessible to princely compliments and royal patronage; if it had been indifferent to him whether he was pensioned from the Hague or from Paris; his venturesome excursion might be referred to personal motives of sympathy or vanity or

¹ B. de S. Opera, Paulus, ii. p. 627.

interest. But that in the absence of all such conditions, a man of sensitive caution who lived among his books and apparatus and went into no society, should in the midst of war become a guest at the headquarters of the foreign invader, and wait upon the military hospitalities of princes, marshals, and colonels, is inconceivable unless there were some public mission behind. And such mission seems to be implied in his subsequent words to Van der Spijck,—that some of the chief people in the country knew what his errand had been. The posture of affairs might well suggest to either belligerent an incipient leaning towards peace. The sweep of French conquest had reached its limit at Utrecht, and would henceforth have to reckon with the Emperor, the great Elector and the Spanish Queen-Regent, as well as with the Dutch, while the English alliance was already insecure: and it was difficult to see what the next campaign might bring. And on the other side, the dreadful impression of the previous summer invasion was still fresh, and the Stadtholder still untried; so that, even in the face of an improved balance of chances, a drawn game, were it offered, would not be without its temptations, especially for the Loevestein minority, who did not desire the Prince of Orange to become Dictator by protracted military necessity. If on each side there was a secret wish to measure the temper of the other, no intermediary could look more innocent and be more informing than a philosophical recluse of republican sympathies, whose private life was in contact with the

most pacific party in the State. That some such public object should lie hid behind the personal motive assigned for the visit would be perfectly consistent with the truest patriotism.

After the murder of Joan de Witt, his heirs disputed Spinoza's continued right to the small pension he had hitherto received ; and maintained their refusal even after the written engagement was produced which gave it him for life. This wrong his indignant friends would have resented on his behalf ; but, rather than retain a benefaction by a quarrel, he surrendered his just claim. So struck were the intending litigants with his forbearance that what they had denied to equity they yielded to admiration, and regularly paid the allowance, which was his chief dependence for his remaining years. He had shown similar disinterestedness on previous occasions. When his father died, he relinquished to his sisters all that was due to him by bequest, except a bed for his lodging, though they had done their best to deprive him of all inheritance. And when his devoted disciple, Simon de Vries, early overtaken by mortal sickness, would have made him heir to his large property, Spinoza positively refused to intercept it from the brother who would naturally succeed to it. De Vries, therefore, was content to charge his estate with an annuity to Spinoza of 500 florins : even this he would not accept in full, but cut down to 300.

Through all the civic tumult and the clash of arms which rang through the earlier half of this eighth decade, the silent influence of the Theologico-Political

Treatise was spreading; receiving new impulse, first from the proscriptive edict, and then from incompetent answers. The only publication relating to it which Spinoza felt tempted to notice was not avowedly a reply to it, but came forward using the same watch-word, and stood side by side with it, as an uninvited and unwelcome ally. From the Hobbist basis of the State this little book—the “Homo Politicus” (1671)—deduces approvingly the most monstrous consequences; that wealth and honours are the supreme good; that, to gain them, religion must be inwardly renounced and outwardly professed; and all serviceable falsehood and perfidy be unsparingly employed. It does not seem to have occurred to Spinoza that the essay might be meant as a satire upon the supposed tendency of a current theory. Taking it all *au sérieux*, he denounces the odious teaching, and for a moment contemplates an anonymous reply, setting forth the true supreme good, the wretchedness of subservience to wealth and honours, and the ruin to States from the inordinate pursuit of them.¹ He did not carry out the idea: probably because the book speedily passed from his disgust to his contempt.

The only published answer to his Treatise² of which he directly speaks, gives him but a few minutes' trouble and stirs in him a far lighter mood:

¹ Ep. 44.

² Viz. Regneri à Mansveldt, Phil. Doct. et Prof. in Acad. Traject. adversus anonymum theologico-politicum Liber singularia. Opus posthumum. Amstel. 1674, 4to.

"A book written against mine by a Utrecht Professor, and published after his death, I saw hanging in a bookseller's window ; and from a few passages which I then read I decided that it was not worth perusal, much less answering. So I turned my back on book and author. It made me inwardly laugh to think how men everywhere, just in proportion to their ignorance, are daring and ready with their pen. These people [doubtless, 'the clergy,' or 'the professors'] seem to me to offer their wares for sale after the fashion of hucksters, who always bring what is cheapest to the front. The devil is said to be the master of wiles : but I find that, for wiliness, their genius is far beyond his."¹

The private criticism of his correspondents he lays much more to heart ; replying to it indeed in an orderly and reasoned way, but with signs of a suppressed soreness. Oldenburg's comments on the Treatise he had not even acknowledged at all : and the correspondence would apparently never have been renewed, had not Tschirnhaus, when in London, excused the silence and healed the breach, by his favourable picture of Spinoza's aims and character.² There was evidently a sunshine in Tschirnhaus before

¹ Ep. 50.

² To this influence must we attribute the apologetic letter (June 1675, Ep. 61) in which Oldenburg (notwithstanding the neglect of his last communication) recommences the dropped correspondence ; retracting his judgment that the Treatise was hostile to real religion, and owning that he had estimated it too much by the ordinary theological standards. In the next month Schuller (Ep. 63), reporting the contents of Tschirnhaus's letters from London, mentions that in Oldenburg and Boyle he had found, and had removed, strange misconceptions of Spinoza. It is impossible to miss the light which Schuller's letter throws on Oldenburg's.

which coldness and suspicion could not live. But no sooner was he gone than the reopened relations began to stiffen again. There is talk of publishing the *Ethics*. Oldenburg had partially recovered from the past book : but the fit of panic returns at the prospect of another ; and he hopes it will contain "nothing which may seem to invalidate the practice of religious virtue." This phrase rubs as a rasp on Spinoza's susceptible nature, and though magnanimously thanking his torturer, he cannot lie still under it. He must know¹ what doctrines of his can be regarded as discouraging "the practice of religious virtue ;" and what are "the scruples in the minds of learned men" which his *Treatise* is said to have raised, and which Oldenburg promises to allay. The reply which this invitation sets in action is curt and narrow enough ; but it suffices to reopen the sluices, and let out a flood of controversy which submerges all the old territory of friendship, with the exception of a few islands of refuge. It turns out that Spinoza's offending points comprise simply the whole of his characteristics ; and that what Oldenburg would like to have from him is a teaching that shall save freewill, the personality of God, the incarnation and resurrection of Christ, and the atonement by the cross. Is it possible to credit such a critic with *both* intelligence and sincerity in his assurance to Tschirnhaus, that he held the *Theologico-Political Treatise* in high esteem ?

This book brought him another correspondence, in

¹ Epp. 62, 68.

which, having to deal with comparative strangers, he evinces much more irritation. The initials of its originator (I. O.) were supposed till recently to be those of Isaac Orobio de Castro, a native of the Spanish Israel who, after being educated in Catholicism, had renounced it for his ancestral Judaism. It is now ascertained, however, that the letters represent the name of Johannes Oosten, of whose position and personality something will doubtless be told by Dr. Van Vloten and Land in their second volume of Spinoza's Works.

For some reason unknown Oosten, instead of acting on his own account, asked Dr. Lambert de Velthuisen of Utrecht to read the Theologico-Political Treatise and report his opinion of it. The long letter written in compliance with this request,¹ though no sooner received than forwarded to Spinoza, affects complete ignorance as to the author of the Treatise; whether the ignorance is assumed, or the writer inveigled Velthuisen into a controversy which he never intended, it is impossible to decide. The paper takes the form, not of a reasoned critique, but of a mere abstract of the leading principles pervading the Treatise, with the reader's conclusion from them. As a compend, it is neither exact nor complete; and though not chargeable with intentional unfairness, is dissentient throughout, yet wavering in its estimates. It begins with treating the anonymous author as a Deist; in a few pages it comes to regard him as a Pantheist; and ends with accusing him of Atheism and the destruction of all religion.

¹ Ep. 42.

Spinoza felt himself too lightly hit and yet too sharply stung by this paper to spend much of his best strength in answering it. Only one of its objections—to his doctrine of Necessity in the Divine Nature and the system of things—does he treat with intellectual care; and even there, instead of writing freshly from the moment, he copies out some sentences already used in a letter to Oldenburg.¹ He duly corrects some misapprehensions into which Velthuysen had fallen; but

¹ See Ep. 75. The last sentence of the first paragraph, beginning "Nam Deum nullo modo fato subjicio," and the whole of the second paragraph, beginning "Deinde hæc," and ending with "metu ducimur," occur again (introduced by different connectives) in the fourth and fifth paragraphs of Ep. 43. There is indeed one small variation, which is not without significance in relation to the chronology of the correspondence. In the letter to Oldenburg occur these words, "Si bonum quod ex virtute et amore divino sequitur a Deo tanquam judice accipiamus, vel ex necessitate divinæ naturæ emanet, non erit propterea magis aut minus optabile;" i.e. "whether we receive *the good*, etc., as from God in the capacity of Judge, or *it flows* (he means, 'or as flowing') from the necessity of the divine nature, it will be neither more nor less desirable." In this sentence "bonum" is made the object of "accipiamus" and the subject of "emanet;" and even then the alternative intended is not accurately expressed. Turn to the Oosten letter: here we read "Si bonum quod ex virtute et amore divino sequitur a Deo tanquam judice accipiamus, vel *quod* ex necessitate divinæ naturæ emanet, non propterea magis aut minus optabile erit:" i.e. whether we receive the good, etc., as from God in the capacity of Judge, or *as what* flows from the necessity of the divine nature," etc. Notwithstanding the weight of Professor Land's opposite opinion, I cannot doubt that the second form is a *correction* of the first. The date of the first is December 1675. That of the second must be later; probably, very little later, the passage being used as fresh in the memory. Bruder has assigned it to 1671; Ginsberg, the same; Mr. Pollock, to 1673.

unjustly compares his mistakes with Voetius's caricatures of Descartes' philosophy. In repelling the charge of atheism, he resorts to the rhetorical plea that atheists pursue honours and riches, instead of living his simple life. And, without noticing any ambiguity in the chief words, he remarks what a strange way it is of "destroying religion," to teach that the love of God is the supreme good, that virtue is its own reward and folly its own punishment, and that every one ought to love his neighbour and obey the civil power. In the autograph of this letter, the most contemptuous expressions are scored out and replaced by milder terms; but such verbal repentances cannot expel the spirit of scornful anger that pervades the whole. In those days of rugged controversy, however, neither writer, it seems, took serious offence against the other; for Spinoza, preparing soon after some annotations for a new edition of his Treatise, asks leave of Velthuisen to insert the two letters, divested, if he wishes, of all that is harsh; and assures him that there is no one whose arguments he is more willing to ponder, knowing as he does his rare candour of mind and his single eye to truth.¹

In July or August 1675 Spinoza took the manuscript *Ethics* to Amsterdam in order to commit it to the press. His intention transpired, and a report was spread and believed, that he was printing a book to disprove the existence of God. This rumour set in action

¹ See Ep. 69, a letter brought to light in 1843 by Prof. Tydeman of Leiden.

against him both a body of divines and some Cartesians who were anxious to disclaim all sympathy with his doctrines : and the former went so far as formally to denounce him to the Prince and magistrates. Before this opposition he recoiled ; at first, only suspending operations till the stir should be over ; but, on finding it increase instead of subside day by day, relinquishing them for an indefinite term.¹ And so it was settled that his personal life should cease ere the chief fruit of his genius began to live. He tells the story of this Amsterdam visit to Oldenburg ; and it is amusing to notice its effect. The secretary, who had again and again urged him to bring out his philosophy and not heed the threats of divines and the outcry of fools,² now quite approves of his countermand to the printer. Nay, it is plain that the news is a great relief to him. He had promised to take charge of some copies ; but, as if they were dynamite passing from a conspirator to his agent, had stipulated that the parcel should be sent through a merchant, and with careful concealment of its contents. The danger of shattered reputation being over, he breathes freely again. This change of feeling marks, in a striking way, the growing odium which the sentiment of the age attached to Spinoza's name.

The last literary task which occupied Spinoza was the preparation of his notes for a new edition of his Treatise. The work was suited to his enfeebled strength : he could take it up at favourable intervals,

¹ Ep. 68.

² Epp. 7, 11.

and lay it down when he was spent; and it was probably spread over the whole year 1676. For some time past his letters had made mention of infirm health, never in the tone of complaint, but only as a plea for indulgence from his correspondents. And no one who looks at the portrait of him and imagines the figure it represents, the bronzed complexion, the bright eyes, the rounded lips, the black bush of wavy hair,¹ can wonder that amid the fogs and deltas of Holland the hunger of consumption eagerly seized upon that warm Southern temperament, which was never meant for amphibious life. The strict and sober regimen which was recommended by frugality was not unsuited to his delicate constitution: but, in spite of it, his emaciation increased; and, though he made no change in his habits, he became so far aware of his decline as on Saturday the 20th February 1677 to send for his medical friend Meyer from Amsterdam. That afternoon Van der Spijck and his wife had been to church, in preparation for the Shrovetide communion next day: and on their return at 4 P.M. Spinoza had come downstairs and, whilst smoking his pipe, talked with them long about the sermon. He went early to bed; but was up again next morning (apparently before the arrival of Meyer), in time to come down and converse with his host and hostess before they went to church. The timely appearance of the physician enabled her to

¹ But was this a wig?—Still, neither Spinoza nor his peruke-maker would be so deficient in art as not to imitate the natural hair.

leave over the fire a fowl¹ to be boiled for a basin of broth. This, as well as some of the bird itself, Spinoza took with relish, on their return from church about mid-day. There was nothing to prevent the Van der Spijeks from going to the afternoon service. But on coming out of the church, they were met by the startling news that at 3 P.M. Spinoza had died; no one being with him but his physician. Meyer returned by the evening boat to Amsterdam; leaving apparently neither explanation nor instruction; and taking with him some money and a silver-hafted knife that were on the table. From the mode in which they are recorded it is clear that these particulars of his visit gave rise to a very uneasy feeling. They are all of them compatible with honour and integrity. Though a medical man would not choose, if he could help it, to be alone with a patient in his last moments, he may be surprised by a sudden collapse when no one is within call. Though he would usually wait to receive from survivors either the acknowledgment of his services or some memorial of friendship, it is possible enough that the patient may himself have made him some final presents of things visible in the room: and, unless taken at once, they would only be at the mercy of the lodging-house keepers. But it was at least imprudent in Meyer to make no local report of the death, and relieve the astonishment of the Van der Spijeks by no word

¹ Coler is particular in telling us that it was to be "*un vieux coq*." Was he thinking of another philosopher, whose last hours required the sacrifice of a cock to *Æsculapius*?

relating to what had happened in their absence. For the aspect of those hours, with no more light upon them, is precisely what it might have been if the philosopher and the physician had arranged together and carried out a method of euthanasia. There is no tittle of evidence for such a thing: and perhaps the neglect to ward off the suspicion is evidence against it. But one would gladly be rid of the disagreeable cloud that hangs over those last moments and their immediate sequel.

Spinoza had instructed the Van der Spijcks to lock his desk after his demise, and send it to the bookseller Rieuwertz of Amsterdam. When this, with its incalculable treasures, was gone, his room, which contained all his perishable possessions, showed scarce enough to pay an appraiser's fee. At least so thought his sister Rebecca, who at first put in her claim as heir; but preferred to drop it, when she had measured the assets against the funeral expenses and small outstanding bills. A row of books, a few lenses,—the last labour of his hand,—some engravings on the walls, these, with his plain bed and body clothing, made up the sum of his worldly wealth: and the sale proved that sister Rebecca had lost nothing by her forbearance. He was buried on the 25th of February, "in the new church upon the Spuy:" and the large attendance of "illustrious persons" in "six coaches," followed by the wine-party of friends and neighbours at the house, strangely contrasts with the lonely life and almost clandestine death which make up the story of his forty-four years.

The foregoing sketch aims to present Spinoza as he appeared. Of the interior character which thus steps forth, it will be easier to speak when the lines of his thought have been laid down and his ethical estimates exhibited. But it is already plain that he made no enemies except by his opinions; and even bitter opponents could not but own that he was singularly blameless and unexacting, kindly and disinterested; if not actively benevolent, at least willing to forego anything for the quieting of anger and the maintenance of peace. His patience under theological ostracism was the more admirable from his evident sensitiveness to injustice and annoyance at pretentious stupidity. He accepted his exiled position without either boast of martyrdom or complaint of wrong: and, far from flapping his heresies in the face of others, he treated all simple and unaggressive religion with tender respect; encouraging the people of the house in their church attendance, and trying to fix their good impressions from it by conversation afterwards; helping them to take their troubles cheerfully as the appointment of God; and comforting his scrupulous hostess about her faith and piety, with the assurance that all was well so long as they kept her in the walks of a pure and good life. Children, young men, servants, all who stood to him in any relation of dependence, seem to have felt the charm of his affability and sweetness of temper.¹

¹ On the significance of this trait Rénan finely remarks, “Rien ne vaut l'estime des petits; leur jugement est presque toujours celui de Dieu.” Conférence à la Haye le 12 Février 1877, p. 17.

And of the many savans and philosophic men who sought him, not one had ever occasion either to complain of his reserve or be aggrieved by his independence. His "metaphysic" might be "strange:" but his love of truth was transparent, and his candour met no resistance from pride. His virtues, no doubt, were mainly of the type which Aristotle calls "*dianoetic*," in which thought takes the lead and will follows. His equanimity, as a few vehement outbursts remain to show, was not gained without self-conquest: which, however, was effected less by the force of counter-affections, compassion, veneration, love, than by intellectual acquiescence in necessity. Self-conservation and self-perfecting exhausted his guiding aims, which led to a sublime prudence, with such sympathy as may be included under it, but with none that transcends it, and no enthusiasm of worship. Whether this estimate must be qualified by reference to another aspect of his mind—viz. a genuine *mystical* tendency—cannot be determined till we reach the propositions in which his philosophy culminates.

PART II.—PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER I.

LOGICAL THEORY.

THOUGH Spinoza's Logic cannot be set clear of his Metaphysics,¹ yet his actual reasoning in the latter will not speak articulately to readers unacquainted with his theory of reasoning. Before committing ourselves to his pilotage over the seas which we explore, we must ask how he proposes to find his way, and by what rules he can make sure of knowing where he is. This is the more needful, as he himself lays great stress upon his *Method*, and translates into it whatever he wishes to render most secure. He announces it on the title-page of his Ethics as the "Geometrical Method," and relies on its cogency no less in moral and speculative inquiries than in the sciences of quantity. Whether we can share this confidence must depend upon the *doctrine of evidence* on which it rests.

No one who remembers the first delight of scientific discovery, the consciousness of real advance as the properties of figure or number revealed themselves, can

¹ See above, pp. 49, 50.

condemn the wish to escape all ignorance and doubt by a path as lucid and as sure. Could we but push our modes of mathematical proof into the realm of unsettled opinion, we should reclaim new continents of knowledge and drive the belt of darkness into harmless distance. This natural ambition, however, may influence us in two ways—to fit our method to the universe, or to fit the universe to our method: and the more difficulty we find in the former, the greater is the temptation to the latter. If the rules of quantity and of necessity cannot be stretched to the range of other categories, the sphere of things can be reduced by interpretation within the rules. Where this fallacious simplification has been unconsciously effected, the formal rigour of proof only imposes upon the reasoner, palming off upon him a misconception as an “eternal truth.” It is an illusion that philosophical “demonstrations” last for ever, and serve as “the eyes of the mind,” by which it sees eternal things and is eternal.¹ It is only *the reasoning* which speaks to all, and is judged by an unchanging rule: what you *reason from* has not the same stability, and though certain for one age, may be unmeaning for another. In order to estimate the *derivata*, it is necessary to appreciate the *data*. Of no age and of no philosophy is this more true than of Spinoza’s. Several of the conceptions which are either tacitly taken up or expressly defined by him are no longer familiar to us, and have to be learned like the vocabulary of a foreign

¹ Eth. V. xxiii. Schol.

tongue ; with the additional disadvantage that our common English supplies no corresponding terms, the very moulds having been broken and cast away in which the thoughts were shaped. For these elements of his method, and the use he makes of them, we must consult the fragment "On the Improvement of the Intellect."

I. DATA OR ASSUMED CONCEPTIONS.

Data to start from you must take up somewhere, else the investigation of truth would involve an infinite regress. As, in explaining how iron is wrought, you stop at the hammer and anvil work, and do not go back to *their* manufacture, and then to that of the *tools* which make them, etc., *in infinitum*, so, in expounding the cognitive process, you must begin with the innate instruments of truth-seeking, and the mode of using them. And this you cannot do unless they have already been at work and yielded their product. In order to inquire what knowledge is, knowledge must first be there. It must be scrutinised as a *given thing* ; and therefore its elements and conditions must be taken as given. What are they ? In all knowledge there is

An *Idea* of the cognised object, presenting within us that which is not within us. This idea is other than the object, and indeed is antithetic to it, planted as it is in the opposite sphere. It is itself a new phenomenon or object which may be known, and of which we may affirm predicates of its own.

Yet this idea, though other than the object, *agrees*

with the object, so as to report *what it is*—i.e. to take its *Essence* into our thought.¹ The idea of an ellipse, e.g., is different from the ellipse, having no area and

¹ This correspondence between thing and thought is described, in the language of the time, as a doubled existence or presence of the thing's essence. So long as the thing, though there, was unknown, its essence had only "*formal*" existence (i.e. in the sphere of *being*); as soon as the thing is known, its essence obtains also "*objective*" existence (i.e. in the sphere of *thought*). To come before the mind's attention is to have "*objective*" existence. To be upon the scene of things in the absence of any perceiving mind is to have "*formal*" existence. The former is ideal, the latter is real. The idea which has the thing for its object is, in its turn, a fact or phenomenon of the mind; and, regarded simply as such, has only "*formal*" existence, just like the thing before it was known; but when it emerges in self-consciousness and attention is turned upon it, the idea also attains "*objective*" existence. This phraseology is long anterior to Spinoza. Descartes says—"To exist *objectively* in the understanding means simply to exist *in the understanding* in the way in which objects usually exist there" (Med. 1st Obj. Cousin, i. 370). And again, "The idea of the sun is the sun itself existing in the understanding, not *really and formally* as it exists in the heavens, but *objectively*, i.e., as objects usually exist in the understanding" (Med. 1st Obj. Cous. i. 371). For the word "*formal*" in this sense, the word "*subjective*" is often employed. This came about in the following way: substantia, sub-stratum, sub-jectum, were all of them translations of *ὑποκείμενον*=subject of a predication=a substantive=the name of a *concrete thing*, or thing *in rerum natura*, which is the seat of properties or phenomena. Thus fire was said to be the *subject* of heat, snow of cold and whiteness, etc.—i.e. they were the *real things* to which these qualities belonged. Hence "*subjective*" denoted, like "*formal*," what is given in reality, irrespective of all minds; "*objective*" what presents itself to thought, and is therefore relative to the thinker. This usage of the words prevailed from the thirteenth to the eighteenth century. Its apparent reversal in modern times is due to the Kantian philosophy, and involves a curious, but for us irrelevant, story.

foci; yet presents in thought the characteristic properties which the figure possesses in fact.

We are to assume, then, these two positions; that the idea is other than the thing, so that the same predicates cannot be affirmed of both; and that yet they have a point of union in the essence of the thing, which is present objectively in the one and formally in the other. In this conception of a single "essence," qualified only by epithets which touch its seat and not its identity, Spinoza flings a bridge across from things to thought: he takes for granted that they communicate, and sets up a doctrine of natural dualism. Idealism is barred out *ab initio*: for it is not true that we know only our own ideas: the thing must be known before its idea is known; having "objective" existence, while the idea has still only "formal." Under the first position, a world of external realities is postulated, opposite to the mind. Under the second is postulated an intercommunion between these opposites, in virtue of which the latter knows the former, though no comparison can be instituted, or common predicate be found, to vouch for the correspondence of idea with object. The idea, being true, speaks for itself, and has to be believed; it needs, and can have, no authentication. It is of no use trying to find an extrinsic criterion of true ideas: they are themselves the primary criterion, and have none. Yet another postulate is involved in the second position. The "agreement" of idea with object is said to consist in the essence of the thing being also in the thought; a phraseology which

implies something identical between the two, however differenced by the adjectives "formal" and "objective." And, as the idea is the derivative fact, the essence pre-exists in the thing before becoming objective in the idea. It is therefore treated by Spinoza as a reality in the world, irrespective of the operations of thought; and not as a mere cluster of the qualities which we make up into the meaning of a word. No language can be more at variance with the Nominalism which (not without adequate *loca probantia*) is habitually ascribed to him.¹

Not *all* our ideas, however, consist of the objective essences of things. Some represent only their partial or accidental affections, that do not lie in their nature, and may even be incompatible with it (like the pro-

¹ The reality which Spinoza ascribed to the "essence," and the dependent relation in which the "idea" stood to it, may be best observed in his early "Short Treatise," where he lays it down that the understanding is wholly *passive* and recipient; that the corresponding activity lies in the objects to which it is exposed; that this activity is of the nature of *affirmation* not *by* the Understanding *about* the object, but by the object's essence to the understanding; so that every understood thing affirms itself, and tells, along with its own truth, the falsehood of the opposite. Hence, no one who has a truth can doubt that he has it, while he who is in error may for a while fancy himself in the truth. For, where the *whole essence* of an object has acted on you and left the corresponding idea, your conscious state is different from what it would have been had only a part of the essence acted on you, leaving you liable to be affected by another part next time—*i.e.* there is a felt difference between a true and an untrue idea. II. xv. xvi. In contrast with this doctrine stands Spinoza's later identification of understanding with activity: "We act so far only as we understand." Eth. IV. xxiv.

digies pictured in our dreams), or, contingently on something else, either may or may not happen to them. These extra-essential ideas are the sphere of fiction and error; and a theory of knowledge must find some assignable mark whereby to distinguish them from true ideas. In order to do this, it must scrutinise both—*i.e.* must treat ideas as objects of comparison and knowledge, and by the method of *Reflection* detect the difference between true ideas and others. The tests of truth must thus be sought within; right self-knowledge will secure all knowledge; and the purified intellect will be the spotless mirror of nature.

The internal marks by which a true idea is characterised are *clearness* and *distinctness*—*i.e.* luminousness in its contents, and sharpness in its separation. From failure in one or other of these features, all figments are *confused*. To have the objective essence of a thing is to think clearly what is in it and omit what is not. Figment cannot enter unless you fail to see what this essence involves and what it excludes. You cannot feign a circle with unequal radii, or a square without four right angles: and if you can fancy the earth a plate and the horse a flying animal, it is only because you miss the definition of these objects, and have no rule to limit your conception,—which is precisely what we mean by “confusion.” Fancy cannot have place among things necessary or impossible. Whenever you start from a clear and distinct idea, and let all the rest follow from it, illusory imagination is shut out. The most frequent

failure of this condition is where your idea is only part of the objective essence, yet is taken for the whole; or else, where it embraces the composite whole only *en masse*, and attaches to it something which would at once be excluded, were the component elements attended to, one by one. Hence, it is a safeguard against such illusion, to break down every compound conception, and bring all its elements into distinct view: for in simple ideas there is no room for fiction; nor can their composition together, when clearly seen, yield any fiction. If you know what a circle is, and what a square, you cannot make a compound out of them; nor, knowing what the soul is, can you fancy the soul square. In all cases the *confused* character attaching to fiction will betray its presence; and is easily detected by attending to the nature of the subject and the predicate, and asking whether the latter runs beyond the bounds of the former, as conceived by us. The same rule applies to *falsity*; which is only fiction *with assent*, or dreaming with our eyes open, when we are unaware that our representations do not proceed from external things. We escape by resolving them into simple ideas, which cannot help being true. We have only to analyse or to follow out any idea, and its truth or falsehood will soon declare itself. To a skilled eye its credentials or its imposture are visible upon its face.

Suppose now that all false ideas have been cleared out; the mind is then left alone with the objective essences of such things as have come within its experience. The mere scattered presence of these would not

constitute intelligence. Understanding requires that they hold the right *order*, of connection and interdependence, in our thought. This is put within our reach by the postulated agreement between *idea* and *ideatum*. Were there in nature anything absolutely detached from all else, its objective idea (supposing it possible) would also be absolutely detached from all others, and yield no conclusion : thought, which must have movement, could not take a step. On the other hand, all things which are interconnected, like the objects in nature, may be understood ; and their objective essences will be similarly connected, and will yield by deduction other ideas, which in their turn will exhibit new relations, and supply instruments of further progress. The order of thought thus reflecting the order of things, the inner and the outer hierarchy of essences will correspond, point by point ; the derivative essence will be deducible from its prior in the scale ; and, in the last resort, all the mind's ideas will hang upon that one which presents the primary source of nature. The nexus of logical cogency reproduces the order of natural necessity.

Spinoza therefore assumes, in the first place, that there are two spheres, of things and thought, different from each other ; that thought, itself an additional thing, contains a knowledge both of other things and of itself, proceeding in the order of deduction ; so that nowhere else than in the scrutiny of thought is truth to be found, and the right ordering of the intellect within itself is the right apprehension of the world.

II. NATURE AND USE OF DEFINITION.

In order to remove out of the way all confused ideas, recourse must be had to *Definition*, i.e. *explicit statement of the objective essence of a thing*. This at least it is in its most perfect form, where nothing is named which does not lie within the thing itself: and this form it will take, when the object defined is itself "*in se*." But when it is not "*in se*,"—when it is "*in alio*," the *aliud* will have to be named in the definition. How are we to understand this distinction, under the two members of which all things are to be found? What is it for a thing to be "*in se*," or not "*in se*"? The phrase originally marked the relation between a given object and the properties which may be predicated of it,—the one named by a substantive and treated as a permanent, the other by an adjective and treated as a dependent affection. The sun is a thing in itself; but its light is an affection of it. We have here simply the category of substance and quality. There is no finite substance, however, which, looked at in its antecedents instead of its consequents, does not lose its independence and turn out to be itself predicable as the affection or manifestation of something else; the sun, *e.g.* being the central condensation of a fire-cloud. The substantive character therefore becomes forfeited by every derived object, and rests exclusively with the eternal source of all,—the only Real self-existent being,

in relation to which all else is Phenomenal. The antithesis of *in se* and *in alio* is the same as that between entity or substantive reality and all that you can predicate of it.

But there is another relation with which Spinoza identifies it, viz. that of Causality, and the language of which he treats as synonymous with its terms. It is certainly a tempting simplification to melt down the two categories,—“Substance and Attribute” and “Cause and Effect,”—into one. It does not seem very violent to regard a given thing as the *cause* of its properties,—*e.g.* the sun, of its heat and light, and the earth, of the weight and fall of bodies upon it; though, in truth, it is not in virtue of its *reality*,—of its *being there*,—not, *i.e.*, quâ *substance*, that either body gives rise to these effects, but in virtue of its being the nidus of certain dynamical relations which are themselves among its *properties*. When the given thing, instead of being physical or qualitative, is quantitative in its essence, *e.g.* a geometrical figure, the language of causality becomes wholly inapplicable. You may doubtless make some one characteristic of the circle, taken as its essence and put into its definition, yield others by inference: but it is not their *cause*; inasmuch as you can invert the order, and deduce it from any one of them that may be substituted in the prior place.¹ Their *ratio*

¹ Yet Spinoza speaks of the relation between the abscissæ and ordinates of a conic section having the same dependence on *the nature of the curve* as the essences of created things on the nature of God (Cogit. Metaph. I. c. ii.) But what is this “nature of the curve” to which he assigns a divine and irreversible priority? Why may not the relation

essendi is a reciprocal one by which they eternally co-exist; and not a successive one, like the *ratio fiendi* which, in causality, determines the order of events. This second category the Understanding applies only to *phenomena*: and the properties of "Substance,"—of entity "*in se*,"—are not phenomena, but eternal as itself.

Spinoza therefore would not be justified, if he merely forced all *properties* to range themselves under the head of "effects." But he does more. Substance itself he obliges to stand beside them there. It also, he tells us, is *an effect*; only not, like them, from anything else, but from itself. It is "*Causa sui*." Whence this paradoxical extension of the idea of *genesis* to that which is defined by its absence? The *influence* of the phrase will be noticed hereafter. At present it suffices to remark that it is rendered possible only by the assumption that Causality is a *universal* category; that *all being* must have a cause; so that if there be nothing else to originate it, it must be self-originated. This assumption, however, is entirely groundless. *Being*, as

between the abscissæ and ordinates lay as good a claim to the title as any other property? It is "the nature of the ellipse" to have the rectangle of the abscissæ in the same ratio to the square of the ordinates that the transverse axis has to the parameter. It is its nature also to be described by the revolution round the foci of two radii vectores at their point of intersection. It is its nature also to arise as periphery to any section of a right cone at an angle less than that of the side with the base. From any one of these characteristics the others may be determined: and it is impossible to establish in favour of any one a "right divine" to the dominant place, analogous to that which "the nature of God" holds in regard to that of "created things."

such, requires no cause : it is the *coming into being*, and the *going out of being*, which alone the intellect insists on treating as an *effect* ; and the moment you designate any existence as "Substance," or "*in se*," you disqualify it for being *causatum*, whether by itself or by anything else. The phrase "Causa sui" is a misleading substitute for the "Self-existent."¹

It follows from this exposition that the interchangeableness of the category "Substance and Quality" with that of "Cause and Effect" is subject in Spinoza's view to a single exception : everything *but one* (God) may be regarded as *Quality* ("in alio") : *absolutely* everything

¹ The phrase, though appropriated by Spinoza, was in current use long before his time. In the very passage above referred to it is introduced with a kind of apology :—"Si res sit in se, sive, *ut vulgo dicitur*, causa sui" (De Intell. Emend., V. VI. and Land, I. p. 38). And in his "Short Treatise" (II. xvii. sub fin.), he actually lays stress upon the absurdity which the phrase involves : to say that "this or that is *causa sui*" amounts to affirming that, prior to its existing, it brought its existence about, which is sheer nonsense." Yet in this very treatise he had already more than once applied the phrase to God ; e.g. in I. iii. 5, I. vii. sub fin. He needed the "Être par soi" of Descartes : he became entangled with its Latin equivalent ; and ultimately found it (for a reason to be hereinafter indicated) the more convenient for the exposition of his doctrine. The phrase belongs, not to the scholastic divinity, but to the heathen pantheism of a much earlier age. In the *Quæstiones et Responsiones* of the pseudo-Justin Martyr (5th or 6th cent.) it is applied, under the form *αὐτοπαράκτος*, to God by the heathen disputant ; while the Christian insists that an unbeginning and eternal being is neither *αὐτοπαράκτος* nor *ετεροπαράκτος*. Resp. iii. 176 C. 178 B., cf. 177 B. 183 E. 185 C.E. Thomas Aquinas anticipates Spinoza's criticism, quoted above, in the words, "Nec est possibile quod aliquid sit causa efficiens sui ipsius, quia sic esset prius se ipso, quod est impossibile." *Summa Theologiæ*, P. I. Qu. ii. Resp. 2.

may be regarded as *Effect*; God, or the "in se," being *causatum* as well as *causa*.)

We have now to observe how this doctrine is turned to account in framing rules for Definition. The problem is, to state accurately the "objective essence" or conceived "nature" of a thing. The main difficulty is to set this clear of properties concomitant with the "essence," but not within it. How are we to tell what has right of entrance and what must be shut out? Spinoza's answer is, "You must name *the thing's proximate cause*." When you say that a *sphere* is the figure generated by the revolution of a semicircle round its diameter as axis; and that *latitude* is the distance traversed by a body on a great circle due north and south from the equator; you secure perfect definitions. In all cases of created things (not "*in se*"), you have to go out beyond them in order thus to find and name the cause. But of eternal things ("*in se*") the cause is intrinsic, and is named in merely stating their own essence. In this case, therefore, the essence must be so stated as to leave nothing for explanation through any cause beyond.¹

¹ This idea of Definition by the proximate cause was thrown out by Spinoza in answer to an inquiry by Tschirnhaus how, among "adequate" conceptions, *i.e.* sufficient for proving all the rest, to pitch upon the most serviceable. The reply is, "Name the producing cause" (Epp. 59, 60). This was in January 1675. The importance which Tschirnhaus attaches to the principle of "Genetic" or "Causal" Definition, in the treatise which he was already meditating (*Medicina Mentis*) is certainly due to Spinoza's influence. In the latter part of the same year, however, his acquaintance with Leibniz began in Paris: and Leibniz claimed the credit of enlightening Tschirnhaus on the

The superiority claimed for "genetic" definition is twofold: by finding the cause, it settles the real or at least the possible *existence* of the thing defined, and relieves it from the suspicion of being a mere *ens rationis*: and it sets the mind to think in the order of nature, viz. from cause to effect. Nothing is intelligible till the movement of reason copies the genesis of things, and we transfer ourselves from the *πρότερον πρὸς ἡμᾶς* to the *πρότερον τῇ φύσει*: and did we pick up the properties first, as experience presents them, we should never secure the essence, the very attempt working against the grain of nature: but, once possessed of the essence as given in its cause, we see how the properties branch out from this stem.

Relying upon this principle, Spinoza makes it a crucial test of the true essence having been found, that from our definition all the other properties can be deduced. Tschirnhaus, however, pointed out to him that, in geometry, we cannot deduce more than *one property* of a figure from its definition, and that, to gain the rest, other definitions or combinations must be called to its aid: *e.g.* from the defined circumference of a circle we

nature of Real Definition, and showing him that, by search for the cause, it must settle whether the thing to be defined is possible or not. (Letter to Placcius, 1687, ap. Trendelenburg's Beitr. iii. 291.) The dates, and the characters of the men, rather tempt one to invert the obligation. Did Tschirnhaus, who talked with Leibniz so much about Spinoza, read him that recent letter about Genetic Definition? and so set him upon the track of thought which led to his "*Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis*" (1684), and, among them, his doctrine of "*Definitiones causales*"? (Gerhardt's *Leibn.* Band. iv. 425.)

learn its uniform self-similarity, possessed by no other curve ; but we have to add radii, tangents, intersecting chords, etc., before we can establish other properties. How, he asks, can this be reconciled with the statement that "from the definition given of anything whatever the understanding infers several properties which do, in reality, necessarily follow from it, *i.e.* from the very essence of the thing"?¹ Spinoza cannot remove the inconsistency ; but tries to limit it by exempting all *real things* from Tschirnhaus's remark, and allowing it to hold only of "very simple things," and "especially mere conceived entities (*entia rationis*), such as geometrical figures." In support of this exemption he claims to have deduced from his definition of Self-subsisting being, several properties, such as Necessary existence, Unity, Immutability, Infinity, etc. Whether Tschirnhaus felt the cogency of this deduction ; whether he admitted the properties deduced to be real *additions* to the initial Self-subsistence ; whether he accepted the distinction set up between geometrical and real essences ; it would be interesting to know. But just at this point, close to the very hinge of Spinoza's philosophy, the correspondence ends.

The rule that, in defining uncreated things, you must leave nothing to be explained by any cause beyond, reappears in another form which needs a few words of exposition. In such case you must so state the essence as to leave no room for the question, whether the thing defined *exists*. Of things "*in se*,"

¹ Eth. I. xvi. Dem.

"the essence involves existence;" and unless you provide for their existence in what you say of their essence, your definition is wrong. This only condenses into a dogmatic shape Descartes' deduction of the existence of God from the Idea of him, viz. that idea includes all perfection: perfection includes existence: therefore God exists. Descartes vainly strove to remove from this argument the paradoxical aspect which he could not but recognise in it; and Spinoza evinces no suspicion of its fallacy. The relation between "existence" and "essence" is perverted when the former is thus treated as one of the characters which make up the latter and may be elicited thence. Every "essence" is the essence of something, and needs an existence to hold and own it: and you cannot depose "existence" from this place of substantive priority, and send it down to do duty as a property among the factors of the essence;—a property, moreover, not usually found there, but only in the special case of uncreated things. You can never get hold of the Real (if you are not sure of it already) by wrapping it up in a parcel of Ideals. If you like to make use, in this case, of Spinoza's postulated "agreement" between "idea and ideatum,"—"objective essence and formal essence,"—you can do so: only you must not pretend to *infer* the "existence" which you take for granted. "Essence" of anything is that which, being posited, gives the thing, and being withheld excludes it. But this "positing" may be in either of two fields,—that of *thought*, and that of *fact*. In both we may admit that

the essence may "involve existence." Do you say it of the field of thought? Then it means that your *idea* of the essence contains the *idea* of existence. Do you say it of the field of fact? Then it means that the essence cannot be *real* without the thing being *real*. But from the conceptual essence to the real existence there is no passage, except by the leap of a postulate. The logical constitution of our conception is *assumed* to be adequate security for the actual constitution of the world.

There are conceptions, however, of a very insidious kind, which are *not* to have the benefit of this assumption, viz. "*abstractions*," which are apt to play the part of sham-essences, and cheat their way into recognition as realities. The mode in which they are formed and qualify themselves for this mischief will appear as part of Spinoza's doctrine respecting the grades of knowledge. Here it suffices to say, that they are mere fabrications of thought, made up out of accidental repetitions of experience, shreds of mutilated perception, having no relation to the nature of things, and, if trusted by the understanding, leading only to false generalisations. In the investigation of concrete nature, these mental creations are of no service; any universal axioms framed from them being indefinite in their range, and determining no one thing more than another. The essence from which we are to define and reason must be sought, not in the common properties of a number of cases, but in the physical particulars and history of an individual thing; and the more

special the ideas resorted to, the more secure will be the inferences they afford. The snare of "abstractions" concealing itself chiefly in common nouns, we shall best guard against it by admitting to our definition no substantive where an adjective ought to serve as well.

III. ARTICULATION OF CONCEPTIONS.

Definition aims at starting us aright upon a course of discovery ; and the next question is, how to proceed from this initial point, and connect the links by which we feel our way forward from one true idea to another. Intelligence being perfect when the order of Thought exactly accords with the order of Nature, we must inquire, if we are to get upon the right track at its outset, whether there is a Being, and of what nature, which is the source of all things ; for if there be, then its essence in our thought will yield us ideas in conformity with the sequences and connections of the world. As that one primary reality determines, by its features, the nature of its first derivative, and this again decides the next, and so on through the whole series of actual existences, so must the true idea of that primary contain as an immediate deduction the essence of the second, and mediately through it that of each successive member in the descending chain of being. And as we thus begin from a single and whole reality, and keep rigorously all through to its steps of positive causality in producing other "singulars"—*i.e.* actually present natures,—we escape the decoy of

abstractions, and are drawn into no inferences either to them or from them.

The following points are clear from this account—
(1.) That for discovery in nature Spinoza relied on a purely deductive method; (2.) That the fountainhead of the deduction must be the definition of God; and (3.) That in framing that definition no predicates must be admitted except those from which the essences of really existing things necessarily follow. These positions are summed up in the avowed aim of his philosophy,—to show how “all things inevitably follow from the necessity of the divine nature.”¹ But of the third position he adds an explanation which is one of the chief enigmas of his doctrine. It is to save us from deviating into abstractions that he insists on close adherence to “the series of causes from one real being to another real being;” and we naturally understand him to advise the study of concrete natural objects in their mode of origin: to these “singulars” he seems to point when he tells us “to take all our ideas from physical things or real beings.” To our surprise he warns us that he is speaking of “the series, not of individual mutable things, but of fixed and eternal things:”—the former being out of the question through two disqualifications, viz. their measureless number and their dependence for *existence* on relations extrinsic to their *essence*, so that you may learn the story of the one, yet remain in the dark about the other. What, then, are these “fixed and eternal things, from which,

¹ Ep. 75.

and from the laws writ upon them for the origin and order of all particulars, we are to seek for the intimate essences of things"? The only characters given us for their discovery are,—that they are "*singulars*," yet, "in virtue of their ubiquitous presence and power, so *comprehensive*, as to be generic relatively to individual mutable things, and supply us with classes of definitions for them, and proximate causes of all."¹

It might well baffle us to find these *universal singulars*, were we not familiar with two ways,—the one inverse to the other,—of interpreting the world. We may read it (to borrow a logical phrase) in *denotation*, and regard it as assemblage of given objects; or, in *connotation*, as a group of component powers. In the former sense we look upon each particular thing as a unit, and say that Nature creates individuals only, while the needs of the human mind gather them into clusters and kinds, and the universe is the muster-roll of them all. In the latter sense, we look upon each particular thing as a complex of attributes, which, relatively to it, may be called *qualities*, but which, reappearing in countless other things, are not among its dependencies. Rather are they among the factors that make it up. Any one of these,—say, *size* or *weight*,—may be isolated for attention, examined in object after object, chased through the universe, till it is set free from its relativity and apprehended in itself. Thus pursued, all sizes merge in Space, all weights in Gravitation, or, it may be, in Motion. Similarly, each

¹ De Intell. Emend., V. VI. and Land, I. 33.

function of an individual thing turns out to be, not its private possession, but a public function for ever exercised by nature through the succession of perishable things. Whoever can tell the complete story of one of these functions is master of a science; and to see through them all would be omniscience.

Now each of these universal functions may certainly be treated as a mere abstraction. Our knowledge of Space is often regarded as built up out of all our experiences of sensible extension,—a generalised residuum of observed relations of position; and in this view the idea is in the highest degree compound, and its object has no reality except as a quality of particular things. But it is also possible to hold, with Kant, that this idea has none of the necessary marks of an abstract; that no multitude of felt elements of dimension could flow together, by dropping their specialties, so as to constitute our representation of space; that we are constrained to think of one universal and infinite space, from which all perceived spaces are cut out and limited. In this view, we may no doubt get rid of our problem by following Kant into idealism. But, otherwise, we must regard Space as the real scene of universal being, “fixed and eternal,” and, while comprising all things, “singular” itself. In like manner Force may be treated as a property of Matter, abstracted thence by our sifting thought; or, on the other hand, *e.g.* by Boscovich, as *constituting* matter by centralisations and movements in space, eternal as space itself. In this latter view, it becomes a simple and all-pervading element of the

universe ; like space, a given condition of things, and not a consequence of them. It is a "thing," because it is a reality lodged in space ; it is *one* thing (a "singular"), because it is self-identical, wherever found, having the same things true about it ; and it is "fixed and eternal," because, even though referable, along with its coefficients, to a higher unit of being, it shares the unconditioned necessity of that supreme existence. All nature, according to Spinoza, is "one individual,"¹ without prejudice to the individualities comprised in its contents.

We thus gain, perhaps, a sufficient sample of Spinoza's "comprehensive singulars," of the "fixed and eternal" type. We might describe them as those real attributes of the primary nature which are presupposed in the essences of derivative things. Always sparing of examples, he gives no list of them, though in another connection we shall hereafter meet with something like it. But there is one drawn up by Leibniz on the margin of his copy of the *De Intell. Emend.*, and communicated by M. Foucher de Careil, which is welcome as the conjecture of an acute contemporary reader.² It runs thus :—(1.) Deus ; (2.) Spatium ; (3.) Materia ; (4.) Motus ; (5.) Potentia Universi ; (6.) Intellectus Agens ; (7.) Mundus. Of these terms, however, Leibniz has crossed out the first, second, and fourth. Opposite reasons are suggested for the erasure. According to M. Foucher de Careil, Leibniz saw in Spinoza's "Deus" nothing but either "Materia" or "Potentia

¹ Eth. II. Lemma vii. Schol. ² Leibniz, *Descartes, et Spinoza*, pp. 122-7.

Universi," and so cancelled the word as an exoteric pretence; and in his "Motus" only what the fifth term expresses better. By thus curtailing the list, he meant to intimate that Spinoza's doctrine was simply "materialism" or "naturalism." According to Mr. Pollock,¹ Leibniz's erasures were intended, not to interpret Spinoza, but to improve upon him, so that the cancelled and the standing terms would form distinct lists, representing the categories of rival philosophies. Neither hypothesis can be worked smoothly through the series.

The "eternal things" then which Spinoza so obscurely designates are the *a priori* conditions, such as the essential characters of Space and Motion, from which every synthetic scheme of Natural Philosophy must start. The mere relation between the initial assumptions and the deduced propositions he may have conceived in the way afterwards exemplified by the Principia of Newton. But the difference becomes conspicuous at the prior stage, on putting the question, "How do you get your initial assumptions, and legitimate them?" Newton would reply, "By a rigorous analysis of concrete experience;" and would spread out, as the contents of this expression, a systematic logic of induction, for gaining (out of mere phenomena) the secure deductive start. Spinoza, omitting all this analytical prelude, takes the assumptions on their own merits as intuitive; testing them only *as thoughts*, by seeing whether they reason out into absurdity or truth.²

¹ Spinoza, p. 151, note.

² He distinctly repudiates the resort to experience in order to verify

In other words, he wields them as an *hypothesis*, and checks them by observing how the hypothesis will work. This mode of trial and error may indeed be called "analysis," but only in the sense of the Greek geometers. And in truth Spinoza, far from grasping the powerful methods of modern discovery and anticipating their results, was so preoccupied by the fascinations of geometrical synthesis and analysis, as not even to keep pace with the scientific thought of his own time.

The only means of checking definitions being the criticism of them as thoughts, conformable or not to the nature and range of the intellect, we have to fetch our criterion of judgment from a previous study of the intellect itself. Its definition is to pass sentence on all definitions. Spinoza accordingly had designed, for the next portion of his essay on Method, an exposition of the powers of the understanding, as distinguished from the parts of our nature which limit our understanding. But here he breaks off with a few lines of mere program, and the fragment ends. Fortunately, he treats fully of the omitted subject in the second book of his Ethics; and it will be convenient to borrow thence the propositions on the psychology of cognition in order to fill the lacuna in the unfinished treatise.

the definition of an attribute, and declares it to be serviceable only where inference from the definition fails us. "Experience teaches us no essences of things." And in regard to things "*in se*," where the essence involves existence, the definition contains all that we want. Ep. 10.

IV. FIRST ORDER OF IDEAS—IMAGINATION.

We have hitherto let Spinoza freely use the terms "idea," and "object of idea," without asking for a definition of them. So long as he converses with us about operations of the understanding, he uses the words as we do; "idea" being the thought of something, and "object" the something thought of. But when, in quest of the rudiments of mind, we descend with him below the plane of self-conscious intelligence, we find him still resorting to these words, where they cease to speak to us with their familiar meaning. He tells us, *e.g.*, that "the idea which constitutes the human mind is the idea of the human body"—*i.e.* "of a certain definite mode of extension in actual existence;" that "the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body;" nay more, that "for *every* bodily thing" (as well as for the human organism) "there is a concomitant idea, so that all things are animate," and "the superiority of our mind to theirs depends only on the superiority of its corporeal object."¹ Here he cannot possibly mean that every tree thinks of the tree and every stone thinks of the stone; or even, that our mind consists of a contemplation of our body; or, that the first and principal thing attended to in the act of cognition is our own organism. Under the coupled terms "idea" and "object," he is evidently dealing with quite a different relation from that which

¹ Eth. II. xi. xiii. and Schol.

they have hitherto marked. We are helped to the right apprehension of it by Sir W. Hamilton's doctrine, that the only *object* of perception is the external body *in immediate contact with the organ of sense*,—effluvia in the case of smell, rays of light in the case of sight, air vibrations in the case of hearing; and that we do not smell the flower, see the sun, hear the violin.¹ If this be true, the only thing "we perceive" and "of which we are cognizant" is what we do not even know to exist; while the one thing on which our attention fastens is wholly unperceived. This paradox arises from confounding the *Cause of a Sensation* with the *Object of a Perception*. It is certainly possible for the same body to deserve both names; the snow which I touch both causes a feeling of cold and is known by me as lying at my finger-tips. But it is the source of my sensation, it is the end of my perception; and to this latter relation only does the word "object" apply. When the last links of physical change prior to our feeling (*e.g.* the undulations of light) are unsuspected by us, and are only the occasion of our knowing the presence of something else, they have no pretension to displace it as the *object* of our cognizance.

This illegitimate extension of the word "object" to what never comes into thought at all, but is only cause of the attendant feeling, is precisely what we find in the propositions we have cited from Spinoza. That "the human body is the object of the idea constituting the human mind," means that, in its physio-

¹ See Hamilton's Reid, pp. 104 note, 160 note, 299 note.

logical constitution, the human body is the source of human thought. That "the idea of the human body is the mind," means that the state of feeling or consciousness which attends upon affections of the human body is what we mean by mind. Nor is this relation between "object" and "idea" limited to the case of man. Every individual thing having its "idea," the "idea of a tree" means the idea which the tree has, or which (irrespective of us) is its inseparable accompaniment. It is accordingly treated as "the mind" of the tree, just as "the idea of our body" (*i.e.* the consciousness it carries) is our "mind:" and the rule, we are told, "for defining wherein and how far the human mind excels the minds of other things, is, to become acquainted with its object, viz. the human body."¹

The identity between Hamilton's use of the word "object" and Spinoza's may seem to be disturbed by one difference. Hamilton admitted, Spinoza denied, the physical "object" to be the *cause* of the ensuing mental state. According to the latter (as we shall see) each of the two spheres,—of extension and thinking,—has its chain of causation, parallel and constant, link to link, but without any crossing action from the one to the other. Motion cannot give Thought. Thought cannot give Motion.² This peculiar doctrine of causa-

¹ Eth. II. xiii. Schol. Ad determinandum quid mens humana intersit, quidque *reliquis* præstet, necesse nobis est, ejus objecti, ut diximus, hoc est, corporis humani naturam cognoscere.

² This position is laid down (being Cartesian) even in the early treatise *De Deo*, etc., I. ii. Suppl. p. 19; though quite inconsistent with passages in the same chapter.

tion, however, makes no difference, except in the choice of words for describing one and the same relation. In both instances "the idea" is conceived as *attendant upon* the physical phenomenon ; and the latter is called the "object," not as being thought of in the idea, but as independently present in the sphere of things. In both instances the concomitance is not simply a reciprocal parallelism on equal terms ; but a certain lead is given to the bodily *reality* as the *incident* fact of which the mental state is the *reflection*, so that any inversion of order, by which you should mention the idea first and the object afterwards is out of the question.

In truth, Spinoza's psychology of perception was originally empirical, not ideal ; nor did it ever conform itself thoroughly to his later purpose of absolutely detaching from each other the physiological and the mental series of phenomena. In his "Short Treatise" he uses the "Animal Spirits" (accepted from Descartes) as a middle term between Percipient and Perceived, just as the "Essences" of things mediated for him between the Real and the Ideal of the Intellect. These "animal spirits" live a kind of amphibious life in the philosophy of the time, now running through the body and now diving off into the soul, so as to play the part of messenger between them. They were the most subtle parts of the blood, that passed along the nerves and filled the interstices of the brain : their centripetal movements occasioned sensation in the mind, their centrifugal, action in the body ; the former being subject

only to corporeal influence, the latter to mental also. When the soul moves the animal spirits in one direction and the body moves them in another, we are oppressed, and feel the strife of the passions. The power of the soul over the animal spirits may be weakened by bodily causes, as when fatigue or fasting has slackened their movement. Through their motion and rest it is that the form and changes of the body, and indirectly of other bodies, report themselves to us in sense-perception: and through the soul's command over their motion and rest, it is enabled to move the body and thence also other bodies. The reason why our own limbs are the only masses which by a thought we can directly stir is, that only a body which *gets* an idea of itself (in its associated thinking function) can be moved through this idea; not one which merely *gives* an idea of itself (to some foreign thinking function).

It is obvious that this hypothesis assumes a real interaction between body and mind: for it has no other purpose than to render this interaction conceivable.¹ It cannot harmoniously coexist with the

¹ More direct evidence of Spinoza's early adherence to the physiological psychology appears in the *De Deo*, etc., App. II. "To understand the nature of that mode which we call mind, and how it originates from the body and its changes depend on the body alone (which is what I mean by union of body and mind), be it observed," etc. Suppl. 241. Even near the end of the posthumous fragment *De Intell.* Emend. he still speaks of some ideas which "*ex fortuitis motibus corporis factæ sunt.*" V. VI. and Land, I. 30. Such passages fully justify the emphasis with which Mr. Pollock insists on the physiological background of Spinoza's psychology.

doctrine that there is no passage either way between motion and thought. Spinoza accordingly refutes its main positions in the Preface to the fifth part of his Ethics: for though, in form, his polemic is there directed against Descartes' centralisation of the "animal spirits" at the "pineal gland" for disposal by body or mind, it applies equally to any other device for establishing an interchange and common measure between molecular change and consciousness. "What does Descartes mean," he says, "by the union of Mind and Body? What clear and distinct conception has he of *Thought* most closely united to a certain little bit of *Quantity*?" These questions are equally pertinent, whether the "animal spirits" *straightway* translate themselves into idea, and inversely receive their message from it, or do and suffer the same thing by nudging the pineal gland and getting a push from it in return.

Though, however, Spinoza confutes his own earlier doctrine along with that of Descartes, the traces of it remain very visible in his psychology. In describing the phenomena of the senses, he is not content to name the last known physiological change, and then, forthwith, the first ensuing feeling, in spite of the chasm between; but cannot refrain from inserting fancied intermediaries, which, though really physical, have names metaphorically imported into psychology. Thus he tells how we gain the first and lowest order of our ideas, viz. "*Images*." External bodies impinging on our own impel the animal spirits towards the

cerebral centre. Arriving there, these fluids press against the soft brain, and by altering its planes induce upon themselves a reaction which would not else exist. This new state has its accompanying and distinctive idea, which is conveniently called an "*image*," on the ground that the corresponding bodily change is the *vestige* left, through the fluids, on the compressible surface of the brain. The special feature of this idea is that in it we regard the external body as *present*, and contemplate it as *an object there*. The corporeal vestiges are in the realm of Extension; the felt images in that of Thinking. Thus we reach Perceptive Presentation.

Further: any such cerebral "footprint," once established, the animal spirits may reproduce by reverting, of their own accord, to the same pressure on the same part. The corresponding idea will then recur; and the outward object, though absent, will be regarded as present, until we encounter some other idea incompatible with its presence. These spontaneous images are *Imaginations*. In themselves they are indistinguishable from the predecessors which they simulate, and leave us to learn elsewhere whether their objects are present or not. In both cases there is the same "affection of our body," consisting of an action and reaction between the "animal spirits" and the brain.¹ In calling this a "vestige" of the outward body, we are to understand only an *effect*, and not to attribute, either to it or to its idea, any *resemblance* to that

¹ Eth. II. xvii. with Cor. and Schol.

body.¹ There can be no *likeness* between different molecular arrangements on a compressed cerebral surface and either the weight, the warmth, the smell, the form, the colour, etc., of external things, or the ideas of these qualities. It is only that for each outward variety there is an inward one as well. Thus is the step taken from Presentation to Representation.

The idea which ensues on the cerebral change is called by Spinoza the "idea of that bodily affection ;" and the bodily affection is called "the object" of the idea. We naturally ask, "Which of the two meanings of the word *object*,—which therefore of the two relations between object and idea,—are we to read in this language? Is it that in the idea we *think* of the bodily affection ; or, that *from* the bodily affection we pass to the idea? Strange to say, Spinoza was unconscious of any difference between these two ; and his interchange of them, as if they were identical, vexes his text with many an obscurity. He seems really to have thought that an "idea" (or feeling) attendant on a bodily affection must be a knowledge of that affection ; and that in it the mind contemplates certain corporeal *vestigia* produced by external things on the brain ; and that this contemplation *is* the idea or imagination of the things.² But how can we "con-

¹ Eth. II. xvii. Schol. "Corporis humani affectiones, quarum ideas corpora externa velut nobis præsentia representant, rerum imagines vocabimus, *tametsi rerum figuras non referunt.*"

² Eth. II. xvii. Dem. "Mens humana *hanc corporis affectionem contemplantur.*" In Eth. III. ii. Schol. the "image of an object" is expressly

template" a molecular change of which we know nothing? What we attend to in such case is either *our sensation*, which is not bodily, but mental; or else, the *outward thing*, which is not *our* body, but *another* body. The corporeal affection through which we are enabled to look at either of these is just the one thing which does not come into "contemplation" at all. This identification of ideas *from* bodily affections with ideas *of* them is the key to several riddles in Spinoza.

The idea of our own body which, he says, constitutes our mind,¹ and is its actual being (*esse formale*),² is not simple and self-given, arising out of the essence of the object; but is made up of all the ideas we have of the several bodily affections.³ These, taken one by one, we do know; and our knowledge of the body is their aggregate: *i.e.* we know it, not *a priori* by its nature, but *a posteriori* by its phenomena. Moreover, these phenomena do not belong to it alone; it needs, for their production, the partnership of external bodies which variously sustain it and play upon it: so that in the idea of each corporeal affection are confusedly mixed up the natures of other bodies and of our own; the latter being the really preponderant element, though the images occasioned by the cerebral identified with the bodily affection:—"prout *corpus* aptius est, ut *in eo* hujus vel illius *objecti imago excitetur*." And in Eth. V. i. "*corporis affectiones*" and "*rerum imagines*" are used as equivalents, in contradistinction from the "*rerum ideæ*." To attend to the "*images of things*" is therefore to attend to the "*bodily affection*."

¹ Eth. II. xiii.² Eth. II. xv.³ Eth. II. xix.

vestiges present external objects.¹ This concurrence, in the same idea, of the organism and its scene of existence leads Spinoza (when speaking of one and the same act of attention) to describe *the object* of the mind's "contemplation" sometimes as the "external thing," sometimes as the "bodily affection;"² a fact which well illustrates his unconscious double use of the word "object." The fact which he intends to mark is this: that the feeling attending "the bodily affection" (*e.g.* of warmth, of sweetness, of beauty, etc.) we plant out in "the thing," which we thereby regard as *present*. Imagination just consists in thus setting up an object, on occasion of a bodily affection, and judging it by a subjective standard; as when a prick of light upon our retina makes us see a star at the bottom of a lake. This externalization of our own states is our "idea of [*i.e.* from or answering to] the affection:" this is our "image" [*i.e.* of the foreign body]. It is a distinctive feature of Imagination that in it the mind is *passive*.³

To render this doctrine exact, an answer is needed to a question which Spinoza omits to treat. Of our body we learn only the particular sense-affections. In these, other bodies are mixed up with it as part-

¹ Eth. II. xvi., Cor. 2; IV. i. Schol.

² In Eth. II. xvii. Dem. both expressions occur. Similarly Mr. Pollock, representing Spinoza, says, "All our perceptions of external things consist in perceptions of our own body as modified by them." P. 197.

³ De Intell. Emend., V. VI. and Land, I. 29, Unde anima habet rationem patientis.

ners. And we plant out these affections to serve as properties of the external things and constitute their images. Then what is it that we keep at home, and that is to give us the apprehension of our own body? The "confusion" charged upon imagination is referred to the hopeless entanglement, in each single sense-affection, of the human body and foreign bodies, and our ascription to the latter of what we know only as in the former. How then do we divide the shares, or even conceive the partnership? Whence do we get the *duality* of body,—our own, and not our own? The sense-perceptions, as predicates, cannot belong to *two* subjects: and if it is their characteristic that they form "images," *i.e.* give themselves away to external bodies, they cannot at the same time play the part of "affections of our own body." His ambiguous use of the word "idea," concealed this difficulty from Spinoza; and he simply *assumes*, as a matter of unexplained belief by sensation, that "we feel that our own body is affected in various ways,"¹ a feeling which he apparently deemed inseparable from the images of outward objects. Our own body and other bodies are thus taken, as two related terms given in imagination together, without any account of their relation. To this somewhat vague assumption there would be little to object were it only rendered congruous with the attendant analysis of imagination.

The whole of these ideas,—the sense-perceptions,—are too confused to give any clear cognition: because

¹ Eth. II. Ax. 4.

(1) they indistinguishably blend in one result the contributions of our own body and of other bodies; (2) what they report of either of these is not the *essence* or total nature, but only some one phenomenon or relation at a time; (3) the ideas themselves are not clear and distinct, being apart from their causes, and from the essence of their objects.¹ Nor is the *self-knowledge* of the mind from this source any better: for, being only *the idea* we have of these same *confused ideas*, it cannot be clearer than its contents, and must be affected with similar limitations, presenting the mind to us in only a part of its nature, and mixing together ideas of external bodies and of its own.²

The chief types of illusion due to Imagination are indicated by Spinoza, and may be reduced to the following heads:—

1. Each particular image gives the object as present, whether it be so or not; and is therefore an inadequate witness of fact. If we err, however, in this way, the error lies not in our *having the image*, but in our *not having* the testing idea which would settle whether it is presentative or representative. Let there be such an idea, and the power of imagining is then an excellence, not a fault.³

2. Images concurrently or contiguously given become agglutinated, so that when one is reproduced the others will recur: *e.g.* the sound of a name (as "*apple*"),

¹ Eth. II. xxviii. and Schol. Cf. De Intell. Emend., V. VI. and Land, I. 30.

² Eth. II. xxix. and Cor. and Schol.

³ Eth. II. xvii. Schol.

and the look, the smell, the taste of the thing named, once experienced together, will each, on returning, recall the rest. Ideas without any intrinsic relation are liable to be thus made up into an arbitrary knot, shaped by chance experience and individual habit. Spinoza calls this association of ideas "*Memory*."¹ But unless, on the recurrence of the linked ideas, there is a conscious reference to the prior experience which joined them, identifying the present and the past subject of them, the characteristic is absent which distinguishes memory from mere suggestion.

3. Where the concurrent or contiguous images are also partially *similar* (as of a man, a woman, and a child), repetition, as it accumulates, will resolve the integral representations; saving the constant features by reiteration, while the inconstants die away through non-recurrence. The result is, a mutilated representation or compend of such common properties as affect us in all the instances; constituting the meaning of a "*Universal*" or Class-name. This meaning will be "confused," not only on account of the "mutilation," but also because, among the properties saved, one will be foremost with you, another with me, etc.; attention fixing, *e.g.* here on the stature, there on the form, and elsewhere on the sagacity, of man.²

Where the partial similarity is reduced to a minimum and the images delivered have nothing in common except in being images, all their features are crowded out; none having advantage by iteration over

¹ Eth. II. xviii. and Schol.

² Eth. II. xl. Schol. 1.

the rest, so as to escape the reciprocal blurring and erasure, consequent on the limited capacity of the human brain. The result is such abstracts as are expressed by the "so-called transcendental terms," "Thing," "Being," "Somewhat." As a mere residuum of obliterated images, these also are "confused."¹

4. At a first glance the language in which Spinoza speaks of *Time*,—" *Tempus . . . nihil est præter modum cogitandi*"²—might seem to anticipate Kant's "*Æsthetic*" doctrine. But it does not mean that the time-order in which sensory material disposes itself is only the *a priori* "form" of our perceptive faculty, and therefore not predicable of things as they are, irrespective of perception. Spinoza did not resolve the externality, coexistence, and succession of objects into the constitution of the subject; but, on the contrary, assumed, as we have seen, the presence in thought of the essence that was real in the thing. He does not therefore teach the ideality of time in the Kantian sense. This much he has in common with Kant, that he insists on the unity and simplicity ("*indivisibility*" he calls it) of the "*eternity*" in which all particular times, as of the "*extension*" in which all particular figures are marked off: only, he treats this unity as *real* (in *naturâ rerum*), while with Kant it is purely subjective, due to the make of our perceptive capacity. In regard to the "*indivisibility*" of the infinite it suffices to say that, in his view, the proper object of the Intellect is that "whose essence involves ex-

¹ Eth. II. xl. Schol. 1.

² Cogit. Metaph. II. c. x.

istence;" whose existence therefore is necessary and eternal, a simple self-identity neutral, like geometric truths, to all that happens with place and date. Nothing else than this, and what inevitably follows from it, has perfect existence: and nothing else than the Definition of this, and the deducibles it gives, constitute adequate knowledge. Within this sphere,—of reasoning out from the essences of things,—we meet with nothing historical or successive, but only with truths which would be the same if "time stood still." Could we read the universe perfectly, it would prove to be constituted, through and through, of such "eternal" data and their contents. But in their combinations they give rise to various phenomena or apparent existences or inconstant things; the differences among which (as we ourselves belong to them) it much behoves us to notice and name. It is Imagination that makes objects of these concrete particulars; and it is in distinguishing them from each other that it invents the language and divisions of Time. One body moves quicker than another, or with variable velocity. To mark this difference between two present experiences, or between the present and the past of one continuous experience, the idea of Time is resorted to, with its triple provision for variation in the Before, the Now, the After, and its measure by comparison with some uniform motion. These are simply "aids of imagination," for the conception and description of phenomena. They are a mere calculus of thought. And that which they are used to compute is not "existence," but the

limitation, *i.e.* the negation, of existence. "Duration," be it longer or shorter, only tells *how little* existence a thing has. As opposed to "*eternity*," it is a predicate of *non-necessary* existence.¹

This failure of necessity is what we mean by "*contingency*." It presents itself whenever a thing taken as now existing can be conceived as either existing or not existing in the future or in the past. This happens when existence is not involved in its essence, and our only rule for thinking it is the experienced series of phenomena, the certainty of which is not secured against the possible entrance of disturbance. From liability to such disturbance, our expectation wavers; and when we construe this subjective suspense into an alternative possibility seated in the object, we are cheated by our imagination.

5. From this point we are easily drawn into another illusion, *viz.* the belief in our own "*freedom*," *i.e.* ability to act in either of two alternative ways. We are naturally impelled to seek our own advantage; we are conscious of our own aims in doing so; but are ignorant of the inward causes which determine our will; and so express them all by claiming them for the Ego in which they are. We thus come to attribute to ourselves and other men a double possibility which is wholly imaginary. Nor do we restrict the conception to human nature; but, on observing the many useful things there are in nature, suppose that there also has been *action for an end*, and that our

¹ Eth. II. xlv. Schol., and Ep. 12.

benefit has been the selecting principle in the constitution of the world. We thus endow the Creator with such free choice as we fancy in ourselves; and delude ourselves with the idea that the universe is "orderly" and "good" and "beautiful" in itself; whereas these terms express no attributes of reality, but only our own likings. The nature of things in itself, and apart from this personal relation, has no ideals, and therefore no place in its vocabulary for "beauty," "order," "good," and their opposites.¹

Such are the sources of error which attach to either single images or their combinations. They are a medley of subjective and objective influences. They carry no apprehension of causes. Their association together is accidental. And their order is uncertain,—as our belief in contingency attests. They are therefore confused and inadequate ideas; involving indeed no illusion, if taken for what they are, viz. mixed and partial states, falling short of the essences of things; but fatally misleading, when blindly accepted as real knowledge.²

V. SECOND ORDER OF IDEAS—REASONING.

The reason why the ideas hitherto treated are confused and inadequate is, that they are "mutilated," and made up of heterogeneous contents. In establishing his theory of "adequate and clear" ideas, Spinoza

¹ Eth. I. xxxiii. Schol. 2, and I. Appendix, and Epp. 21, 23.

² Eth. II. xviii. Schol.; II. xvii. Schol.; II. xxxii. xxxiii. xxxv.; Ep. 21.

therefore turns away from this feature, and looks out for ideas of simple and universal predicates; not the false "Universals" of random experience, but the true "communes notiones," i.e. ideas of what a totality of "things has in common, and what is alike in the part and in the whole." First, let the totality be the universe of bodies. Whatever is common to our body and all other bodies and alike in the part and in the whole, must always, in their mutual action, be entirely present; else, it would be either not common or not alike throughout. Its idea, therefore, can never be supplemented, it can only be repeated, in all experience, though it were infinite. It is consequently adequate.¹ Next, let the totality comprise only our body and such external bodies as habitually affect it. Still, of any common characteristic (*commune et proprium*) homogeneous through this narrower range, we shall have an adequate idea. For, this range might have been the whole, and is open to the same reasoning: what happens in our body from external bodies is in virtue of what is common to it and them; and when we are affected by the common element, whether as present in our own or in the external body, it comes over just the same, and is not changed or curtailed by shifting its relation: what it is *here*, that also it is *there*. Its idea, therefore, is distinct and complete, so as to constitute what is characteristic in the idea of that affection.² Had Spinoza been pressed for examples of these comprehensive predicates, he would probably have named

¹ Eth. II. xxxviii.² Eth. II. xxxix.

"*extension*" for the absolutely, and "*weight*" for the relatively universal. He is moving here in the same field of thought where we formerly found him gleaning his "universal singulars."

The range of adequate ideas is further enlarged by rational deduction from those already given. For, such deduction is of the very essence of the intellect or knowing power, and is identical with what we mean by enlargement of knowledge.¹

As, in this theory, the part played by our own body is that of a sample of corporeal nature, serving as a base of comparison for detecting, by its affections, the common properties of all related bodies, it follows that the more the human body has in common with other bodies, the more is the mind competent to know.² Our own organism is our key to unlock the world; and the more variously it answers to the numerous wards of nature, the fewer will be the chambers closed against our entrance.

To these "communes notiones" Spinoza attaches two marks which give us some further help in determining their nature. As really Universal, and "unfolding the essence of no particular thing," they constitute, he says, the *base or starting ground of Reasoning* (*fundamenta rationis*):³ *i.e.* they furnish the definitions of primary geometrical or physical properties, whence all deduction in pure mathematics or rational mechanics takes its commencement. We have first-hand and adequate knowledge of whatever is true alike of our

¹ Eth. II. xl.² Eth. II. xxxix. Cor.³ Eth. II. xl. Schol.

own and all other related bodies ; and derivative knowledge no less certain of a system of ulterior predicates evolved from these data. It is plain, therefore, that, on the question subsequently raised, whether the first principles of dynamics were axiomatic or empirical and the science itself demonstrative or inductive, Spinoza would have pronounced on the *a priori* side.

The other mark used to distinguish the "communes notions" with which *Ratio* deals is, that what they give us to apprehend has the character of *eternity*: we know it "*sub specie eternitatis*,"¹ i.e. as *necessary* truth, always and everywhere predicable, and not depending on anything which may or may not exist. This exemption from all time-relations is only another way of keeping at a distance the contingencies of experience and shutting us up within purely logical processes. It therefore again claims an *a priori* certainty and an apodeictic procedure for the contents and use of our "adequate" rational ideas. That we thus know the common properties of all material things is still due to the idea of our own body;—not, however, of it as a present fact; but of its essence as necessary, i.e. as belonging, together with all other bodies, to the infinite and eternal extension. Only by knowing the eternal essence of our own body do we know that of other things: i.e. we learn the existence and properties of space by our own participant relation to them.²

¹ Eth. II. xliv. Cor. 2.

² Eth. V. xxix. and Schol. The inexperienced readers of Spinoza need a caution with regard to Spinoza's use of the word "essence." The

Spinoza crowns his account of the "communes notions," or "adequate knowledge" of "what is common to our own and all other bodies," by identifying it with a "knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God."¹ The full meaning of this proposition will appear hereafter. Here we have only to note that the common property of all matter, *i.e.* extension, is taken when known as interchangeable with the essence of God; and the inference is expressly drawn that all men necessarily have "an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God."² What we say in the fundamental definitions and axioms of geometry and physics, we say of God.

The "clear and adequate ideas" thus gained supply "essence" of the human body would usually be understood to mean the properties necessary to define it, *i.e.* the properties which determine its relation to other things in point of resemblance and difference. And though the generic characters are assumed to be contained in it, it is chiefly the *distinctive characters* on which the word fixes attention. Here, however, Spinoza calls the *common properties* of all bodies the *eternal essence of the human body*, or the essence of the human body "sub specie eternitatis:" *i.e.* he names the essence of all body as peculiar to some. He commits the further inconsistency of finding an "essence" in *singular things* (see, *e.g.*, Eth. V. xxxvi. Schol., *ipsa essentia rei cujusque singularis*): and indeed he could plant it nowhere else, his nominalism leaving him no *classes* or *types* of being to serve as its owners. But "essence" is a word wholly relative to classification, and cannot survive the pulverisation of natural groups into individuals. It means the defining qualities of a *Kind*, by possession of which a single object becomes entitled to the name and fellowship of its members. If nature has no classes, neither has it "essences:" and in his large resort to this term and its conception Spinoza unconsciously retains the realism which he professes to renounce.

¹ Eth. II. xlv.-xlvii.

² Eth. II. xlvii. Schol.

the categories of relation under which all objects of attention should be brought. When so taken into inward view, these objects disclose their resemblances and differences, and fall into due order under their determining properties. And this is their "*ordo ad intellectum*," as contrasted with the "*experientia vaga*" of imagination;—an order constant and universal, being no other than the necessity of nature.

VI. THIRD ORDER OF IDEAS—INTUITION.

Yet another stage of knowledge, at once higher and ulterior, Spinoza describes in terms of tantalizing and perhaps studied obscurity. The ideas which constitute it are clear and adequate, like those of the second order, and present their objects also as necessary (under the aspect of eternity). But it is distinguished by three characteristics—(1.) Its *objects* are different from those of Ratio. (2.) It is an immediate knowledge of what *is*, instead of a mediate, of what *must be*. (3.) It depends wholly on the mind itself, so far as the mind is eternal, *i.e.* on the mind *quod mind*, or the necessary essence of mind (essences being eternal). Each of these points needs some elucidation.

(1.) The *objects* given us by the *communes notiones* are real universals, the separate common properties of all things, *i.e.* the apprehended attributes of nature or God. These are essential to everything in general, but are the essence of nothing in particular.¹ The

¹ Eth. II. xxxvii.

objects of Intuitive Knowledge, on the other hand, are the *essences of single things*¹ (*res singulares*), including all their distinctive features, regarded as necessarily concurring in one nature. This distinction would be clear enough, had not Spinoza already applied the term "single things" to the "real universals," which are here taken as the contrasted term (see p. 124 *seqq.*) The reader must guard himself against this ambiguity, and remember that the word *single*, as an epithet of what is intuitively known, marks the unity, not of a *cosmical property*, but of an *individual nature* which a plurality of properties subscribe to set up.

(2.) The second feature,—of understanding at a glance and not by a process,—Spinoza illustrates by our instant seizure of a fourth proportional in the case of very simple ratios, as $1:2=3:x$; 6 being read off at sight as the value of x , without either working the sum by customary rule or referring to Euclid's proof of the common property of proportionals.² In his first use of this illustration, Spinoza doubtless regarded this intuitive apprehension as a happy flash of insight, in conformity with his doctrine (explained above, p. 111, note) that an object of cognition delivered its essence direct upon the recipient understanding.³ Its repetition in the *Ethics* can only be treated as the inconsistent survival of an example when the rule to be exemplified was gone. For assuredly Spinoza no longer conceived

¹ *Eth.* V. xxxvi. Schol. "*Rerum singularium cognitio, quam intuitivam sive tertii generis appellavi.*" ² *Eth.* II. xl. Schol. 2.

³ Short Treatise De Deo, etc., Part II. c. i. § 4.

of the Understanding as the passive receptacle of a ready-made essence of its objects ; or of Intuitive Knowledge as an inspiration independent of all prior exercise of rational thought. On the contrary, he expressly describes this "Third kind of apprehension" as an ulterior step to which the Second leads ; it "*advances from the adequate idea of the real essence of certain attributes of God, to the adequate idea of the essence of things.*"¹ And further, the *mode* of this "advance" is distinctly affirmed to be by *logical deduction* : "since we all know the infinite essence and eternity of God, and all things are in God and conceived through God, it follows that from this knowledge we can deduce a multitude of things and bring them into adequate knowledge, and so form that third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the 2d Scholium of the 40th Prop. of this Part."²

How, it may well be asked, can "Intuition" be reached by "Deduction"? "Immediate" knowledge be built up by mediate materials? No answer can be given sufficient to remove the formal contradiction. But the relation in which Spinoza intended to present the second and the third stage of thought admits of reasonable interpretation. The *second* supplies us with some universal properties of nature (infinite and eternal essence of God), *e.g.* extension, gravitation, etc., conceived and defined separately. From each of these may be deduced, by necessary inference, many particular properties of extended things, as geometrical figures, or of heavy things, as bodies in motion or at

¹ Eth. II. xl. Schol. 2.

² Eth. II. xlvii. Schol.

rest: *e.g.* the equality of rectangles under the segments of intersecting chords of a circle; or the path of a projectile. Each of these chains of proof constitutes an articulated science, and all reasoning moves on one or other of their lines. But upon none of them do you ever alight on an integral individual thing. More goes to make a degree of latitude than extension, and to make a moon than gravitation. Several links from different lines of deduction must be combined in thought to supply the essence of any single determinate nature; and this combination it is which the Understanding, already rich in the resources of conquered sciences, intuitively effects. The mind, once furnished with the formulas of two or three separate universal properties, is quick to detect them in their disguise when entangled together in particular objects or facts, and can thus read at sight the essence, *e.g.*, of a rocket's flight, of a planet, and of a comet, in the modifying conditions, geometrical and dynamic, which meet upon the object and specialize its movement. And so, the universal properties of which the second stage of knowledge takes account in their separation, the third apprehends as united in the essence of a particular thing,—a concrete eternal,—grounded in the eternal essence of nature, only under more aspects than one.¹ If this apprehension is "intuitive," the intuition is conditional on a prior command of scientific conceptions of the second stage. As genius alone can merit a hearing for its divinations, so is it only the practised intellect

¹ Eth. V. xxxvi. Schol.

through which the coloured rays of different sciences instantly converge into the white light of truth.¹

(3.) The remaining characteristic of this intuitive cognition, viz. that "it depends on the mind, as real cause, so far forth as the mind itself is eternal,"² is the most obscure of all. Does not *all* cognition, we first ask, "depend on the mind"? Why then limit the remark to the "intuitive"? Perhaps we are to lay stress on the annexed condition, "as real (*formalis*) cause," which shuts up the whole genesis of the intuition, as well as its occurrence, within the mind itself, and excludes external things from all concern with it. Yet how can this be, seeing that what the intuition gives us is just the essence of some "*res singularis*"? Must we then fasten on the remaining clause, which makes the mind answerable for intuitions, *only* "so far as it is itself eternal"? Is it in virtue of the mind's eternity that it has intuitions of eternal essences in things? Here, perhaps, we approach an intelligible meaning; for if by "eternal" we understand "necessary" in the order of thought or being, and the mind be called "eternal," so far as it is the organ of such necessary thought, then to this function of it are we certainly indebted for our apprehensions of the essences

¹ Busolt remarks that "Spinoza has not explained how his 'intuitive' knowledge is possible; whether through previous preparation from the second stage, or by felicity of nature." True: but a comparison of passages makes it probable that he began with the latter explanation and finished with the former. See Busolt's *Grundzüge der Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik Spinoza's*, p. 62.

² Eth. V. xxxi.

of particular things as consequences of universal laws. But then to this same function we are no less indebted for the *rational* cognition of the second stage than for the *intuitive* of the third. The mind, as the organ of necessary thought, assures us that, over and above the perceived attributes of thinking and extension, an *infinite* nature *must have* innumerable others, unperceived because unshared by us; this is mediately known as an irresistible conclusion; but not immediately, as an intuition of what actually *is*. We have yet to find therefore, in Spinoza's words, the specialty of mind which supplies such positive apprehension in verification of necessary inference.

That specialty is, that mind in us is only an example of the thinking function of nature and qualitatively one with it, as our body is of the attribute of extension. It is indeed simply "the idea of the body,"—the basis of the idea of all body,—the essence of which is extension, an infinite and eternal attribute of God. What we know of body is just what it has in common with our own body, and the "eternal" character of its essence we conceive as belonging to our own body. In other words, to conceive it as extended is to throw it into the category of an "eternal" attribute of nature. But if the body is "eternal," so is its "idea," for they go together, and one cannot be contingent while the other is necessary; and this idea is the mind, which is thus a participant in the universal thinking, as the body of the universal extension. Both these attributes, therefore, with their defining

properties, are known to us directly, in our own persons, by their contents, and not by a mere inference which tells us at secondhand *that* they are, while silent about *what* they are. In this intuitive apprehension they present themselves, not as personal accidents, but as coextensive with the nature of things; wherever there is thinking, its relations to reality and conditions of cogency are the same; wherever extension, its quantitative rules, and the necessity which links them, must reappear. Even prior, therefore, to all reasoning out of them, we have an intuition of them as underlying the nature of things, *i.e.* as having place among the essentialities of God. But the intuition, which is thus the prelude to reasoning, comes in again as its consummation. When the philosopher, after working from his first principles down the lines of law through several sciences, addresses himself to some particular nature which perhaps borrows from them all, the first formula which his practised eye reads into it so simplifies it as instantly to show room for another, and yet another, till, by a process as quick as thought, a whole group of affinities or contrarieties are seen in equilibrium within the single essence. This confluence in thought of laws that had been held apart, this partial reproduction of their original unity, in the total conception of a given nature, is the goal where the steps of ratiocination end. The initial intuition is analytic, the final is synthetic. Of the synthesis the mind itself, as eternal, is the real cause; for, being only the idea of the body, and being "eternal" simply

as so conceiving of the body, it has its own essence in a concurrence of thinking with extension; and, serving as the base of our interpretation of the world, leads us to seek a unity at the beginning and the end of all seeming parallelisms.

It may be doubted whether Spinoza had a perfect self-understanding respecting the nature and scope of intuitive knowledge. A certain embarrassment is apparent in his exposition of it. His examples of it, few as they are, do not all seem to illustrate the same thing. And he himself remarks that "he can find very few matters (*perpauca*) which he understands in this way."¹ Yet it plays an important part in the concluding propositions of his *Ethics*; where it is identified with "seeing God in all things and all things in God," *i.e.* discerning the necessary involution of all particular natures in the primary attributes of universal nature. In this aspect we shall meet it again.

VII. JUDGMENT AND INTELLECT.

It is usual with logical writers to treat in succession of Terms, Predication, Syllogism, with their corresponding psychological contents, *viz.* Ideas, Judgment, Reasoning, and to show how judgment is made up of a plurality of ideas, and reasoning of a plurality of judgments. With Spinoza, on the other hand, every idea, be its order what it may, in itself involves a judgment. If it be of the first order, it may, from its

¹ *De Intell. Emend.*, V. VI. and *Land*, I. 9.

confusion and inadequacy, carry an erroneous judgment *e.g.* that an object merely imagined is present: but judgment of some sort there will be.¹ If the idea be of the second or third order, it will involve, in virtue of its clearness and distinctness, agreement between idea and ideatum, *i.e.* a *true* judgment, attended moreover by a *consciousness* of its truth, or assurance of certainty, so as to be self-verifying.² The idea of a triangle, *e.g.*, cannot be formed without mentally affirming one or more of its distinctive properties.³ It is to these adequate ideas of the second and third order that the word *Intellect* is applied; thus receiving, by limitation to the *true*, a narrower scope than *Judgment*, which may be false.⁴ Having this inherent *assertive* character, an idea is not to be regarded as a silent picture to be looked at, distinct from the act of looking, but as the very act of looking and understanding itself; as intrinsically an affirming or denying, and not the passive object of affirmation or denial.⁵

By thus conveying over the active function into the phenomenon itself, Spinoza dispenses with a subject that puts forth the activity and is the same in all the phenomena. He accordingly insists that, beyond the particular judgments contained in ideas as they arise, there is no such thing as a *faculty* of judgment or understanding.⁶ All such words as *Intellect*, *Will*, etc.,

¹ Eth. II. xli. xlix. Dem.

² Eth. II. xlii. xliii.

³ Eth. II. xlix. Dem. ⁴ Eth. II. xlix. Schol. ⁵ Eth. II. xliii. Schol.

⁶ Eth. II. xlix. We shall hereafter speak of Spinoza's identification of Understanding and Will. In these propositions *Voluntas* evidently is equivalent to Faculty of affirming or denying, *i.e.* of *Judgment*.

are mere compendious expressions for the sum of our single acts of affirmation or denial,¹ which, in their turn, are identical with our single ideas of things. Of these ideas, each is brought up by this or that antecedent one, itself dependent on a prior, and so *in infinitum*.² Thus faculty is reduced to separate acts; separate acts to particular ideas; and the occurrence of ideas to a determinate order of necessity.

Besides the conscious clearness and certainty distinctive of intellectual ideas, they have the further characteristic of being alike in all men; while those of the imagination, depending on accidental experience, are the source of all human variations of thought.³

VIII. THE GEOMETRICAL METHOD.

Spinoza's theory of knowledge led him consistently to an attempt which has often been made without any such theory at all, viz. to evolve the order of nature from the necessary order of thought, and, by successive reflections of self-evident light, to fling illumination into every dark corner of the world. Identifying *truth* of thought with clearness and distinctness of idea, which speak for themselves to our own consciousness, he needed for a starting-point nothing but an adequate conception, laid out in correct definition. This would constitute for him an "objective essence" of some "formal essence," *i.e.* would express some *real* nature :

¹ Eth. II. xlviii. Schol.

² Eth. II. xlviii.

³ Cf. Eth. II. xviii. Schol. and xl. Schol. 1.

and whatever logically followed from the interplay of such adequate conceptions would physically present itself in the world of things. Geometry afforded already an encouraging example of this method of discovery: though its figures, as defined, were but abstractions, they so nearly reappeared in concrete objects that their properties were everywhere exemplified, and the system of nature seemed like a vast geometrical construction. Spinoza longs to extend this only secure form of proof throughout the field of knowledge, and apply it no less to the passions of men than to the phenomena of the earth and heavens; and wonders why its use has stopped short with mechanical science, instead of being pressed into the service of Philosophy. The reign of law being universal, the links of necessity in things, with counterpart links of necessity in thought, run through the whole and render all its contents demonstrable.¹ Metaphysics therefore may aspire to stand on the same line with Mathematics. If not, what is the flaw in their title?

Wherein consists the peculiar cogency of Geometry as a scientific instrument? Not in its *deductive* procedure: for this only secures the coherence of its inferences *inter se* and their collective dependence on the *data* whence they are drawn: and if those data are only hypothetical assumptions, they will transmit this character to all that is accurately evolved from them.

¹ "Did men clearly understand the whole order of nature, they would find all things no less necessary than all those of which Mathematics treat." Cog. Met. II. c. ix.

It is no less possible to reason strictly from false premisses than from true: *e.g.* a pseudo-science might be rigorously worked out, in place of our present Optics, from the conception of darkness as a positive element, and light as its negation. Indeed the earlier stages of this very science, as of most others, afford partial examples of such intellectual dealing with provisional hypotheses. The security for truth therefore must be sought, not only in the chain of thought, but in the supporting point which carries it.

How is it then, by this rule, that Geometry is not simply an ideal, but a *real* science? It is because its definitions are *not merely nominal*, of our inward conceptions and their words, but all run up into the idea of *Space*, which is to us the very field and meaning of the real, and cannot come into *thought* except as a *a priori thing*. In defining the properties of anything else, you may raise the question—But does it *exist*? *i.e.* is it “*there*”? In defining the modifications of space, no such question is possible; to be “*there*” (*Dasein*) to “*exist*,” is to be in it, as one of its modifications; and, conversely, to be one of its modifications is to exist. It makes no difference whether we rest in the common construction of space as an absolute field, or, with Kant, reduce it to subjectivity. If we take it home into the mind, as mere form of faculty, all the “*existence*” it carries goes with it, and the relation of the two remains the same for us, *viz.* that “*to be real*” means “*to be the contents, or among the contents, of space*,” though both space and its

contents should be ideal. It is this coalescence of thought and thing in the underlying ground of Geometry, that makes it not a mere conceptual but an applicable science. Since space cannot come into thought except as existing out of thought, and its subjective presence is what constitutes objectivity, all the quantitative rules which are reasoned out from its characters are not only functions of its idea, but measures of the world.

This peculiarity might be expressed by saying, that, in the instance of space, its "essence involves its existence." Is there any other conception of which the same can be said, and to which therefore the same method is appropriate? Spinoza claims the peculiarity, for "*Substance*," i.e. for what is *in se* and is conceived *per se* (see p. 115), as opposed to what is *in alio* (i.e. *Quality*). And certainly, the *idea* of substance is the *idea* of a real existence: non-existing substance involves a contradiction (*contradictio in adjecto*, as the logicians say). But this only means that, in the nominal definition of "substance," in laying out the constituents of the conception, "its essence involves existence": the involution is simply of thought with thought, and not of thought with thing. You cannot think of substance without thinking of existence; neither can you think of fire without thinking of heat: but you are quite at liberty, all the while, to disbelieve the reality of either. In order that substance should be conceived, there is no need that it should be there. Being entirely relative to quality, it has no other

necessity of being, except as the support of attributes and phenomena: and as all these may be thought away, so may substance. But space cannot be thought away: and if it could, it would carry off substance too. To think it is to be in it and know it as an objective infinitude.

Hence arises a further difference between substance as the ground of quality and space as that of quantity. The former gives us a mere relative notion, empty of all contents except what its correlate supplies, and having therefore but one predicate, "supporter of qualities." The latter presents us with the *a priori* field of all experience, furnished already with a plurality of predicates, viz. three dimensions, infinity, susceptibility of form through enclosure of parts. To these are due the various definitions and axioms which render possible a synthetical advance to undiscovered relations of quantity and form. Had the geometrician but one predicate to start from, he could never move except to spin upon that pivot and make no way. The reasoner from "Substance" is in no better plight; and can never extort a single quality of things from his initial definition.¹

Spinoza, however, relying on a supposed analogy between Geometry and Metaphysics, as implicitly contained in the term Substance (*ὑποκείμενον*), attempts to construct a *Hypokeimenometry*,—a science of Substance

¹ Of Spinoza's mathematical method, a good account is given by Kuno Fischer in his *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, I. ii. 12; and a good criticism by Dr. Georg Busolt, *op. cit.* pp. 67-76.

and its affections, whereby the constitution of the universe shall be deduced from its primary essence,—the All out of the One. How to name that primary essence,—“Nature,” “Substance,” “God,”—might be, and evidently was, a matter of some hesitation with him. But one preconception was involved in his very problem, viz. that of *absolute Necessity* through all the steps of the deduction, like that which, from the essence of the triangle, equates its three angles to two right angles. Equipped with this conception, and with the theory of knowledge which we have sketched, he addresses himself to his task.

CHAPTER II.

METAPHYSICAL SYSTEM.

SPINOZA's theory of the world was not born in a day ; and in its growth was far from building itself up in the order ultimately given to its exposition. Were we to tell its story chronologically, we should begin with the two parallel data which he accepted from Descartes,—Extension and Thinking,—the bases, respectively, of matter and mind. Reduced afterwards to the second tier in his pyramid by the superposition of a crowning apex, these were at first his supreme categories. On their resources he relied for detecting the laws of the universe ; thence it was that he started his doctrine of physics, psychology, and ethics. They were the working factors of his speculation, though not its titular head. He thus wrought out, in the first instance, a dualistic philosophy ; and then, by a prefatory stroke of thought or of assumption, converted it into a monism. In his early Short Treatise, the higher term (there called "God") into which he resolves the two heads of deduction, is reached by processes of *reasoning* borrowed for the most part from

Descartes.¹ In his Ethics the show of inference is dispensed with, and the unit of Being is made also the initial point in thought and provided for at the outset in a *Definition*. That he thus treats as self-evident what before had needed demonstration implies a new phase in his philosophy; and, to appreciate that philosophy as a whole, we must look at it in its final form.²

I. SUBSTANTIVE EXISTENCE.

The problem of philosophy being, in Spinoza's view, to trace the necessary evolution of the system of things from its absolute essence, he required distinctive names for—(1) that absolute essence; (2) its immediate predicates; (3) the varieties into which each of these predicates differenced itself.

Beginning with the primordial entity itself,—the “*fons et origo rerum*,”—he uses several terms to denote it,—Nature, God, Substance,—the two former preponderating in his earlier writings, the last in

¹ Of the two *a priori* arguments for the existence of God with which the Treatise opens, the first is Descartes' “Ontological Proof,” as given in the fifth Meditation and the Reply to the first Objections, and restated in the fifth Prop. of Spinoza's *Princ. Phil. Cart.* And the *a posteriori* proof appears in the third Meditation and in the *Princ. Phil. Cart.* I. Prop. vi.

² The genesis of Spinoza's doctrine forms in itself a highly interesting study, to which an admirable introduction may be found in the Essay of Dr. Richard Avenarius, *über die beiden ersten Phasen des Spinozischen Pantheismus und das Verhältniss der zweiten zur dritten Phase*. 1868.

the Ethics.¹ Though identical in their application, they differ somewhat in their inner meaning: under "Nature" we are expected to think of the continuous *source of birth*; under "God," of the *universal cause* of created things; under "Substance," of the *permanent reality* behind phenomena. Prior to the composition of the Ethics, Spinoza does not object to speak of "*created substances*;"² of "*extension*" and "*thinking*" as "*substances*;"³ and he gives of "Attribute," the same definition which he afterwards assigns to "Substance."⁴ It is not that in these passages the word has any different meaning:—it is still "permanent reality:"—but he had not yet withdrawn that meaning from matter and mind and "created things," and disowned all permanence, except the absolute.⁵

Before "Substance" had been technically installed

¹ This remark refers, not to the mere numerical proportions of the names, but to the logical momentum of what they respectively connote.

² Cog. Metaph. II. c. xii. To "*substantia creata*" here, is previously opposed "*substantia increata, sive Deus*," I. c. ii.

³ Short Treatise, I. ii. Suppl. p. 31. "*Maar de uytgebreidheid, zijnde een zelfstandigheit.*" And Cog. Metaph. II. c. xii.

⁴ Cf. Ep. 2. "*Per attributum intelligo omne id quod concipitur per se et in se; adeo ut ipsius conceptus non involvat conceptum alterius rei;*" with Eth. I. Def. 3.

⁵ Yet this statement, though called for by some passages, is at variance with others. In the earliest of Spinoza's extant writings,—the Dialogues, incorporated with his Short Treatise,—*Vernunft* is made to say that though the corporeal and thinking principles may be called "*Substances*" relatively to their dependent modifications of body and thought, they are themselves but modifications of one sole, eternal, infinite Substance. Suppl. pp. 40, 41.

and defined in the initial place, some of the predicates which were to be made over to it had already been won in the name of the other two terms; these terms being taken as known, and reasoned upon without explicit definition. Thus, it is of "*Nature*" that *Infinity* and *Perfection* are first proved; from the consideration that being a totality, it cannot be bounded unless by Nothing; and this is merely the negation of boundary to an eternal, all-comprehending unity.¹ And it is of "*God*" that *Self-existence* and *Sole Causality* are proved, being elicited from the assumed idea of God as the all-perfect being.² These, however, are just the predicates to which "*Substance*" must lay claim; for it is "*in se*," i.e. self-existent: it is infinite, as inclusive of all reality; therefore perfect, since being or reality is the measure of perfection: it is alone causal, since all that comes to be issues from that which *is*.³ From whichever of the three terms Spinoza reasoned, he found himself landed on the same affirmations, and was thus led to identify the subjects which did but repeat each other's contents. He passes accordingly, both casually and intentionally, from one to another of these equivalents; "the eternal and infinite entity which we call *God or Nature* acts and exists with like necessity;"⁴ "*God or Substance*" consisting of an infinitude of attributes, each expressing an eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists."⁵

¹ Suppl. p. 37.

² Suppl. p. 1 *seqq.*, 43.

³ Eth. I. Def. 3, Prop. vii. viii. xi., Schol., xvi. Corr.

⁴ Eth. IV. Pref. V. VI. and Land, I. 188.

⁵ Eth. I. xi.

And it is but a variation of expression when, as the only object intrinsically eternal and imperishable, he mentions "*God*, or what we take to be one and the same, *Truth*;"¹ and again affirms that "God is Truth, or Truth is very God;"² for by "truth" he means the real essence of things as thought.

The conception of "Nature" is scientific, expressive of a certain unity among *phenomena*; that of "God" is religious, marking a living unity of *cause*; that of "Substance" is metaphysical, indicating a unity of *ground*. And Spinoza's preference of the last evinces the ultimate ascendancy in his mind of the idea of *Reality* over those of Totality and of Power. Thus overshadowed, the two subordinated terms dropped a part of their received meaning. "Nature," emptied of its living movement, was reduced to mechanical necessity; and "God," at first endowed with "goodness and simplicity of will," and "absolute liberty of will,"³ surrendered such mental qualities either altogether or to finite beings, and lapsed into the underlying condition of all things. As this surrender cancels from the Divine name the characteristic significance of Theism, Ueberweg naïvely protests against the retention of the word "God" to denote anything so heterogeneous as "Substance," and complains of such "perversion of religious terms as misleading and repulsive."⁴ Till it is found out, it is misleading; and when it is found

¹ Suppl. p. 117.

² Suppl. p. 157.

³ Suppl. pp. 19, 21, 23. Cogit. Metaph. I. c. ii. 3. Cf. Eth. I. xxxii. Cor. 1. "Hence God does *not* act from liberty of will."

⁴ Geschichte der Philosophie, iii. S. 6, ap. Busolt, p. 120.

out, it is repulsive; but in the meanwhile it gains a hearing for Spinoza which would else be denied him by public law and private feeling.

The identification of Nature, Substance, and God settled, at a very early date, the fundamental doctrine that nothing was possible except the actual. The general belief that the contents of the universe might have been other than they are, assumes that they come from a Source of wider range than themselves,—the finite from the Infinite. If, however, Nature is infinite and complete, no scope is left for other than it; and if God is simply the common ground of all things, Reality and he are one, and leave no margin over to either. As all that is in Nature has its ground in God, so must all of which God is the ground be found in Nature. Do you urge that never can he create so much but that he might create more? What is this but to say that he can never create what he can create?—than which there is no plainer contradiction.¹ [This co-extension of God and the world leaves nothing which transcends the actual, and turns all the actual into the necessary; cancelling the other modal conceptions,—of the contingent and the possible as human illusions, and banishing the moral conceptions of better and worse to the provincial dialect of the human affections. Everything follows by inevitable necessity from the Divine nature.² All that is must be; and nothing can be but what is.

¹ Suppl. pp. 22, 24.

² Epp. 75, 43. "Id ipsum," Spinoza himself declares, "*præcipuum*

[The moment Spinoza had, to his own satisfaction, identified Nature, God, and Substance, he would have done well to select the term which he preferred to the exclusion of the others.] If a modern man of science believed himself to have alighted on the ultimate principle of phenomena,—be it protoplasm or some protodynamic polarity,—he would mark it by an invariable name. (Should it have been previously known in some of its disguises, and called now this, now that, without suspicion of its universal function, he might perhaps choose one of its existing designations; but, having chosen this, would certainly not keep wandering about among them all. But Spinoza, maintaining in use several terms for the same subject, virtually neutralises the equivalence which he has established among them, and reopens questions which his philosophy completely shuts up.) This will appear from a survey of the Definitions and early deductions which supply what he has to say of Substantive Existence. ✓

That primary entity he defines three times over under different names :

“By *Causa sui*, I mean that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived but as existing.”—Eth. I. Def. 1.

“By *Substance*, I mean that which has existence in itself and is conceived of itself, *i.e.* that the conception of which needs for its formation the conception of no second thing.”—Eth. I. Def. 3.

est fundamentum eorum omnium quæ in tractatu quem edere destinaveram (i.e. the Ethica) habentur.”

"By *God*, I mean Being absolutely infinite, *i.e.* Substance consisting of an infinitude of Attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence."
—Eth. I. Def. 6.

Each of these definitions has two clauses, giving account, respectively, of the matter defined and of its expression in our conception. Agreeably to Spinoza's logical doctrine already explained, it assumes the reality of the object, and states what it is irrespective of the mind ("prout est extra intellectum");¹ and then appends some character attaching to our conception of it. It is easy to see that, under different names, the prior clauses thrice present the same reality; of which the posterior clauses offer separate conceptual marks, selected from the "objective essence." In the realistic part, the one thing which is affirmed all through is *existence*; and the identity of that existence is apparent through the modifying epithets by which the cases are distinguished. "*God*" is expressly called "*Substance* absolutely infinite," therefore total and sole substance. And "*Causa sui*," having existence in its "*essence*," has existence "*in se*," and not "*in alio*:" it is therefore "*Substance*," and not only bars out *non-existence*, but dispenses with *other* existence. Spinoza himself (by an inverse order of inference) concentrates the same three predicates upon "*Substance*" as his paramount term.²

¹ Ep. 9.

² Ep. 12. The *unity* of substance he infers from its existence being involved in its essence. The validity of this inference depends upon his rule that things are distinguishable and have plurality only

Of this one reality our conception carries in it, *ab initio*, three inherent marks—(1) the idea of *necessary* existence; (2) conscious *independence* of any prior conception; (3) the belief in an infinite essence, expressing itself in an infinity of attributes, apprehended or not.

The first of these, reproduced as we have seen, from Descartes, and expressed in the words "*non potest concipi nisi existens*,"—is reproachfully misconstrued by Schelling to mean that the conception stops short with *bare existence* and cannot advance to any further predicate.¹ Spinoza, however, plainly meant,

by different attributes of substance or affections of them (Eth. I. iv. v.); so that, where the essence or definition is the same, the objects defined are *one*. The "*essence*," however, settles only the inner contents or "*comprehension*," without varying which the outer relations of space and time, on which "*numerical distinction*" depends, may be different. Unless these outer relations are taken up into Spinoza's "*attributes or their affections*," his rule will not work. If sameness of definition excluded plurality, there could not be two new shillings or two equal squares. He himself became conscious of this; for the very predicates,—"*Unus*" and "*Unicus*,"—which he had elaborately worked out for Substance or God (Eth. I. viii. Schol. 2, xiv. Cor. 1), he declares (in 1674, Ep. 50) to be inapplicable to God, on the ground that they are *denotative*, affirmable of things in their extension—*i.e.* under membership of a class, not *connotative*, belonging to *essence*, and existence identical with essence. An intermediate state of mind appears in the first letter to Huyghens (Jan. 7, 1666, Ep. 34), where, from the silence of Definition about *number* he infers that, in the case of necessary existence, it *involves Unity*. He had not yet observed that the absence of numerical indication has exactly the same effect on unity and on plurality. It is simply that no cause is provided for either rather than the other.

¹ Philos. der Offenbarung. Sämmtl. Werke, 2 Abth. iii. 156, 157.

not that you cannot attribute *more than* existence, but that you cannot attribute *less*; for he forthwith proceeds to establish other predicates; and in his correspondence prides himself on having been able, from this very definition, to deduce several properties beyond its range.¹ A more valid objection to the definition is, that, professing to explain self-causation it tells us of nothing but self-existence; and brings the momentous word *cause* into use without any account of its meaning beyond this misleading identification with another idea.

The second feature of the conception, represented chiefly by the word "Substance," is independence of any prior conception. I venture to say *prior*, though Spinoza more vaguely writes "*conceptu alterius rei*;" for by the "*second thing*" whose conception is not wanted he undoubtedly means the higher *genus* which, with a *differentia*, defines an ordinary species. Substance, as supreme genus, is free from this dependence, and speaks for itself.² He did not intend to deny that "Substance" was a *relative term*, needing a correlate to complete its meaning; but only that the relation was not that of a specific to a generic concept.

The definition of Substance, as originally drawn, contained the following additional sentence—"I under-

¹ "Ex hoc solo, quod Deum definio esse ens, ad cujus essentiam pertinet existentia, plures ejus proprietates concludo; nempe quod necessario existit, quod sit unicus, immutabilis, infinitus," etc. Ep. 33. See also Ep. 9.

² On this point he is his own interpreter in the treatise *De Deo*, etc. Suppl. pp. 77, 79.

stand the same by *Attribute*, except that 'Attribute' is used with reference to intelligence attributing such determinate nature to Substance."¹ The passage shows that Spinoza was still (1663) affected by the Cartesian dualism, assigning a substantive character to extension and thought. Reserving for the next chapter the main questions which it raises, I content myself here with a single remark: the common feature which enables the same definition to cover both "Substance" and "Attribute" is that the latter, as well as the former, is *without higher genus*, and is apprehended therefore without aid from a prior conception. Though in the sphere of reality subordinate to Substance, in which it inheres, it has not the dependence of subsumption, in the sphere of thought, as *a kind of substance*.

The third conceptual constituent of the ultimate reality is Infinity of Essence, doubly marked; by illimitable number of attributes, and by the eternal and infinite character of each.

The new element, viz. of "Infinity," which here turns up, is gained by an interposed subsidiary Definition, viz. of the "*Finite*," as "that which can be bounded (*terminari*) by something of the same kind," as body by body, thought by thought, but neither by the other. From Substance this condition is absent; as self-existent, it can have no beginning; cannot be produced by another; or have any like or equal

¹ Ep. 9, where Spinoza cites these words as part of the Definition in his MS. of the Ethics.

(which, through identity of essence, would be only one with it).¹ It is therefore Infinite :² Being and God are one ; and to say that "God exists" is to affirm that "entity is." Existence is what we mean by "God;" it is the very essence of the definition of Deus, and therefore "eternal;" for "*Eternity* means being or entity itself, as conceived to be necessarily involved in the mere definition of the thing designated as eternal ;"³ *i.e.* means logical necessity of the real. Absolute being, however, speaks to finite natures like ours, not in its total essence, but by certain related attributes, each independently apprehended, and each in its own range infinite and eternal. To us, two only of these attributes, extension and thought, represent the field of existence: but the limitation of number being merely relative to our constitution, the absolute essence must comprise an infinity of such infinitudes, similarly distinct in their history, and similarly united in their fountain-head.

It is obvious from this exposition that, though the attributes are all *lodged* in Substance, as their indispensable subject, they are not *deduced* thence. For we are in the dark about them all, except those which are given to us in experience. It is only when these have been separately learned and have served as twin *ἀρχαί* of our knowledge, that Substance is set over them and offered to them as their common home,

¹ See treatise De Deo, etc., I. ii. and II. Pref., Suppl. pp. 17, 90, 91 ; Eth. I. v. vi. xiv.

² Eth. I. viii.

³ Eth. I. Def. 8.

already populous with innumerable mutually unintelligible guests.

Whatever further predicates are attached to Substance depend on its relation to

II. ATTRIBUTES.

"By Attribute I mean that which intelligence perceives of Substance as constituting its essence."¹ The questions arising out of this Definition require us to subjoin that of "*Modes*." They are "the affections of Substance, or that which is in something else (*in alio*), through which also it is conceived ;"² therefore antithetic to Substance, which is *in se* and conceived *per se*. Where then do Attributes stand, in respect to these two contrasted terms? "Whatever exists," the first Axiom tells us, "is either *in se* or *in alio* ;" to which head must Attribute go? Plainly, to the latter : it is found, whatever be its own essence, within the essence of Substance. So far, it complies with the definition of *Mode*. Does it fulfil the remaining condition? Is it "*conceived through*" its *aliud*? Is it by subsumption under the preconception of Substance that we make acquaintance with such Attributes as we know? On the contrary, it is precisely because they are not deducible, that we know only these two which are given in experience, and then carry them up to unite in Substance. In the sphere of being, therefore, they are secondary ; in the sphere of thought, primary ;

¹ Eth. I. Def. 4.

² Eth. I. Def. 5.

while Substance is primary in both; and Modes secondary in both.¹

Hence, as we step down from term to term, we find the relation between Substance and Attribute not the same as that between Attribute and Mode. Define an attribute, and you can infer its modes, just as from the definition of a triangle you can prove the equality of its three angles to two right angles. But from the definition of substance you can learn no attribute. At the same time the substance is no less the "*cause*" of the attribute (what else does "*causa sui*" mean?) than the attribute is Cause of the mode.² There is

¹ Against this statement it would be easy to quote phrases of Spinoza's, if no sufficient attention be paid to the successive phases of his doctrine—*e.g.* in the treatise *De Deo*, etc., I. vii., Suppl. p. 79, he defines "Attributes" as "Things, or, to speak better and more literally, a self-subsisting essence which as such is known *per se* and self-revealed." But he adds that others call these "Substances;" and his whole treatment of the subject betrays the marked influence still of Cartesian conceptions. See Trendelenburg's *Histor. Beiträge zur Philos.*, iii. p. 362 *seqq.* In the second Letter, he defines "Attribute" as "everything which is *conceived per se* and *in se*, so as to involve the conception of no second thing;"—making no mention of the sphere of *existence*, but only of *thought*: so that Substance or God would be "Attribute." But the final result of no little wavering and confusion may, I believe, be summed up as in the text.

² This identity of causal relation is expressly asserted as early as the first of the two curious dialogues inserted in the *De Deo*, etc., I. c. ii., Suppl. pp. 39-43. In this Dialogue "Desire" having cited "Extension" and "Thought" in evidence of a plurality of substances, "Reason" replies that they coexist in only one: "If you call them Substances in regard to the Modes dependent on them, you must no less call them Modes in regard to the Substance *on which they depend*." "Just as willing, feeling, conceiving, loving, are different Modes of

here, therefore, a breach of conformity between the logical relations and the real. Yet their complete identity is a fundamental principle of Spinoza's philosophy: necessity in thought is but the ideal form of necessity in things; and "knowledge of an effect depends on knowledge of the cause, and involves it."¹ The source of this flaw in the philosophy is not far to seek. Spinoza's logical construction never ceased to be dualistic, worked out from Thought and Matter, the two Cartesian "*summa genera*,"² both of which he at one time called indifferently "substances" or "attributes," as primaries in conception. But his metaphysical genius was uneasy under a divided allegiance to two known and countless unknown heads of being, especially if they are no more separate than body and mind in man. Nature, in its absolute infinitude, contains them all; and their self-evidence and self-subsistence must be only so many aspects of its eternal

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what you call thinking Substance,"—so, I conclude from your own exposition, are infinite extension and infinite thinking, together with other infinite Attributes (or, as you call them, Substances), nothing else than Modes of the single, eternal, infinite, self-subsisting essence. "Reason," being asked whether the relation of Substance to Attribute is not rather that of Whole to Part than that of Cause to Effect, maintains that,—the causality being *immanent*,—it is *both*: just as the Understanding is the *cause* of its conceptions, whether they are regarded as depending on it or as constituting it.

¹ Eth. I. Axiom 4, cf. II. vii. "The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things."

² Cf. Princ. Phil. Cart. I. Prop. viii. ; Cogit. Metaph. II. c. i. xii. ad fin.

essence. Though independent in idea, we must assign them a real unity : and this is best done by taking up the word Substance a step higher, and reserving it as their common receptacle,—the Absolute subject of all their respective kinds of infinitude. The monism thus set up is a detached prefix suspended over the dualistic deduction which commences at the next stage, and not articulated with it as a premiss. It is a speculative denial of the yet admitted parallelism of thought and extension, and a suggestion that perhaps after all the lines lean a hair's-breadth and meet at a point in the invisible fields.

In treating of Spinoza's psychology I have shown (p. 135) how the doctrine of "Animal Spirits" provided for some interaction of the human body and mind, and neutralised the alleged independent parallelism of the attributes.¹ But, on surrendering this doctrine, he insisted unconditionally on the causal and logical continuity of each Attribute without any transverse passage from it to any other. The proposition—"Neither can body determine mind to think, nor mind

¹ In the treatise *De Deo*, etc., the very same chapter contains the statements, that no mode of thinking can produce bodily motion or rest ; that effects in the sphere of thought, having no extension, can be due only to thought ; and also, that each of these attributes operates on the other ; that the soul produces motion ; that motion produces perception, II. c. xix., Suppl. pp. 185, 187, 189. By the doctrine of the 16th and 17th chapters the action is restricted, in the last resort, to one direction,—from extension to thinking ; understanding being reduced to a *passivity*,—an external object's *affirmation of itself* within us. Suppl. 161-175.

determine body to motion or rest, or anything else, if anything there is,"—does but apply to human nature a principle which he has already laid down in unlimited terms.¹ *All* the attributes are without intercommunication; each producing its own infinity of modes, in order and connection keeping time with the others, but with no contact below the point of origin.

This theory brings into the strongest light the inconsistency of Spinoza's metaphysical monism with his logical dualism. If the Attributes are separate determining causes, having nothing in common with one another except their co-presence in all being, there is no proper Unity in the Substance to which they belong: for the mere *housing* of a number of agencies foreign to each other, does not constitute it; there cannot be a subject with only disparate predicates: the very hypothesis turns it from a unit into an aggregate.

Kuno Fischer would relieve the difficulty by identifying Substance with Causality, and Attributes with the several forces into which it divides. As Plato deduced all things from the "Idea of the Good," opening out into an infinity of contained ideas, so did Spinoza evolve the world from "Efficient Causation," distributing itself into all the varieties of Force. And that in this way a plurality of eternal natures may belong to a single eternal essence, geometry enables us to understand: for the one infinite space contains all the bounded figures with their demonstrative relations of

¹ Eth. III. ii., cf. II. v. vi.

quantity and form.¹ Unfortunately, these analogies fail in precisely the vital point of the difficulty: they illustrate the *independent* attributes by *interdependent* functions in nature or in thought. The types of force are interchangeable: the geometric properties are rationally concatenated and form a single science; and in both instances, the derivatives are particular cases of the originals,—*Cause* in the one, *Space* in the other.

With a more trenchant hand Erdmann cuts away the incompatibility between Substance and Attributes by withdrawing the latter from Spinoza's *real* world and reducing them to mere forms of conception in the human subject.² That "Attribute is what *intelligence perceives of Substance*, as constituting its essence," he takes as equivalent to "Attribute is what our mind sets up in order to constitute a way of conceiving Substance:" so that it is all a subjective device and has no place in "God or Substance" at all. No præ-Kantian reader could have put such a construction on Spinoza's language. With him, all that "*Intellectus percipit*" is real; while that which is merely subjective and illusory lies in the field which *Imaginatio contemplatur*. Nothing can be intellectually perceived in substance which is not there. Indeed the attributes are so far from being treated as figments of human thought, that he makes them the contents and measure of real existence itself: "the more reality or being an

¹ Geschichte d. neuern Philosophie, B. I. Th. ii. cap. 14, §§ 4, 5, 6.

² Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen Darstellung d. Geschichte d. neuern Philosophie, B. I. Abth. ii. 60 *seqq.*, and Vermischte Aufsätze: die Grundbegriffe des Spinozismus, 145 *seqq.*

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entity has the more attributes must be ascribed to it ;” and “the more attributes I ascribe to an entity, the more must I ascribe existence to it, *i.e.* the more do I conceive it as it truly is in itself (sub ratione veri ipsum concipio) ; whereas it would be the exact reverse, had I feigned a chimera.”¹ The realism of Spinoza therefore obliges us to leave the Attributes their seat “extra intellectum,” manifesting the essence of Being so far as apprehensible by the understanding. How that essence can be one and self-identical, while its constituents are many, heterogeneous and unrelated, is a question which is hopeless of solution.² If they have nothing in common with one another, how can the essences which they express help being different? And if the essence is the same, how can they be aliens in nature?

B. I. Th. II. c. 137-8

The Attributes then are real, and are the understood essence of Substance. To help our conception of them, in conformity with Spinoza's conditions, three equivalent phrases have been proposed. “They are co-ordinated *Powers* inherent in Substance.”³ In this

¹ Ep. 9.

² See the conclusive criticisms of Kuno Fischer, *Gesch. d. n. Phil.*, B. I. Th. ii. c. 14, §§ 1-6. Also, of Trendelenburg, *Hist. Beitr. zur Phil.*, II. 21, 40-2, III. 366-7. Cf. the review of the controversy by Busolt, *op. cit.*, Th. II. §§ 11, 12. And Camerer, *Die Lehre Spinoza's*, pp. 9-12.

³ This interpretation has the sanction of Spinoza's own treatise *De Deo*, etc., *e.g.* in II. c. xix., Suppl. p. 183 ; but not of the *Ethica*, or of Ep. 9. It is adopted, as already shown, by Kuno Fischer ; as previously, by Jacobi, *Werke*, B. IV. i. 183-185, ii. ; *Beilagen*, 114, 115 ; and subsequently, by Camerer, *Die Lehre Spinoza's*, pp. 5, 6.

capacity they would be varieties of a single genus, and not be separated by the stipulated interspace of parallelism. If, to correct this, you isolate each, it expresses only a *part* of the essence, and fails to give the substantive idea. Again; "they are different *Definitions* of the same Reality, just as a curve may be defined geometrically by the mode of generating it, or algebraically by its equation."¹ But here also the parallelism is lost: for in the course of deduction from either definition of the curve you are sure to come across the property named in the other; and only on this account is it that, take which you will, you have all that is *essential*. But your reasoning, once started on the rail of one attribute, can never change on to another. Lastly, Mr. Pollock's suggestion² that the attributes be regarded as "*aspects*" of one "substance" is free from these objections, and has the advantage of implying that what affects us differently may be contained in the same essence. But the word, besides its too subjective character, does not clear the relation between the "many and the one." The "aspect" of a thing is "how it looks." Extension and Thought, *i.e.* Matter and Mind, are our two "aspects" of Substance; *i.e.* they are, to our understanding, two different looks of one existence. Is this true? Do we intellectually perceive them as two, *quod* appearance, constituting a single reality? If so, its essence for us will want them *both*: but Spinoza says that *each* suffices to

¹ Spinoza himself supplies this comment on his own idea, in Ep. 9.

² Pollock's Spinoza, p. 164.

express it; in which case we have *two* "infinite and eternal essences," conforming to the definition of Substance; and are landed in Spinoza's own statement that to the intellect Attribute cannot be differenced from Substance. The total difference of the two "aspects" (required by their parallelism) denies to them the common element indispensable for their unification in reality. Is it said, they have at all events *existence* in common? Yes, but not existence in the sense needed for securing the singleness asserted. When you affirm of Substance as one, that it has two "aspects," you assign to the "aspects," as phenomena, an existence other than that which you assign to substance: what suffices for the former does not suffice for the latter. But it is the phenomenal existence only which the "aspects," as such, have in common; it is incompetent, therefore, to constitute substantive unity. Besides, it is not enough for the "aspects" to have "existence" in common: "existence" (in order to satisfy the account of "attribute") must have *them* in common, *i.e.* there can be no existence with only one, —no "matter" without "mind:" for the attributes (we are told) are to be credited to existence *as such*; not to *this* existence as distinguished from *that*, but to indeterminate being,—*"blosses Seyn."* Yet surely it is not of this vacuity that "aspect" or "attribute" expresses the essence; but of *determinate* being, *viz. matter or mind*. By no interpretation, therefore, can parallel attributes be brought to lapse in a single substratum.

In seeking for the suspected ultimate unity of "Extension" and "Thought," Spinoza perhaps looked in the wrong place. He sought for it in the *Objects* that have these attributes. He should have turned rather to the *Subject* that knows them. The former,—shift the light upon them as you will,—can never be identified. In the latter,—the apprehending *ego*,—there is a court, indisputably single, that has cognizance of both, and somehow neutralizes the interspace of their two worlds. Here it is that the question is most hope-
 fully raised, whether two things which thus stand related to the same are not also intrinsically related to one another. Spinoza was not far from this when he still defined Attribute "that which exists of itself and is *conceived through itself*." For "through" Thought alone can anything be "conceived;" Extension cannot conceive extension; this second "attribute" must wait upon the first for its conceptual phase, and is therefore (according to the definition) no "attribute" at all; and there remains only the Thinking principle,—the "*Res cogitans*,"—to coalesce with *substantia*, as the fountain-head of things. From this side a strong current urged Spinoza towards Idealism, reducing the material world to a mode or phenomenon of thought. But from his early physiological psychology an opposite tendency was still active in him, and persuaded him that "the Mind is the idea of the *Body*," its dependent reflection; so that the modes of Thought become, in their turn, only modes of Extension; and we are set down at the door of Materialism. He n t r of these

things, but poised his philosophy in an unstable equilibrium, whence it inevitably verged, with every changing breath, to either side. We shall see hereafter that he himself could not maintain the balance, but gave unawares an indefinite preponderance to the ideal side.

A word must be said respecting the separate meaning of each known Attribute. It may prevent misapprehension, if we venture on the paradoxical assertion that "Extension" means *Body*, and "Thinking" does not mean *Mind*. The former is treated (as with Descartes), not as the *prior* requisite, but as the *property* of material things; as *common* to them all, and therefore adequately known; as *constitutive* of their nature *quâ* material, and therefore expressive of their essence. It is not that matter is constituted, and room found for it in Extension already there, but that extension, as simply the essence of matter, carries everywhere some companion properties of matter. This notion is expressed in Spinoza's denial of *a vacuum*. That to him the universe, through all its fields, was a *plenum*, denoted that its extension belonged to something that was there. The notion is also expressed when he says that, though we can clearly conceive of empty space, yet, as it has no self-existing power, it is a *created* thing, having its origin in God. Not that space was ever absent from existence, or restricted to the finite samples of it of which the world consists; for in God, as origin, it exists "*eminenter*," *i.e.* without any such imperfection (*e.g. divisibility*) as we encounter in the effects. God

therefore "has all the perfections of Matter in a superior way, so as to do the work of matter."¹ The infinitude of space, which was self-evident to Spinoza, was thus tantamount to the infinitude of matter; and this, when divested of divisibility, to the infinitude of God. Extension is Substance on the corporeal side.

Next, the *Thinking* attribute does not mean Mind. Spinoza no doubt borrows the conception from human experience, in which particular Mode it does mean self-conscious intelligence. But to qualify the conception to do duty as a cosmical principle, he has to divest it of all ideal character which is not present in everything, in water and slate as well as in men. Having assumed that like only could operate on like, and having separated the world as known from the world as extended, he could not allow that any idea could be given by a material thing. Whence, then, do we get our idea of water or of slate? It must come from something akin to it belonging to the object, something which represents it in the Thought-sphere, and makes it an *intelligible*. It is in virtue of its thus carrying an "idea" or "soul," that every outward body speaks to our perception. The doctrine of parallelism is saved by this device, of animating all bodies with a spark from the other attribute.² But the "idea" or "soul"

¹ Cogit. Metaph. I. ii. 1 ("vices materiæ supplere potest").

² This doctrine, that "Omnia individua, quamvis diversis gradibus, animata tamen sunt" (Eth. II. xiii. Schol.), which appears also in the treatise De Deo, etc. (II. xxii. Suppl. p. 207), is somewhat similarly presented by Giordano Bruno, and characterised as "something very new." "Do you mean that not only the form of the universe,

he puts into the water or the slate simply to fit it for *being known*, not to qualify it for *knowing*. It is not a conscious thinking *subject*; it is a mere *object* of thought, and has no other title to a place within the attribute "*Cogitatio*." By a descending analysis, Spinoza resolves the *thinker* into a set of *thought*-phenomena, and thought into a self-reflection of the *thinkable*; and only in this lowest form can the fundamental attribute assert its universality, as distinct from its particular modes. The ideal principle in nature which makes it "*res cogitans*" is only the *potentiality* of thought, undeveloped into consciousness till it emerges into partnership with the human or some analogous organism, and gathers itself into separate individual foci. In its Absolute essence, it is not mind, but "*mind-stuff*" or *mind-force*, the dormant base of intelligence to be. In this sense and no other it is predicated of God as infinite. In this sense it is said that "there is in Nature only a single '*res cogitans*,' expressed in an infinity of ideas, corresponding to the infinity of

but also the forms of all things in it, are psychical?" "Yes." "Then all things are animate?" "Yes." It is further affirmed that this ideal principle animates "all things in different gradations." De la Causa, principio et uno, German translation by Adolf Lasson, pp. 57, 61. The resemblance, though striking, is superficial. Bruno "animates" things, to get them into *action*: Spinoza, to fetch them into the sphere of *intelligence*. All the evidence of influence from Bruno to Spinoza seems to me of the same illusory kind. Sufficient allowance is not made for the considerable currency of pantheistic expression inherited from previous centuries, and available for living writers of Spinoza's time without special dependence on individual predecessors.

(So H. a. n.)

things ;”¹ and that “there can be nothing in nature of which there is not, in the soul of *that same thing*, an idea.”² But in the specific sense of conscious intellect, Spinoza expressly restricts the predicate to finite and originated beings. “I think I have proved clearly enough that *intellectus*, though infinite, belongs to *Natura naturata*, not to *Natura naturans* ;” “human attributes, will, *intellect*, attention, hearing, etc., I do not assign to God.”³

The doctrine, then, of Substance and Attributes, relatively to us, amounts to this: that the base of the universe, being one, necessarily throws off its phenomena in the concurrent but independent order of two functions, thought-producing and thing-producing, emerging into conscious unity in the human Ego. The unity at both ends, and the parallelism all along, of the two independent factors, remain mysteries unresolved.

¹ Treatise De Deo, etc., II. xx. Suppl. p. 199.

² De Deo, etc., II. xxii. Suppl. p. 207 ; where, however, the text needs the correction supplied by Professor Schaarschmidt’s translation from the better MS. *Kurzgefasste Abhandlung von Gott*, etc., p. 97.

³ Epp. 9, 54. Cf. Eth. I. xxxi., containing the proof to which he refers. It is surprising that a writer so well versed in the Ethics as Dr. Kalisch should, in spite of this and similar passages, translate the word “*Cogitatio*” by “*Reflection*,”—a term surely involving the form of intelligence which Spinoza restricts to *natura naturata*. Path and Goal, p. 378. That Spinoza’s involution in one conception of Thinker, Thought, and Thinkable, was deliberate is evident from his statement that some Jewish writers had a hazy apprehension of the truth that God, God’s Understanding, and the things understood thereby, are one and the same. Eth. II. vii. Schol.

III. MODES.

In the definition of "Mode," quoted at the beginning of the preceding section, a trace is still retained that its original correlate was Substance, and that it belonged to a twofold, not a threefold, graduation of things, viz. of those which are *in se* and those which are *in alio*. In using it Spinoza always had in view the varieties of Extension and Thought; but at first he treated extension and thought as Substances, and when they became Attributes, they did not form an intermediary term by being either a *kind* of substance or *other than* substance; but were only the *constitution* of substance,—its essential contents as explicitly known,—*i.e.* its very self; so that it might still be said that "there is nothing but substance and modes;¹ and yet that the modes are modes of *Attribute*. This transference of the word to Attribute as its correlate is the only new feature in Spinoza's use of it. In Descartes and Malebranche it was "*Manière d'être*." In Bruno, "*Modi*" are the relations and forms into which the same infinite *substance* phenomenally defines itself, whether as different functions or as individual things.² In Scotus Erigena, to whom apparently the phrase is due, it has the form "*Modus essendi*."³ And even in Locke the same association clings to it, in his psychological division of ideas into those of substances, modes, and relations.

¹ Eth. I. xxviii. Præter substantiam et modos nil datur.

² Della causa, principio et uno. Lasson, p. 127.

³ See Eucken, Geschichte d. philos. Terminologie, im Umriss, p. 63.

Spinoza included under the term precisely what it already covered,—all finite properties and objects, considered as determined out of an infinite ground: only, by relating it immediately to attribute, he disposed its contents into two series which, except in their community of *being*, are throughout heterogeneous, distinct, and parallel. All ideas are modes of Thinking, *e.g.* concepts, volitions, emotions; all physical phenomena, figures, weights, motion, of Extension; all concrete things, of both (*diversis gradibus*). It is their *finite* character, *i.e.* their being bounded by another of the same kind, that makes them modes; what they *have* is affirmed to them by one of the two infinite attributes: what they have *not* is a negation of the same, so that to *define* them, *i.e.* to mark them off from all else, is to put upon them a limit or exclusion:—"omnis determinatio est negatio." It is incumbent on a "Geometrical Method" to show how this descent from the infinite to the finite—this partial privation of being—takes place.

If we ask the question, why Modes should arise at all, and introduce defect within the perfect existence of the Absolute,—whether, as Schelling says, "the Absolute is ennuyé with its perfection"?—Spinoza answers with a constant phrase:—It is "by the *necessity* of the divine nature."¹ That is, the divine nature cannot help it, comprising in its essence an immanent causality, rendering explicit its own implicit contents. The proof offered in support of this statement is, that from the definition of a thing the understanding infers

¹ Eth. I. xvi.

several properties which follow from it in reality, and are more numerous in proportion as the essence defined has a greater range of reality; so that, where the range is infinite, so will be the sequences. The fallacy involved in this account of causation (the only one Spinoza gives) has been already pointed out (p. 116). It mistakes logical cogency for dynamic necessity, or, what amounts to the same, assumes that, in virtue of parallelism, the one is the exponent of the other, and that in the dialectic of thought we may read the genesis of things. Proceeding, however, on this assumption, he first introduces us to a class of

1. *Eternal Modes.*

In the category "Modus," set up as a receptacle for finite things, how, it is natural to ask, can there be anything "eternal"? The simplest answer—true to Spinoza though not directly given by him—is found by distinguishing between the *essence* and the *existence* of particular things; their finiteness attaching to the latter, without prejudice to an eternal character inherent in the former. But, for the origin of this class, we must retreat to an earlier stage of deduction. From each Attribute,—for us extension and thought,—follow certain properties, or dependent possibilities, not explicitly named in its definition: and since whatever can be, also *is*, these are real modifications of the attribute, elicited from its essence, and sharing its necessary, *i.e.* eternal, character. Thus, Extension is the condition of *Motion and Rest*: and Thinking, of

Intelligence: and these, taken not in sample, but in their universal nature, are first-hand or "*immediate* Eternal Modifications" of the Attributes which respectively give them.

But these again have a fruitful essence, yielding ulterior varieties, sub-deducibles from properties already deduced from the definition. Of such second-hand or "*mediate* Eternal Modifications" Spinoza gives but one obscure example, viz. "the face of the total universe, which, though varied in modes infinite, yet remains always the same."¹ To interpret this secondary "eternal," we must look at its primary, which is undoubtedly the previously-mentioned "motion and rest." Respecting this immediate Mode there are two positions of Spinoza's which, taken together, throw some light upon his meaning. The total quantity of Motion in the universe is constant.² No changes in the size, velocities, or direction of moving particles of an individual body will affect its nature and form, so long as they retain the same ratios of motion and rest. And similarly, if the individual body be itself but a constituent in a vaster integer, its interactions with the other components will, under the same proviso, leave the system undisturbed: so that the rule, in its ultimate extension, secures the self-identity of Nature, though

¹ Ep. 64.

² A Cartesian principle, Principia Phil., § 36, P. II., expounded by Spinoza, Prin. Phil. Cart., II. xiii., and approved by him, as appears by Ep. 32: for the one Cartesian law which he disapproves is different, Prin. Phil. Cart., II. xxx. See a similar application of Galileo's law by Comte, Phil. Pos., vi. p. 795.

it is but the sum-total of universal change.¹ It is this idea of non-interfering partial forces carried by a whole which perseveres in its own law, that exemplifies for Spinoza the *mediate* eternal modes. It is "mediate," because a corollary from his doctrine of "Motion and Rest," which itself flows immediately from the attribute of Extension. The formula "proportion of motion and rest" became with Spinoza an equivalent for *stability*, in the human body,² in the State, and in the universe. We should not perhaps misinterpret the meaning of his example, if we called it the "universal equilibrium;"—the ultimate equation of the cosmos, retaining its validity through all the changing values of its particular elements.

Spinoza does not follow out the Thinking attribute into the *mediate* stage of Eternal Mode: and at the *immediate* we are already arrested by the enigmatical phrase, "Absolutely infinite Intelligence." We are prepared for his treating the essence thus described as a *Mode*: for we have seen that "Thinking," as Attribute, is something short of Mind, being its unconscious prior condition; from which "Intellectus" is distinguished by being a process of *Thought by ideas*, or self-conscious apprehension. However much we may share Van Vries's difficulty,³ of conceiving what Thought can be without ideas, we must, as interpreters, accept the fact that this is what Spinoza finds in the

¹ Eth. II. Lemmata 4-7, Schol.

² Eth. IV. xxxix.

³ Ep. 9, a most important letter for the understanding of *Cogitatio* as an attribute of substance, in its distinction from *Intellectus*.

Natura naturans ; while *intellectus* he expressly limits to *Natura naturata*, and denies to God.¹ But how then, consistently with these limits, can it be described as "absolutely infinite"? The Thinking Attribute itself is not "*absolutely*" infinite, but only infinite "*in suo genere*:" and *Intellectus* is not coextensive with it, but merely one of its modes. Spinoza does not enable us to relieve his language of contradiction : but how he came to fall into it may perhaps be explained.

First, although from God, as absolute Substance, he withholds the predicate *intellectus*, yet he affirms it of him as coincident with the endless concatenation of rational thoughts that constitutes our minds and makes up their whole series. ["Our mind, so far as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this by another, and so on *in infinitum* ;] so that all together constitute God's eternal and infinite understanding"² (*intellectum*). It is evident that the intellect here assigned to God is not that of a Subject other than human, but is simply the total human mind itself, as an illimitable sum and series of connected thoughts. It lies therefore entirely within the *Natura naturata*, and means nothing at variance with the refusal of the term to the *Natura naturans*. It is affirmed of God as identified with the former ; denied of Him, regarded as the latter. Still,

Eth. I. xxxi.

² Eth. V. xl. Schol., comp. Eth. II. xi. Cor. In the treatise *De Deo*, etc., II. xxiv. Suppl. 213, Spinoza expressly says, "that no other thoughts are to be ascribed to God than his creatures' thoughts."

this Mode, though covering the whole ground of *actual* intelligence (*intellectus actu*), through unbeginning and unending series, cannot be called "absolutely infinite," so long as the greater part of the "Thinking Attribute" (*e.g.* in water and slate) is left out of it. The epithet is not justified, unless we can yet widen the range.

Secondly, such enlargement may be gained, by taking the scale of the Mode, not, as in the passage just cited, from *actualised* understanding, but, as in other passages, from *possible* understanding, *i.e.* from understanding that *would be* if all that is intelligible were understood, and the Thinking Attribute resolved itself exhaustively into self-conscious reason. When the measure is thus changed from the census of knowing subjects to that of knowable objects, an "*intellectus*" competent to cover it becomes truly "*infinitus*:" and when Spinoza wants an equivalent for "the infinity of things that in an infinity of ways must follow from the necessity of the Divine nature," he can find no truer than,—“that is, all that can fall under an infinite intellect.”¹ The intellect which he here posits is not to be taken as if assigned to God. Had he intended this, he would not have said “all that *can* fall” (as if there were an alternative, of not falling), but categorically “all that falls.” It is a *hypothetical* understanding ideally set up as a tribunal before which the things of which he speaks are supposed to appear as objects. As a modern disciple would say: the *mind*-

¹ Eth. I. xvi., cf. Cor. 1. Deum omnium rerum, quæ sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt, esse causam efficientem.

stuff of the universe is infinite; conceive it all turned into *mind*; the resulting mode is "intellectus infinitus." Yet

Thirdly, we have still to cross the line from a particular *genus* of infinitude (belonging to a single Attribute) to the "*absolutely* infinite." Spinoza can help us over it, though not without dropping a favourite principle on the way. Of all that exists, he tells us, there is an idea. The idea of our body has its object in the field of extension; but is itself an existence in the field of thinking, and in its turn has its idea in the same field. This second fact is subject to the same rule, and yields a third, and so on *in infinitum*. One extended thing is thus answered by an infinitude of ideas. As the same holds good of every mode, not only of extension, but of all the unknown attributes of Substance, it follows that the contents of the thinking attribute exceed those of all the rest by an infinity of infinities; so that it absorbs and appropriates the claim of Substance itself to be called "Absolutely infinite." But, in doing this, it emerges from *parallelism* with the other attributes into supremacy. At this cost alone can we clear and vindicate the language of Spinoza.

Were we now to fill up by conjecture the lacuna in Spinoza's list of examples, we might perhaps append to this *immediate* eternal mode, as its *mediated* term, the constant form of reasoned thought or Necessary Logical laws. As, in the Extended sphere, through endless variations among its motory contents, one "*facies totius universi*" still persists; so, in the Think-

ing sphere, whatever the distribution and composition of its intellectual contents, one system of relations pervades the universe of knowledge, and through the perennial conflict and concurrence of mind secures an ideal equilibrium.

Spinoza's deduction from the Absolute nature of the two attributes stops at the second stage: or rather his "*mediate* eternal mode," exemplified at the first step from the "*immediate*," is left to cover, without any named instance, an indefinite series of ulterior derivatives. One mark, however, he gives us by which they may be recognised, anonymous though they are. Whatever follows from a *mediate* eternal mode has itself necessary and infinite existence: and conversely, every mode which has necessary and infinite existence, must necessarily follow, immediately or mediately, from the absolute nature of some attribute.¹ Now there is an immense class of modes,—viz. the *Essences* of things,—to which Spinoza habitually ascribes "*necessary*" and "*eternal*" existence: and though the word "*infinite*" is rarely added, this is not because he deemed it an inapplicable predicate, but because it needed a prior special theory to render this particular application of it intelligible. That Spinoza attributed *reality* to the essences of things has been already shown (p. 111 *seqq.*): and in his account of Definition, he expressly affirms that reality to be "*eternal*."² This principle he himself directly applies to things dependent and short-lived. For instance, he

¹ Eth. I. xxii. xxiii.

² Ep. 9.

lays down the curious rule that an object caused differs from its cause precisely in what the cause confers upon it; *e.g.* a son derives from his parents his existence which is distinct from theirs, but not his essence which is the same as theirs,¹ and is an eternal mode, *extra intellectum*. The human being has no advantage in this respect over other transitory objects; the description of the whole class is that "their existence is not an *eterna veritas* as their essence *is*;"² in perfect agreement with his earlier definition of "Essence" as "the mode in which created things are comprehended in attributes of God."³ Here, then, is the mark of necessary descent from the immediate eternal modes; and we are thrown into the midst of the unnamed residue of mediate eternals. Having arrived at the goal of "particular things" we can look back and survey the course of necessity along any sample-radius of derivation, *e.g.* from Substance, through Extension, Motion, Statical and Dynamical law, under variation in Solids, Liquids, Gases, and so on with fresh differentiations down to the most specific results. Each step in this process we are to conceive as rigorously "geometrical," leading to its consequent as certainly as, in the case of four proportional lines, the equality of the rectangles under the extremes and means follows from the property of reciprocal proportion in the sides of parallelograms.

¹ Eth. I. xvii. Schol.

² De Intell. Emend., V. VI. and Land, I. 22.

³ Cogit. Metaph. I. c. ii. For further proof that Spinoza held the doctrine of his time, as to the eternal character of essences, see Camerer's well-reasoned section, III. ii. 2, cf. Avenarius, p. 41.

Have we, then, really alighted upon the essence of concrete things by deduction from absolute Substance? Have we made good the step from the infinite to the finite? Was not that passage stopped by the rule that from the infinite only an infinite can follow? Have we leapt or have we slipped that bar? To this difficulty Spinoza has an answer ready, to which we must now turn. It says: the essences of finite things are *not* finite, but still infinite: it is the *existence* of the things that is finite: and how two such incommensurable factors can constitute one individual is to be learned from the doctrine of

2. *Finite Modes.*

Since finite things cannot be deduced from infinite, they remain as far from us as ever, prolong as we may the chain which links essence to essence. No essence which we may define gives us more than the inner nature of a thing,—its connotation without denotation: it is silent of its outer history, its frequency, its dates, its place. These are not determined by its essence any more than the definition of humanity furnishes the census of mankind. Anything freely given up to its own essence would be eternal.¹ [Limitation can be put upon it only by some other thing of the same kind, *i.e.* similarly limited within the same attribute:] for, if the two are hetero-

¹ Eth. III. iv., IV. iv., Dem. "Could a man be exempt from all changes but such as were intelligible from his own nature alone it would follow that he could not perish, but must always exist."

geneous, as thought and extension, they will not disturb each other's infinity. There cannot, therefore, be a finite thing till there is another that is homogeneous to determine it; which other is again subject to the same rule, and so on *in infinitum*; each term of the series being external to the rest. In Spinoza's own words: "No single thing, *i.e.* having a finite and determinate existence, can exist and be determined to act, unless determined thereto by some other cause, also having a finite and determinate existence; which again cannot exist and act, unless determined thereto by some other finite and determinate cause, etc., *in infinitum*."¹

This proposition, negative in its expression, is negatively proved; by appeal to the impossibility of eliciting finite and determinate existence from the absolute nature of any attribute. The attribute must therefore be got out of the absolute into the modal form, and with a proviso that the mode shall not be of the infinite and eternal kind, before it is qualified to produce the finite thing.

What is this but to confess that the necessary causality hitherto so elaborately worked out is unavailing to produce a single finite thing; and that, to account for the existence of such thing we must take for granted the existence already of another? If finite must be there ere finite can arise, how comes it there where all is from Substance and Substance is infinite? The sudden step into finiteness is wholly unexplained, —nay, is made under conditions which have been

¹ Eth. I. xxviii.

carefully proved to exclude it.¹ Hitherto we have been taught to identify causality with necessary sequence from the attributes of God,—a process at once logical and real, whereby the implicit contents of the supreme essence become explicit. And it is difficult to resist the conviction that Spinoza intended to work his problem through with this single type of causation; and that he never fully realized how little homogeneous with it is that by which he replaces it: for he tries to unify them, like the parallel attributes, by covering them both with the name of God. But that he has to invoke quite another kind of causality, in dealing not with the deduction of essences, but with the genesis of things, is at times evident to himself as well as to his readers. He distinctly states, in a letter to Huyghens, that if anything exists in definite number,—say, 20 men,—(and the same applies to any other limit than numerical), there must be, *over and above its defined nature or essence*, a cause of that number,—therefore an *external cause*.² Vested in finite things, therefore, there is a causality, in virtue of their finiteness, other than the “geometrical” cogency inherent in their essence;—a *dynamic* efficiency which determines their sequence, unbeginning and unending, in ways extraneous to the laws of thought. Taken as a whole, this new type of necessity, with its “*regressus in infinitum*,” becomes the “order of nature,” the “causal nexus,” which more or less acts *against* the essence of each thing, and hinders its adequate realization.

¹ Viz. in Eth. I. xxi.-xxiii.

² Ep. 34.

The qualification of finiteness for exercising this novel causality is the more mysterious, because, in Spinoza's view, finiteness is nothing positive, but only a partial negation of existence,—a denial to a thing of more than a defective expression of its essence. That the essence, so far as it *succeeds* in expressing itself, should yield results, is intelligible: but that, in *failing* to do so, it should become a power and call up concrete things which its free essence could not cause, is unaccountable.

It was inevitable that Spinoza, on arriving with his deduction at the confines of the phenomenal world and trying to push it across, should feel the consequences of identifying the relation of Substance and Attribute with that of Cause and Effect.¹ So long as he was dealing only with the large conceptions from which he started, and turning them inside out to see what coherent web could be woven from them, it was easy for one to whom *veritas* meant indistinguishably "*truth*" and "*reality*," to take the necessity of thought as a discovery of the order of being, and to forget that the firmest chain of reasoning will drag up nothing out of night. But when he came to things distributed in space and successive in time, to birth and death, to large and small, to changes slow and swift, deduction from the infinite was brought to a stand, and the most capacious essences were struck with sterility. He had nothing but reasons; and he wanted causes. He was overdone with an "infinity" of logical possi-

¹ See above, pp. 116, 195.

bilities; but could convert none of them into physical power. He had dealt thus far with the *λόγος*, or ground of things; and now it refused to serve as the *αἰτία* of their phenomenal existence. To force his way through this difficulty some little violence was indispensable. He will not revoke the word "cause" from his "infinite modes," though it fails to carry them any further: he hopes to find some "*Potentia*" hereafter, by still leaving it wrapped up in "Essence." But he brings upon the stage, under the same name, a *dramatis persona* that we have not seen before, and that is entrusted henceforth with half the remaining action of the piece.

It follows from this doctrine that in each particular thing two causalities coexist; its essence, which is infinite and eternal; and its finite presence, which is due to a prior and to which a posterior will be due in endless series. And as it is with each, so is it with all. The total cosmos has the same factors; infinite attributes, immanent eternally, and forming its constitutive ground; and a tissue of causal connection, determining the perpetual march of phenomena and birth of things. Though driven to admit the latter, Spinoza insists on the importance of concentrating attention on the former, the system "*rerum fixarum æternarumque*." The other series eludes human cognizance by its complexity, and being independent of the essences of things yields no eternal truth.¹ Indeed it is only at last, in the *Ethica*, that he admits

¹ De Intell. Emend., V. VI. and Land, I. 33.

particular things to the honours of Causality at all. These, as long as it was possible, he reserved exclusively for the favoured "essences:" and he put off the pretensions of finite individuals by drawing a distinction between "cause" and "condition," and relegating them to the latter. Thus, he says :

"Although an object needs for its existence a particular mode over and above the Attributes of God, yet this does not preclude him from being its immediate producer. For, among the requisites of an object's existence, some are indispensable as its producers, others as rendering its production possible. For instance: I want to have light in a certain room: I light a candle, which of itself does the business: or, I throw open the window-shutter; which, without itself giving light, yet enables the light to enter the room."¹

Accordingly, he reckons, as sole *producers*, *Motion* in the extended sphere, and *Understanding* in the thinking sphere: these are the "intima essentia rerum," fixed and eternal; "and from the laws written, as it were, on their infallible record, all individual things arise and are disposed, with dependence on them so close and essential that without them they can neither be nor be conceived."² The *conditions*, on the other hand, are found in the varying distribution of rest and motion in the extended sphere, and in the thinking sphere the transient occurrence of particular ideas.³

¹ De Deo, etc., I. ii., Dial. 2, Suppl. 49.

² De Intell. Emend., V. VI. and Land, I. 33. Comp. De Deo, etc., I. ix., Suppl. 81.

³ De Deo, etc., II. Præf. Not., Suppl. 89. See also Sigwart, pp. 50, 51.

Failing, even with the help of this distinction, to work his problem through by Immanent causality alone, Spinoza did at last (Eth. I. xxviii.) set beside it "another" and "external" cause,—the concatenation of finite things: with imperfect consciousness, however, of its being "another;" and therefore not, as we shall see, without frequent relapse into modes of reasoning based on the earlier assumption. Meanwhile, we have to regard it as fundamental with him that, in each finite thing an eternal mode is united, as its affirmative essence, with a partial negation of that essence by an outward order of nature hindering its full expression. It is the former that, through the whole scene of things, supplies the divine immanence; the latter, the phenomenal world pervaded by it. The possibility, for the human mind, of emerging from the latter to the former, by the essence clearing itself of outer hindrance and asserting its eternal nature, lies at the base of Spinoza's logical and ethical theory; both of which are summed up in the self-liberation of the mind's essence. But how to unite and reconcile, in particular things, the infinite and the finite causes; what business the latter, as mere negations, have in the nature of God; how a finite thing, producing a finite, can secure it an eternal essence not springing from the finite,—these are questions to which we search in vain for a reply.

IV. THE PRIVATIONS OF THE FINITE.

If the essence of any single thing could have its way, it would simply affirm itself and be. But, instead of having the field to itself, it is only part of a course of nature indefinitely greater than itself, and full of other essences similarly affirming themselves. It thus encounters changes *ab extra* which restrict its self-expression, and with its agency mingle the experience of a *patient*. Every *passive* affection, due not to the inner nature itself, but to the influence of outward things, constitutes one of the marks of finite things; more emphatic and conspicuous in proportion as the essence is less a match for the scene of things on which it appears.¹

Besides this liability to be acted on, each finite thing is under the possibility of not existing at all. Of its two component causalities, its *essence* determines its nature and the attribute to which it belongs; but its *place* among things, *i.e.* its antecedents and concomitants in the order of the world, must determine whether or not it can put in its appearance among phenomena. Hence its existence is (*contingent*, *i.e.* not involved in its essence, but dependent on external conditions which may necessitate it, or exclude it.² The contingency, however, is merely relative to our apprehension. In themselves the external conditions are perfectly definite, only by us incalculable, and no

¹ Eth. III. Def. 2, iii. Schol. ; IV. ii. iv.

² Eth. IV. Def. 3 ; II. Ax. 1, xxxi. Cor.

less certainly determine the sequel than would the essence itself. But since we cannot read the causal nexus, as we can the "geometric ergo," we mark our suspense by calling the thing "*contingent*;"¹ under two varieties, viz. "*possible*" when among the ill-seen group of requisites our eye picks out some that are intrinsically competent to the effect; and "*probable*," when these appear to be preponderant; both lying between the extremes, viz. *necessary*, where the conditions are wholly affirmative; and *impossible*, where they are wholly negative.²

This contingency in an individual thing attests that its essence is not competent to assure its existence in presence of the order of nature. That as yet it has no existence, and in the future only problematical, shows how much being is negatived in it, and that whatever it may have rises out of non-being, *i.e.* has a beginning *in time*. Once in the light, its essence, which did not bring it thither, would never take it away,³ being infinite and carrying in it no term.⁴ But the same outward causality that detained it from existence, will expel it thence, and give it an ending in time.⁵ This enclosure within a certain *duration* is the prominent element in the meaning of the word "*finite*," and, when opposed to the "eternal" character assigned to the essence of the same thing, interprets Spinoza's doctrine that all defect is finiteness, and all finiteness absence of being. Where the infinite is positive, the finite must be negative.

¹ Eth. I. xxxiii. and Schol. 1.

² Eth. IV. xii.

³ Eth. III. iv.

⁴ Eth. III. vi.

⁵ Eth. II. xxx.

V. INDIVIDUAL BEINGS.

With the appearance of the second type of Causality and its "external order of nature," the movement of Spinoza's philosophy changes its direction. Hitherto it has descended from the one to the many, from Unity of Substance to infinity of Attributes, each breaking into an infinity of Modes. It has professed to do so by rigorous deduction, though it is plainly impossible to infer the species from the genus alone, and no principle of differentiation has been supplied to complete the conditions. Further advance upon this line is now arrested. The modes under each head invite no ulterior subdivision; on the contrary, at the bidding of the new causality those under different heads begin to unite and constitute together each single thing. If there be unity in an individual, it is the inverse of the unity of substance, and arises at the terminus of its differentiation. Not only must the two Attributes concur to set up any single thing, but numerous modes of each must centre in it to constitute its qualities and their idea; its size, its form, the motion of its parts, are so many varieties of extension, as their perceptibility is of thinking. It is therefore a *manifold*; and its individuality, whatever it may mean, does not denote *simplicity*. Approaching it from the empirical end, Spinoza studies it first in the human being, and then in external objects.

1. *Man.*

Spinoza brought into his speculations on human nature two preconceptions which, though masked by his later metaphysics, never really lost their influence. The body takes the lead of the mind as its given condition. And, of the mental states, the cognitive take the lead, as prior conditions of the affectional. These assumptions appear in the positions that "the idea which constitutes the human mind is the idea of the human body, *i.e.* a certain actually existing mode of extension and nothing else;"¹ and that from this idea, or "objective essence of the body," which is the "first immediate modification of thinking, all other modifications, as Love, Desire, Pleasure, etc., have their origin, so that without this antecedent they could never be."² Whatever doubt might be raised about the meaning of the word "idea" in this early essay is removed from his final doctrine by its definition as "a Concept of the mind, which the mind forms as a *res cogitans*;" with the comment, "I say *Concept* rather than *Percept*, because the latter term seems to imply passive affection by the object; while the former seems to express the mind's action."³ The former of these preconceptions appears early in still stronger forms, as when he undertakes to explain "how the soul *has its origin from the body*, and how its changes *depend on the*

¹ Eth. II. xiii.² De Deo, etc., Append. II., De mente hum., Suppl. 243.³ Eth. II. Def. 3.

body alone.”¹ In the doctrine of parallelism he seems to abolish this order of dependence, and to substitute concomitance of the ideal with the bodily states for sequence on them. But if, as he says, “the idea which constitutes the human mind” has the body *for its object*, it is still conditional on the body being there; the relation between the “formal essence” and the “objective” can be read only one way, viz. from the “formal” to the “objective,” and not *vice versa*. The body may be nominally deprived of its causality, but is certainly not removed from its leading position as supplying the “idea” with its contents. The second preconception, similarly adopted from the empirical psychology of his time, Spinoza deliberately retained, resolving all emotion and action into inadequate or adequate *ideas*; desire, *e.g.*, into the idea of a pleasure, and will into “intellectus.” How, then, with these data in their latest form, does he interpret the unity of an individual man?

We have seen (p. 139) that the “*Idea corporis*” which constitutes the mind “is not simple but composed of very many ideas,”² successively contributed by experience of the bodily affections.³ As the modern psychologist would say, “We know only as we feel, and we feel only our bodily changes.” The growth of this idea Spinoza does not trace in detail: each movement within the body or of the body is assumed to be attended by its “idea,” and the aggregate of these gives “the

¹ De Deo, etc., Append. II., De mente hum., Suppl. 241.

² Eth. II. xv.

³ Eth. II. xix.

mind." The body, therefore, is no single "object" of thought, and the mind is no single thinking subject: each is a complex of many phenomena,—the one of movements, the other of ideas. And these two pluralities are kept apart by the fact that each idea, while itself in the sphere of thinking, has its object in the sphere of extension, between which there is no communication. These are not promising conditions for a principle of individuality.

Perhaps they will assume a more favourable aspect at the next step, which brings us to self-consciousness. The moment the idea of the body becomes a fact, that fact has its own idea, and to our knowledge, hitherto limited to a phenomenon in the field of extension, is now added a phenomenon in the field of thinking; besides knowing, we know that we know. This further knowledge is a new fact, of which also an idea is formed; and so on, till the first self-reflection includes an infinity.¹ We are not indeed aware of having this infinite series of *discreet* cognitions: for the invariable occurrence, with every idea, of the *same knowledge of it*, amounts to a *fusion* of all the reflexes into one, viz. self-consciousness of the whole as *our mind*,—a comprehensive *continuum* of thinking. "This knowledge of the mind," it is added, "is united with the mind, as the mind is united with the body."² The doctrine wrapped up in these difficult propositions means simply, —Given, manifold sensible affections; consciousness of

¹ De Intell. Emend., V. VI. and Land, I. 11, 12; Eth. II. xx.

² Eth. II. xxi.

them involves self-consciousness, and self-consciousness, self-identity : and so, numerical data melt into individuality.

The first of these positions Spinoza supports by a favourite formula, which it may be useful to interpret once for all. "Of the human mind also *there is in God* an idea or knowledge, which follows in God and belongs to God after the same manner as the idea or knowledge of the human body." For (1) "Thought being an attribute of God, there must be in God an idea of it and all its affections, including the human mind. But (2) This idea of the mind is not referable to God as infinite, but as affected by another idea of a particular thing (standing as it does, like all finites, in the causal nexus). Now (3) The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes. Therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God and belongs to God after the same manner as the idea or knowledge of the body ;"¹—which has just been proved to arise (in us) from our ideas of the bodily affections.

The reader who strains after the sense of these sublime propositions alights with some surprise upon their homely meaning, viz. that "to have an idea is to know that you have it." This cannot be all, it will be said : for Spinoza's affirmation is about an "idea in God," not in us. Yes : but that which is in us is none the less "in God,"—nay, in Spinoza's sense, is no otherwise "in God" than by being in us. And this

¹ Eth. II. xx.

is precisely what he affirms when saying that the idea belongs to God, *not as infinite*, but only in a finite mode among its successive phenomena, *i.e.* in the human mind. The idea is not predicable of the Thinking Attribute absolutely, but merely of that modification of it which turns up in our "idea of the body" and its indefinite reflections. Under this restriction, "God" becomes "Man," and to affirm the idea as God's is to deny it of any but Man. Paradoxical as this may seem, it is no longer strange when we remember that, with Spinoza, the word "God" is equivalent simply to "Nature" or the sphere of "Existence" whether Being or Becoming: so that for an idea to "be in God," it suffices for it to be *somewhere*: it has no need to be present beyond the created mind: the straw on the wave is still in the sea.

This premised, the thesis becomes "Of the human mind there must be, in the human mind, an idea arising from its particular phenomena, as the idea of the body arises from its particular affections." And the proof runs thus. Thought exists wherever matter (extension) does. Of everything that exists, therefore of thought in all its existing modes, there is a corresponding idea. The "idea of the body" (*i.e.* the mind), as one of these, has its idea; of which, when it exists, there is another, and so on; *i.e.* there is an idea of a mental phenomenon converted, by summation of series, into an idea of the mind.

In this theory of self-consciousness some of the difficulties already lurk which were afterwards brought to a head in the ruder psychology of Condillac.

"When I have an idea, I know that I have it." Yes, certainly, if "I" am already there; the idea is then brought home as a phenomenon to an apprehending subject, capable of making it an object. But this "I" is no *datum* of our problem; on the contrary, is precisely its *quæsitum*,—the *self* which, with its personal consciousness, is to issue as product of the experience described. At the outset there is only some bodily affection and the idea of it, also called the knowledge of it. Where, then, is the *knower*, who has this knowledge? Is the "idea" expected to play this part too? Then it is the subject which has the bodily affection for its object, *i.e.* a certain mode of extension. But this idea No. 1 immediately becomes the object, as a certain mode of thought, of an idea No. 2, as its knowing subject as well as the knowledge of it. Here for the first time we are said to arrive at *self*-knowledge; whether as the result of the second stage alone, or of both taken together, is not explained. If the former, then the self, being the object known, is identical with idea No. 1, *i.e.* with a mode of *thinking only*. If the latter, then, putting together the object known (bodily) by idea No. 1, and that known (mental) by idea No. 2, we certainly have both the constituents of the self, as defined. But, then, the knower of the one is not the knower of the other,—*being*, in fact, that other, and reduced from knower to known. It is obvious that either a Subject for the series of phenomena is missing altogether; or else, a new subject arises at every stage, and instead of unity we have an infinity. Nor can we

admit any psychological equivalence between the sum of an infinite series of *ideæ idearum* and the continuity of personal self-consciousness.

Turning to the further statement, that "the knowledge of the mind is united to the mind, in the same way as the mind itself is united with the body,"¹ we must seek the key to its significance by asking, "What way is that?" The intended answer is, "The body and its idea constitute not a duality, but one individual, regarded now under one attribute, now under another." And so, the rule affirms, there is no breach of individuality in the relation between the mind and its self-knowledge. It is as truly inherent in an idea to become the object of another, as in the body to become the object of an idea: it belongs to the very nature of ideation, and is nothing else than its "form."² This is Spinoza's meaning: but the analogy gives way when closely pressed. Between *idea* and *idea ideæ* there is, it is true, the same concomitance as between *corpus* and *idea corporis*: but in the former pair, both within the same attribute, it is concomitance *with causality*, amounting to proper unity; in the latter, separated in parallel attributes, it is concomitance *without causality*, leaving the unity ungrounded and nominal. Did we (as the dictum proposes) use the relation between the body and its idea as the standard by which to estimate that between the mind and its self-apprehension, the latter would be made up of two independent and absolutely heterogeneous phenomena, unsusceptible of fusion, and

¹ Eth. II. xxi.

² Eth. II. xxi. Schol.

with nothing in common except *being phenomena*. To such conditions it is hopeless to look for the continuity and self-identity of personal existence.

At present, therefore, the problem of constructing personality from impersonal attributes remains unsolved. It will come up again in treating the moral doctrine of Spinoza, and may wait for such further light as he may then shed upon it. Meanwhile he has brought us to this point: that it is by the objective contents of my self-consciousness that I am a different individual from you. The distinction is therefore resolvable into dissimilarity, and need not be carried over to any isolation of Subject expressed by the "I" and the "you." The doctrine may be briefly summed up. Man is a finite mode of Thinking and Extension; the former attribute giving his mind, the latter, his body. The essence of his mind is formed of adequate and inadequate ideas, or intellect and imagination; the former from the eternal *causa essendi*, the latter from the consecutive *causa fiendi*. Though neither attribute and neither causality can be deduced from the other, or from any common source, yet somehow their product turns out one and individual.

2. *Things.*

Since every object in nature has its "idea or soul," it is only in degree that it falls short of the story of man. The human mind is superior in so far as its object—the human body—is so: and to find the

measure of this superiority, it is necessary to deduct, and therefore to investigate, the common properties of bodies in general. With a view thus to correct our confused apprehensions of our own body, occasioned by its large range of special action and feeling, Spinoza weaves into his *Ethica* an episode on Physics which needs a brief notice.¹

The mode in which our experience mixes up together our own body and other bodies, and our imperfect success in disentangling the two, have been already described (pp. 139, 140). When at last our conception of them and of their common properties has cleared itself, it yields certain empirical rules which Spinoza, assuming the trustworthiness of perception, uses as axioms and postulates, or embodies in lemmata. Beginning with "simple bodies," he differences them only by rest and motion, more or less swift, in this or that direction: where this is the same, their nature is the same: where it is different in two or more bodies, the nature of each has its share in the effect of their interaction.² If a moving body impinges on an immovable so as to be deflected, the angle of incidence will be equal to the angle of reflection.³ The self-evidence claimed for these principles,—Spinoza would admit,—is that of familiar experience and not *a priori* in the conceptions themselves. It is a curious question whether he would say the same of the following law: "A body in motion or at rest must have been determined to motion or rest by another, and that again by

¹ *Eth.* II. xiii. Schol. to xvi. ² *Eth.* II. xiii. Ax. 1. ³ *Ibid.* Ax. 2.

another, etc., *in infinitum*.”¹ This looks at first so like the law of “*Inertia*,” that Newton might seem to have been anticipated. But the difference is highly significant. Spinoza says that a body cannot *be* in motion or rest, Newton that it cannot *change* its motion or its rest, without the determining action of another. The latter position is a legitimate generalization from experience, the former goes out beyond the witness of experience. The latter demands a Cause where it is wanted, viz. for *phenomena*: the former, where it is not wanted, viz. for *being*. And, as if to render the contrast more conspicuous, Spinoza actually deduces Newton’s true law as a corollary from his own groundless one.²

From simple bodies compounds are formed, either by pressure of adjacent surfaces together, resulting in a *solid*; or, by combining them, if moving, into reciprocal communication of motion in definite proportions, with a *fluid* as the result. In both cases, the product is *an*

¹ Eth. II. xiii. Lemma 3.

² The doctrine that Motion cannot *be* in Matter (Extension) as such, *i.e.* as absolute attribute of Substance, but must belong to each finite body as a specialty derived from its finite predecessor in motion, is inconsistent with what we find in the *De Deo*, etc., I. ii. Suppl. p. 35. There, he says, that if body were self-subsisting extension with only length, breadth, and depth, it could not have motion: but as Nature, not limited to these dimensions, has all attributes, motion cannot be wanting. This can only mean that “*Extension*,” taken as the designation of Matter, must be understood as including Motion as well as Space-quantity. If so, it belongs to the infinite Attribute, and not to the finite Mode,—to the “*eternal*,” and not to the successional causality.

individual, which, in its turn, may serve as an element in an ulterior whole, similarly formed; and so on, till the totality of nature is reached; each system being stable in its identity (as already explained) so long as the ratios are undisturbed of its internal communications of molecular motion.¹

In his report of this process, Spinoza is far from precise. The simple bodies, previously² differenced only by "motion and rest," surprise us by now appearing of different "sizes," and of different "natures."³ The motion of these elements is assumed as the means of providing pressure and internal mobility for compounds, solid and fluid. But, as these elements are "finite bodies," their own motion requires, in each case, propagation from a prior finite body, in infinite regress:⁴ so that every datum buries us beneath an avalanche of fresh quæsitæ. And Spinoza must surely have forgotten these simple bodies when he laid down the Axiom that "there is in nature no particular thing than which there is not a more powerful by which it may be destroyed."⁵ An ultimate element that is destructible is hard to conceive; especially when it is a mere *nidus* for motion that is always transmitted and never destroyed.

Among bodies thus constituted none is more complicated than the human organism;—made up of very

¹ Eth. II. xiii. Def. Ax. 3, Lemm. 4-7.

² Also, subsequently, Schol. to Lemma 7. Individuum quod non nisi ex corporibus quæ solo motu et quiete distinguuntur, i.e. quod ex corporibus simplicissimis componitur.

³ Def. p. 90, and Ax. 1, p. 89.

⁴ Eth. II. xiii. Lemma 3, I. xxviii.

⁵ Eth. IV. Ax.

many compound individuals, fluid, soft, and hard ; sustained by the assimilation of foreign materials ; variously disposing of external bodies and affected by them again. To this constitution the mental system accurately responds : like the internal organism, the *idea corporis* is very complex : and like its foreign relations, the perceptions of the mind are various.¹ Thus, it will be observed, Spinoza, as if unable to preserve the equipoise of the parallel attributes, concludes the psychological phenomena from the bodily, as prior : *i.e.* the reasoning is not only empirical instead of "geometrical," but starts from the data of *physical* experience.

In physics we do not so imperatively require a principle of individuality as in anthropology. But some account we do need of what it is that insulates a definite object in the field of extension. Spinoza, telling us that an individual is a manifold turned into a unity, does not help us to conceive the metamorphosis and its persistence. He has not matured his loose conceptions of "motion and rest" into an intelligible dynamical and statical doctrine ; so that the concrete units at the phenomenal end remain as much an enigma in his philosophy as the ontological unit at the outset.

VI. NATURA NATURANS AND NATURATA.

Among the equivalent terms by which Spinoza designates the first principle of things, *Substance* and *God* emphasize its absolute unity of Ground, while *Nature*

¹ Eth. II. xiii. Postulates 1-6, xiv. xv.

and *Causa sui* connote what issues thence: the former make us think of τὸ εἶν, the latter of τὸ πᾶν. The paradox contained in the last is intended to make it serve both purposes, to distinguish and yet to identify the efficient and the effect. The "*Causa*" makes us expect something else to come: the "*sui*" says, "No, it is nothing else, but a reappearance of the same." The phrase thus prepares the way for a similar resolution of the remaining term *Nature* into duplicate form by appended epithets, marking respectively the causative essence and the modal expression of one and the same infinite existence. *Natura naturans* denotes "that which exists in itself and is conceived of itself, or, such attributes of Substance as express an infinite and eternal essence; i.e. God, considered as *libera causa*" [purely out of intrinsic nature]. "*Natura naturata* denotes all that follows from the necessity of the Divine nature or of any one of the attributes of God; i.e. all modes of God's attributes, considered as things which exist in God, and without God can neither exist nor be conceived."¹

The line, it will be observed, is drawn, not between substance and its attributes, but between the attributes and their consequences. And among these consequences are distinguished two classes or stages: (1) *General*, i.e. the "eternal modes" immediately following from the attributes, as Motion and Rest from Extension, and Intellectus from Thinking;—each, "a Son, product or creature of God," and "a work so great as to be

¹ Eth. I. xxix. Schol.

worthy of the Master of the work:" and (2) *Particular*; i.e. the individual objects or things which, in the order of nature, arise as phenomenal centres set up by the general modes.¹ Not only *Intellectus*, but all human attributes, as *Will*, *Attention*, etc., belong exclusively to *natura naturata*, and cannot be predicated of God as *natura naturans*.²

This antithesis is much older than Spinoza's time, and is resorted to by him merely to adjust the relation of his philosophy to that of an earlier age. He himself remarks that the school of Aquinas applied the term *Natura naturans* to God, only, not as *being* substance, but as *outside* of it; i.e. as transcendent and not simply immanent cause of all. Giordano Bruno also uses the phrase as synonymous with "God," telling us that Adam's excuse "The woman whom thou gavest to be with me beguiled me" was addressed to the *natura naturans*.³ It was more usual, at the dawn of the modern philosophy, to give both the contrasted terms a passive form, and one, a negative: thus we find in Eckhart "ungenaturte Nature" and "genaturte Nature."⁴ The growth of the Pantheistic tendency is probably responsible for the substitution of an active form.

¹ De Deo, etc., I. viii. ix, Suppl. 81, 83. The phrase "Son of God," in this early work, might be regarded as a remnant of Theism, were it not repeated, respecting *intellectus*, in a letter to Oldenburg, near the end of 1675, Ep. 77.

² Epp. 9, 54.

³ De la Causa, etc., Dial. 4, Lasson, p. 97. Bruno mixes up Eve's excuse with Adam's.

⁴ Eucken, Geschichte der philos. Terminologie, pp. 122, 172.

CHAPTER III.

ETHICAL DOCTRINE.

I. NECESSITY AND FREEDOM.

HAVING deduced, from the cognizable attributes of Substance, their human modification and especially "the origin of the mind," Spinoza narrows his stage, and concentrates his study upon the processes of feeling and action in man. To analyze the facts, to define the possibilities, and exhibit the ideal, of human character, is his object in the last three books of his *Ethics*. His pursuit of it is controlled, as he gives notice at the outset, by the previous assumption of an absolute necessity determining all human, as well as other, phenomena: so that he must treat them, whatever they be, as he would the properties of lines and figures, not with approval or reproach, but with rational recognition of their reality. To prepare us for this naturalistic treatment of facts usually regarded with some moral sentiment, he had closed his second book with two propositions,¹ in which he divests the mind of freewill, resolves will into intellectual acts of affirmation and

¹ Eth. II. xlviii. xlix. with Corollaries and Scholia. See also above, pp. 159-161.

denial, and reduces each of these to the occurrence of some particular idea; so as to leave the whole inner history at the mercy of circumstance and suggestion. The fundamental importance of his determinist position requires that his own statement and proof of it should be given :

"In the mind there is no absolute or free will ; but the mind is determined to will this or that by a cause, which has also been determined by another, and this again by another, and so on to infinity.

"*Proof.* The mind is a given and determinate mode of thinking, and so cannot be a free cause of its own acts ; i.e. cannot have absolute power of willing and not willing, but must be determined to will this or that by a cause which has also been determined by another, and this again by another, etc., *in infinitum*, Q.E.D."¹

So far as this "proof" is more than a mere recital of the thesis over again, it relies on previous propositions, settling respectively, what the mind is,² what free causality is,³ and what other causality is.⁴ "That which first constitutes the mind is the idea of the body, as an actually existing thing." Of this "idea," in whichever of its two senses it be taken, no one ever affirmed freewill : the disproof, if valid, is superfluous. "Free" causality is causality exclusively *ex se*, belonging therefore to God, or the universal *Natura naturans* alone, beyond which there is no foreign sphere. Since, for the exercise of *such* free causality, one would have to be infinite and sole, "the mind" can certainly have no pretension to it. *Other* causality is that through which the essence of a finite object is controlled or its exist-

¹ Eth. II. xlviii. ² Eth. II. xi. xiii. ³ Eth. I. xvii. ⁴ Eth. I. xxviii.

ence limited *ab extra* by surrounding and anterior finites, in perpetual regress of nature. That this causality has its play upon the mind of man, and that his volitions are not therefore the pure product of his essence, is too obvious for proof. Once having defined freedom as exemption from external influence, Spinoza does but harp upon a truism in denying it of any originated being. In this capacity man is doubly disqualified for the exercise of such "freedom:" he is subject to *both* the causalities; as "finite," to the dynamic play of sequence in the external world; as intelligent "mode," to the logical nature of the Thinking Attribute whence his essence is deduced: so that even if nothing interfered with his essence when he had got it, its freedom is negatived by its being derived.

If we follow up this "freedom," when expelled from lower spheres, to its sole seat in absolute Substance or God, we shall no more dispute Spinoza's affirmation of it than his denial of it elsewhere; but shall still say, that it is not the thing we mean. Does unhindered spontaneity constitute freedom? Then "Extension" is "free" in setting up its "eternal modes" of Motion and Equilibrium; and the circle, in yielding its deducible properties. In these cases, it is the essence alone that determines the consequents: they fulfil the specified condition; but are not called "free," from their failure in another, viz. that the essence itself shall contain a command of alternative possibilities. If it does *not* contain this, and cannot help or vary the derivatives and relations it puts forth, its

title to the epithet is imperfect : the plea of external immunity is answered by that of internal necessity. Spinoza himself, in defending his interpretation of "freedom," admits, *totidem verbis*, that he makes it identical with "necessity." "God who is absolutely free, has at the same time necessary existence, understanding, and operation, *i.e.* exists, understands, and operates from the necessity of his own nature. For undoubtedly God operates with the same necessity by which he exists : as therefore he exists from the necessity of his own nature, from the necessity of his own nature he also acts ; *i.e.* he acts with absolute freedom."¹

The freedom, then, which Spinoza reserves for God and disproves of man is simply uncontrolled action out of the essence itself. It neither carries nor admits any *alternative* : so that in getting rid of it, you exclude no such thing. Yet, in proving the proposition quoted above, he declares the phrase (applied to the mind) "free cause of its own acts" equivalent to "absolute power of willing and not willing," and supposes that the human dependence which negatives the first extinguishes the second. This only shows how impossible it is to deal with the conception of freedom, yet dispense with the idea of an alternative. If the essence already contains a "power of willing and not-willing," this power is not expelled by associating with the essence an external causality as partner in the result.

The subjection of the mind to necessity, unaccomplished by combining in it two causalities, is more

¹ Tractatus Politicus cap. II. § vii. ; V. VI. and Land, I. 287.

promisingly attempted by frittering away from it all causality. If, in the phrase "free will," you can negative, instead of the epithet "free," its subject "will," the business will be more effectually done: and to this task Spinoza addresses himself in the succeeding Scholium and Proposition.¹ First he disabuses us of our false belief in "*faculties*" of the mind, as so many *δυνάμεις* or springs of its activity. "Will" is only a general name for particular volitions, a fictitious universal which means nothing beyond the phenomena, taken one by one; to which it is no more causally related than "stoniness" to any given stone. If we have ever supposed the generalization to cover a power not exemplified in the particular facts, we may thank Spinoza for ridding us of an illusion. But, on the other hand, if he supposed that by resolving the general term into its contents he discharged all dynamic element from volition, or in any way changed it, except by taking it piecemeal instead of totally, he over-estimated his exposition on the opposite side. ✓

He is content, however, to deal gently with *voluntas* and let down its claims to energy by degrees. Notwithstanding his objection to "*faculties*," he will allow it to be one, provided it be of the right sort, satisfied to forego separate pretensions and merge itself in the power of *judgment* about truth and falsehood. ✓
 "Here it must be observed that by *Voluntas* I understand the power (*facultas*) of affirming and denying, and not the desire of understanding;—the power, I

¹ Eth. II. xlviii. Schol. and xlix.

mean, by which the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, and not the desire or aversion which the mind directs towards an object."¹ By this definition he at once transfers Will to the intellectual phenomena, subjects it to the laws of assent, and leaves it an activity only of the conceptual kind.

One step more reduces this activity of the subject to its lowest terms. In the mind are only particular judgments. Of these, each one affirms of its object that which is involved in the idea of that object and without which its essence could neither be nor be conceived. To make the affirmation, therefore, is no more than to have the idea.² By this reduction to equipollency of *Voluntas*, Judgment and Idea, the Will falls under the laws which determine the rise and succession of ideas in the consciousness. "Will and Understanding are the same,"³ and destitute of any power except to pass on to the next idea.

¹ Eth. II. xlviii. Schol.

² Eth. II. xlix.

³ In his earlier writings Spinoza had, after Descartes, distinguished Intellect from Will; not in kind (for both were *Judgment*); but in range; Intellect affirming only in virtue of clear and distinct ideas; Will pronouncing also in case of confused and inadequate ideas. We cannot refrain from judging of more matters than we can certainly know. Hence Intellect was called "finite;" Will, "infinite." On this wider scope (*latius patet*) of Will, the theory of error depended, and, in the case of Descartes, the doctrine of freewill. Adopting determinism, Spinoza became disaffected towards it; and, to abolish the distinction, proposes, in this Scholium, to stretch the meaning of Intellect so as to cover *all* Judgments. Then it becomes identical with Will. See *Cogit. Met.* II. xii.; Ep. 21. Also, Descartes, *Medit.* 4, and *Princ. Phil.* I. 35, 37. In spite of "Meyer's Preface," I believe

In Spinoza's determinism two opposite lines of thought meet and become welded together with the utmost tenacity. It pre-exists in his synthetic pre-conception of Substance : it results from his analytic pulverizing of Man into loose molecules of extension and points of consciousness. The former refuses sufficient differentiation, the latter sufficient unity, for the appearance of a responsible moral being upon the stage. No distinction, therefore, remains between natural history and moral history : and the human subject has to be studied simply as a living thing. Spinoza, commending the advantages of this method, urges the peace of mind arising from unconditional dependence upon God and conformity with him, without mercenary reckoning of rewards ; the equanimity with which the allotments of fortune are received, when seen to come to us by the same decree that fetches the properties of a triangle out of its essence ; with Joël (Genesis d. Lehre Spin., 51-2) that when Spinoza wrote the Cog. Met. he cannot yet have relinquished the libertarian doctrine in favour of that which he treats so contemptuously in Hereboord.

Voluntas shifts its meaning still more than *Intellect*. Here in Eth. II. xlix. Cor. these two are the same : in I. xxxi. xxxii. they are pronounced different. Here, we are cautioned *against* associating *Voluntas* with Desire (*cupiditas*) : there, it stands in the same category with Desire and Love. And in the De Deo, etc. (II. ii. ad fin.), Love and Desire figure as *modes* of *Voluntas* : while in II. xvii. the order is inverted, and *Voluntas* appears as a *mode* of Desire, viz. Desire towards the Good, in contrast with *Voluptas* = Desire towards the wrong thing. In Def. 6 (of Love) Eth. III. Append. a new turn is given to *Voluntas*, and it becomes the *Acquiescentia* or "Complacency which a lover feels from the presence of the object beloved." Other varieties are found in III. ix. and xxvii. Cor. 3, Schol.

the furtherance of social life by removal of all ground for hate and anger, contempt and jealousy, and the substitution of mutual succour and contentment ; and the improvement of the State by an obedience, on the part of its members, not servile but of consent.¹ He naturally draws his persuasion from the *passive* side of human life and the virtues born out of the sense of dependence. But even in this aspect he sometimes sees another picture, as when he says, "Hence it is plain that we are disturbed in many ways by outward causes, and, like waves of the sea driven by opposite winds, heave and sink, knowing nothing of the issue and of our fate."²

II. DETERMINING FACTORS OF EXPERIENCE.

In conformity with the rule of Spinoza's psychology which assigns priority to the cognitive elements of mental experience, the link of transition to character is found in the distinction between adequate and inadequate ideas. The former constitute us *agents* ; the latter, *patients* :³ the cause being, in the one case, the mind's own essence ; in the other, the external things which limit its expression.⁴ To understand is to affirm, *i.e. to act* : to be acted on is *pati*, *i.e. feeling* (*affectus*).⁵ We should thus have four modes of expressing one and the same antithesis : (1) Clear and

¹ Eth. II. last paragraph.

² Eth. III. lix. Schol.

³ Eth. III. i. iii.

⁴ Eth. III. Def. 2, 3.

⁵ Eth. IV. xxiv. Nos eatenus tantummodo agimus, quatenus intelligimus. But cf. De Deo, etc., II. xvi., Suppl. 166. *Meminisse oportet rō intelligere puram esse passionem.*

adequate ideas,—confused and inadequate ; (2) Understanding—Imagination ; (3) Activity—Passivity ; (4) Essence as Cause—Externals as Cause ; and these pairs are accordingly often treated as interchangeable. Yet the equivalence is broken by a variable interpretation of the mind's "Essence ;" which, though identified at one time with pure Understanding, is taken at others to be of a mixed nature and comprise Imagination as well.¹

It is at this point that we most palpably feel the want of some account of Causation. Understanding is made equivalent to Action, and Essence to Cause. But understanding is *knowing* ; essence is *type of being* ; while action and causation are *doing* ; and no help is given us for passing into this very different conception. One essence may rationally determine another, but not fetch it up into existence : one clear idea involve another which yet remains only an idea : and if this be called "*causation*," it still is not what we mean and want under the name "*activity*." The chasm is not bridged by Spinoza's definition of "Adequate Cause" as "that whereby the effect can be clearly and distinctly apprehended," while "Inadequate or partial is that which alone does not suffice for understanding the effect ;" and of "Action and Passion,"—"We act, when something within us or without takes place of which we are the adequate cause ; *i.e.* when from our nature something, in us or out of us, follows which can be understood by that nature alone :

¹ Eth. III. iii. ix., IV. iii.

while we passively undergo something, when something takes place in us, or follows from our nature, of which we are not the cause, unless partially.”¹ According to this, we cannot tell whether we are the adequate cause, except by clear and distinct apprehension of the effect: Understanding is *the test* of Causation, *the evidence* of action: but in playing this part, it is far from becoming *identical* with action. We are still detained upon the track of *Thinking*, and can only look with vain wistfulness at the *Doing* throng on the opposite bank: and when Spinoza, leading us by the hand professedly along the continuous edge, snatches us across with sudden spring, we can neither go nor let go, and the advance ends with a disastrous plunge.

The formula on which he relies for accomplishing this feat is his law of “*Conatus*,” thus expressed: “Each thing endeavours, as far as it can, to persist in its own existence.”² And this “endeavour” is nothing over and above the thing itself, but simply its actual essence, whence certain results necessarily follow, and no others can follow: the issuing of these results is the self-assertion and self-maintenance of the thing; and their necessity is its *conatus*.³ The human mind,—understanding and imagination too,—consciously shares in this universal endeavour; which, as limited to it, is *Voluntas*; as belonging to it and the body together, is *Appetitus*, constituting the essence of the total man himself, and possibly operating unconsciously; when consciously, it becomes *Cupiditas*. These states, thus rooted in the

¹ Eth. III. Def. 1, 2.

² Eth. III. vi.

³ Eth. III. vii.

very essence of our nature, do not wait to be formed by some prior judgment about what is good; but themselves supply our ideas of what is good, *i.e.* what is relative to our needs.¹

The great part which this *conatus* has to play, as the very nerve of Spinoza's doctrine of action and passion, ought to have secured it some cogent proof. But he supports it only by the negative consideration that the essence of a thing cannot militate against its existence, and that only external causes can destroy it. In this form, it is simply a reproduction of Descartes' "first law of nature," viz. that "each particular thing continues to exist in the same state, as far as it can, and never changes it except by collision with others."² This rule of physical *inertia* Spinoza had first made to do further duty as the principle of *life*;³ and now recognizes again in all the propensions and emotions of the mind. By this extension he carries it far beyond its original definition as an absence of spontaneous change, and surreptitiously charges it with a *potentia* or causal energy which has no rightful place in it. An individual thing, as he himself has explained to us, is in truth a resultant system in which a number of conflicting movements attain an equilibrium and set up a relatively stable attitude towards what lies beyond. This equilibrium is simply the equation of all the attractions and repulsions (to use a con-

¹ Eth. III. ix., and Schol.

² Princ. Phil. II. 37.

³ Cogit. Met. II. vi. sub fin. See Trendelenburg's Hist. Beitr. zur Phil., II. p. 82 where the origin of the "conatus" doctrine was first pointed out.

venient abbreviation), and will continue till one or other of them obtains increment or decrement, whether from interior molecular change or from external invasion. Against either of these disturbances the fact of present equilibrium has absolutely nothing to say, can make no protest, put forth no "conatus;" it is simply helpless, and will disappear as it appeared without any voice in its own existence. It is illegitimate, therefore, to convert the mere presence of a statical condition, *i.e.* of a thing, into a new *δύναμις*, or self-sustaining tension,—a "*Vis* quâ res in existendo perseverat."¹

The importation of this fresh cause tacitly confesses anew the incompetency of "geometrical necessity" as a key to the system of the world. We have already had a second order of necessity set up,—in the external nexus naturæ,—to deal with finite successions which the first could not touch. And now, in its own proper field, *viz.* the *essences* of things, we are introduced to a *Vis* put forth by them which Pythagoras and Euclid never suspected. If the link which connects the definition of a figure with its deducibles be the representative type of all necessity in nature, and if every essence carries a conatus, the circle must be always *trying* to uphold its properties, and resisting their dissolution with a preventive "potentia." That this is absurd only shows how little adequate is the idea of mathematical necessity to the illustration of nature, physical or human.

¹ Eth. IV. iii., as also Cogit. Met. II. vi. Vim per quam res in suo esse perseverant.

If we ask whether this *conatus* in each thing belongs to it as a mode of thinking or as a mode of extension, the award must doubtless be to the former. As in the human mind it is self-conscious, so throughout nature must it be referred to that *ideal* side of each object which in man rises into self-consciousness.¹ It is directed, however, upon something which exists in the sphere of extension, viz. the maintenance of the object's place among finite realities, and so far as the *conatus* is successful, its "vis" or "potentia" passes over from the thinking attribute to the extended. No limit being placed to the law of self-conservation, this violation of the principle of parallelism is universal.²

¹ In the *De Deo*, etc., Spinoza says, "The natural love, inherent in each thing, of preserving its own body can have no other origin than the idea or objective (*i.e.* apprehended) essence which is in such body's thinking attribute." App. II. 2, Suppl. 243. By a curious turn, Spinoza identifies this *conatus* with *Providence*. "The second attribute of God is Providence, which for us is nothing but the striving which we find put forth in nature as a whole, and in each particular thing, to uphold and maintain its own existence." *De Deo*, etc., I. v., Suppl. 63. As Sigwart has pointed out, this conclusively assigns the *conatus* to the Thinking side of Nature. Spinoza's *Neuentdecker* Tractat., p. 59.

² The frequency with which we come across these breaches of parallelism raises a doubt how far Spinoza sincerely held a doctrine which he so ineffectually guards. His attitude towards it is best seen by comparing Eth. III. ii. with the appended Scholium. The proposition says, "neither can the body determine the mind to think, nor the mind determine the body to motion or rest, or any other state, if such there be." The Scholium goes far to unsay the first clause of this thesis, while letting the second stand. Against the common belief that the mind's volition moves the limbs he insists that it is not yet

III. PRIMARY FEELINGS.

The feelings are described in two ways, which at first appear to be contradictory. They are *passive* states induced by outward causes. They are only various forms of the self-affirming *conatus*, which is our inward essence set in *action*. In a transaction, however, between external things and ourselves, the state into which we are put must include both a recipient and a respondent element ; and if the whole be called a *feeling*, we *suffer* it as imposed *ab extra*, and *give it character* as determined from within. Of the three Primaries recognized by Spinoza, Pain, Pleasure, and Desire, the last alone supplies the mind's reaction ; the others go no further than the prior condition into

made out how much the body can do ; that the lower animals and somnambulists show what very skilful things it can effect, so that there is no telling whether it may not be within its competency to produce buildings and pictures ; and that from the astonishing structure of the human body an infinity of unexpected things may follow. In all this he overproves his refutation ; not only pulling down the pretensions of volition, but setting up at least a prospective right, on behalf of the body, to be credited with intellectual products. His tone is that of the sanguine physicist. The distinction between the "*decretum*" of the mind and the "*determinatio*" of the body is reduced to a vanishing point, a mere subjective way of expressing the same thing ; whereas the proposition affirms the distinction as absolute, in the *sphere of causality*. Spinoza's speculative monism could never settle terms with the Cartesian dualism : and the latter he probably admitted as a provisional hypothesis, required by the state of knowledge, till his early confidence in the supremacy of physical nature should be justified.

which it is thrown. Whenever a change is wrought on the body, and correspondingly on the mind, which enhances the acting and thinking power respectively, it reports itself to consciousness in the shape of *pleasure* (lætitia); while a change which lessens this power reports itself as *pain* (tristitia). The one is the feeling of passing to greater perfection; the other, of passing to less.¹ Both are strictly *πάθη*, to which we contribute nothing; but as signs of what is being done to us, they are a note of encouragement on the one hand, of warning on the other, to our instinct of self-conservation, and wake up its *conatus* into the self-conscious pleasure of *Desire* (cupiditas). This feeling, therefore, is not on the same line with the other two, but dependent on their presence, and is the first that can properly be called a form of the *conatus*.² It is intense in proportion to the pleasure or pain occasioning it, which again is measured by the increment or decrement of functional power. And it has as many varieties of kind as there are external objects to affect us with this or that pleasure or pain.³ As it is the "idea of the body that first constitutes the mind," the increase or diminution of active power in the body, with the concomitant increase or diminution of thinking power from the parallel idea, forms the basis of Desire. But when the self-consciousness comes to contemplate the mind's own changes of gain or loss,

¹ Eth. III. xi. and Schol.

² Definitions of Affectus at the end of Eth. III. 1, 2, 3.

³ Eth. III. xxxvii. lvi. lvii.

apart from all corporeal reference, the attendant pleasure or pain gives rise to desires whose objects are simply mental. These desires wholly escape the passive character and the confused ideas that cling to all the rest, and emerge into pure activity.¹

Though desire varies in intensity as the feeling whence it springs, pleasure as its source has an advantage over pain, by itself increasing the self-conserving power which pain diminishes ; so that the external causality is in the one case added on to the normal *conatus*, in the other subtracted from it, and it makes the difference between going into the same enterprise with a reinforcement and after a desertion.² It is further obvious that from the satisfaction of desire a fresh pleasure arises, which in its turn must occasion a new desire, viz. for a repetition of the same experience. In all cases, pain stands in a negative relation to the essence of man, and cannot be understood from it ;³ it is a blockade or invasion felt but not interpreted from within. But the consequent desire is due to the mind itself, being the resistance of its essential nature to assault upon its power.

IV. DERIVATIVE FEELINGS.

All feeling, as conscious increase or decrease of living power, presupposes the idea of the body, which in its turn involves that of other bodies, and is a compound of adequate and inadequate elements. Our

¹ Eth. III. liii. lv. lviii. ² Eth. IV. xviii. ³ Eth. IV. lxiv. Dem.

passive states are due to our dependence on external things, and are varied with our inadequate ideas of these, which, as we have seen, constitute Imagination. If, therefore, we would trace the genesis of the derivative feelings, we must see what the Imagination does with the primaries, and survey them in the order of its laws. This will be more convenient than a closer adherence to Spinoza; who, in his propositions, dislocates his psychology to suit his apodeixis, and, in his appended list, makes the objects and not the origin of the feelings his *fundamentum divisionis*.

1. CONDITIONAL ON INADEQUATE IDEAS.

A. Imagination as Conservative.

The simplest form of the *conatus* is the attempt to maintain pleasant images and banish unpleasant, when brought to us by outward things; the former heightening, the latter depressing our bodily and mental power.¹ To this tendency (=Bain's law of conservation) Spinoza attributes (1) *Love and Hate*, which are merely (as Hobbes had said) the idea of a pleasure or pain blended with the idea of the object causing it.² So long as the image is retained, the increment or decrement of power goes on, and the feeling grows with its continuance. Hence whoever loves tries to keep present, or imagine as present, the object of his love: whoever hates, to remove and destroy the object

¹ Eth. III. xii.

² Eth. III. xiii. with Cor. and Schol.

of his hate, or at least to rid himself of the idea.¹ The varying effects of external bodies on the human organism in different men, and in different conditions, render it quite possible for one person to love what another hates, and even for the same person to change his mood towards the same object.² But, so far as objects are persistent in their relation to the human body and in their difference from each other, each will be regarded by a feeling of definite type and have a passion to itself. Only the most marked of these have received names, and that often only in their excess. Thus we have (2) *Luxury* or *gluttony*: (3) *Intemperance*: (4) *Lust*; forms of inordinate love for different causes of sensible pleasure.³ No object is more surely a source of pleasure and pain to you than *yourself*: and you try to imagine such a self as will please you, or, in case of your having become hateful to yourself, you visit yourself with ill; and this gratified or inverted feeling of your own merits is (5) *Pride* or *self-exaggeration*; with its opposite, *Self-depreciation*.⁴ But the sentiments of others towards you are also great elements in your happiness or misery. Hence your imagination dwells on what is or may be pleasant in them, and shrinks from what is unpleasant; a habit which constitutes (6) *Love of Praise* and *Dread of Blame*.⁵ From the natural delight in imagining all that is agreeable to an object of love, and that is disagreeable to an object of hate, arise respectively (7)

¹ Eth. III. xix. xx. ² Eth. III. li. ³ Eth. III. lvi. and Schol.

⁴ Eth. III. xxvi. Schol. ⁵ Eth. III. xxx. Schol.

*Over-estimation and Disparagement of Others.*¹ Finally, this law of imagination plays a curious part, when you suppose yourself loved by one whom you hate. His love makes you wish him well. Your hate makes you wish him ill. In this conflict you dislike the claim which his love makes upon you, and want to be rid of it; and you try to maintain and justify your hate in spite of it. If you succeed and, indulging your fancy, do him harm, the passion to which you yield is called (8) *Cruelty*.²

B. Imagination as Sympathetic.

The next law of imagination is this :—whenever we imagine an object which is like us but indifferent to us, to be under the influence of some feeling, we ourselves become affected by the same.³ Spinoza's proof, resting on his parallelism, may be construed thus : to imagine an object you must have a part of your brain in a certain form : to imagine it *like you*, that form must be the same as when you imagine yourself : to imagine a feeling, you must have the cerebral configuration inseparable from it ; induced, if the feeling be attributed to your like, on the previous form, viz. that corresponding to the idea of yourself. From this conjunction, however, of molecular conditions, involving the idea of a feeling superimposed on the idea of yourself, the actual feeling is inseparable, just as the image of an object, if uncontradicted, is its *presence* no less than the actual perception of it. In simple psychological

¹ Eth. III. xxvi. Schol. ² Eth. III. xli. Cor. Schol. ³ Eth. III. xxvii.

terms, another man's feeling is the feeling of a second self, and cannot be imagined (*i.e.* from the inside and not merely by its look), without being more or less reproduced : since the act transposes us into the position and mood of another, and is tantamount to the conception of ourselves under identical conditions. This *Imitatio affectuum*, or conveyance of feeling between similars, afterwards worked out, under the name of "Sympathy," into an elaborate theory by Adam Smith, plays an important part in Spinoza's anthropology. Chiefly by means of it, he explains the origin of (1) *Commiseration*, or fellow-feeling with suffering. Simply as cause of pain to us in seeing him, the sufferer might excite our hate : but then we should take pleasure in his sufferings : contrary to the hypothesis. Instead of this, *our* pain incites us to remove *his*,—its cause.¹ (2) *Ambition* is, in part, a direct "*Imitatio affectuum*," *i.e.* a pleasure in doing what pleases men, or a copying of their tastes;² and, in part, an *inversion* of the same, *i.e.* an eagerness that men should love and hate as we do : in any case concordance, though aimed at in opposite ways. (3) *Sympathy* and its opposite *Envy*, *i.e.* pleasure and pain at the sight of others' happiness, result from the imitation ;—the former, directly ; the latter, from an admixture of fellow-feeling with good fortune and chagrin at our own inferior lot. This mortification we escape if the fortunate person is above comparison with ourselves,

¹ Eth. III. xxi. xxii. Schol. ; xxvii. Cor. 2, 3.

² Eth. III. xxix. Schol. ; xxxi. Schol.

so that what he is or has is out of the range of our capacity. We then envy him no more than we envy trees their height.¹ (4) *Benevolence*, or delight in others' happiness, implies, besides, the desire to promote it, but otherwise is the same as sympathy.² (5) *Self-praise* and *Humility* are not indeed wholly the reflection of others' appreciation of us: for in mere self-contemplation there may be a consciousness of strength or weakness. But they are greatly intensified by imagining the corresponding applause and censure of men: and so far they exemplify the *imitatio*. Spinoza characteristically adds that the pleasure of self-praise tempts men to recite their exploits and merits, till they bore one another; and that from the pain of humility men are naturally envious, taking pleasure in the weakness of their equals, and being annoyed by their virtues: inasmuch as, excellence being relative, a man's self-regard is most gratified when the inferiority of others is conspicuous, and his own merits stand out in the light. This method of disparagement is favoured by the large use of competition in education.³ (6) Hence the transition is natural to *Emulation*, which, as the desire of something which we see to be desired by others, still exemplifies the *imitatio affectuum*.⁴ (7) And so too does *Repentance*: for it is the pain we feel in having been the cause of pain to others,—a sympathy not only with their distress but with their reproach.⁵

¹ Eth. III. Def. of Affectus, 23, 24, and lv. Cor. and Schol.

² Eth. III. Def. of Aff. 35, and xxvii. Schol. 2. ³ Eth. III. lv. and Schol.

⁴ Eth. III. xxvii. Schol. 1. ⁵ Eth. III. xxx. Schol., li. Schol.

C. Imagination, as subject to Association of Ideas.

Spinoza nowhere expounds systematically the doctrine, afterwards so carefully elaborated, of "Association of Ideas:" but in numerous detached instances he applied it with happy ingenuity; influenced perhaps by the example, but surpassing the subtlety, of Hobbes. He especially illustrated the mode in which, through the principle of association, the range of emotions was increased, so as to embrace a host of objects originally indifferent to us; and well understood how, by "the law of transference," the neutral causes of pleasure and pain come to eclipse in interest the effects whence they borrow their significance. Nothing can so often and so closely accompany a pleasure as its own cause: and if it happen to be the possible cause of any one of many pleasures, to its idea will cling the idea, not of this or that alone, but of all; so that it not only draws upon itself the charm of what it brings, but indefinitely multiplies to the imagination the measure of its worth. (1) Thus is explained the fascination of money,—representative of countless pleasant possibilities;—and its result, the passion of *Avarice*.¹ (2) Again, resemblance, as well as causation, serves as a link of suggestion: and if some feature in a thing indifferent reminds us of what we love or hate, we shall look upon the thing with *Liking* or *Dislike*.² (3) As love consecrates every indifferent particular

¹ Eth. III. xiv. xv. lvi. Schol.

² Eth. III. xvi. Def. Aff. 8, 9.

connected with the object of affection, we cannot without pain miss any one of these from the image of the object. That pain is *Regret*.¹ (4) A more complicated cluster of associations gives rise to *Jealousy*. When an interloper snatches from us the attachment of a friend supposed to be specially our own, pain at the lost love and hate towards the cause of it are aggravated by the imagined happiness of our supplanter; as the source of which the late object of affection becomes an object of aversion, not without such returns of the old feeling as to distract us with distressing fluctuation. It is this conversion of love into hate that differences Jealousy from *Rivalry*.² (5) Towards a benefactor of one whom you love you look with *Favour*; towards an injurer, with *Indignation*; the agent being the cause of your own sympathetic pleasure or pain.³ (6) Among a crowd of level phenomena or common objects attention passes from one to another without arrest: but on anything exceptional in their midst, it rests with some intensity. This fact,—called *wonder*,—Spinoza refuses to recognize as an “*affectus*,” because it is merely the case of an *insulated image*. But, when coming into association with love, hate, desire, etc., it gives rise to special forms of feeling. Hence proceed *Devotedness* and *Contempt*: the former resting on admiration of fine

¹ Eth. III. xxxvi.² Eth. III. xxxv. and Schol.³ Eth. III. xxi. xxii. Schol. Spinoza, however, oddly accounts for our pleasure in a friend's happiness by its intensifying the idea of his existence, especially as his pleasure gives him more existence.

qualities in an object of love; the latter, on the discovery of worthlessness in an object which has been taken into admiration on trust and testimony; so that we dwell on what it *has not* rather than on what it has. From the same stock, with variations which have won different names, come (7) *Veneration* and *Horror*, directed respectively on qualities pre-eminently high and pre-eminently revolting.¹

D. Imagination, modified by Time-associations.

Imagination (see above, pp. 142-3), in its function, takes no notice of Time distinctions. Its objects are always quasi-present: *i.e.* its images carry in them no condition which can exclude the actual existence of the things; and so they affect us in the same way, whatever be the dates of the things. When marks of time are superinduced upon these images, the equality of their influence is disturbed; a shadow dims the past and the future, which, compared with the intensity of the present, gives rise to special forms of feeling. It is chiefly by introducing or resolving doubt in various degrees that these are distinguished. To this group belong (1) *Hope* and *Fear*; the former, a variable or wavering pleasure, the latter, a similar pain of expectancy, directed on uncertain good or ill. (2) Take away the uncertainty, and these are converted respectively into *Confidence* and *Despair*; the good and ill emerging into the strongest light, though still not at hand.

¹ Eth. III. lii. and Schol. Def. Aff. 10.

(3) Should the event, uncertain to the last, have suddenly declared itself, it brings *Joy*, if answering to hope, *Disappointment*, if realizing fear.¹ These are all cases of passive feeling, given to contingencies which we cannot influence. In the prospect of disaster admitting of some modifying action of our own, another order of emotions appears, measured chiefly from the average level of fear among men, and named from some marked distance below or above this level. (4) Do we refrain from what we wish, through dread of a danger which our equals are not afraid to meet? It is *Pusillanimity*. Do we follow a desire into action, at the cost of a danger which our equals are afraid to meet? It is *Daring*. (5) There is a form of *double* fear, which brings yet a new experience; when we are disposed to escape, through some less evil, a greater which else impends. Should the price dismay us, when the moment for its exaction is at hand, so that we know not which of the two ills is worse, but only that both are great, our fluctuating misery is *Consternation*.³

E. Imagination, under Illusory Beliefs.

Time-associations, besides producing particular affections, such as hope and fear, modify the intensity of several that are due to other sources. This would not

¹ Eth. III. xviii. and Schol. 1, 2, Def. Aff. 12-17. I avail myself of Mr. Pollock's well-chosen translation of *Conscientie morsus*.

² Eth. III. Def. Aff. 40-41.

³ Eth. III. xxxix. Schol. But cf. lii. Schol., where *Consternation* = Attention riveted by an object of Fear.

be the case, had we a perfect knowledge of causality, so as to read the links of necessity not less distinctly in the past and the future than in the present. As, however, they become hazy at a little distance from us, the images of things so placed are more compatible with the non-existence of their objects than the images of what we immediately perceive, and are on that account less impressive; and the farther off we place what we imagine, the more room do we leave for unknown possibilities that might exclude it. Time-difference here affects us, not on its own account, but merely as the index of a supposed contingency : and it is a rule that towards what (in our conception) may either be or not be our feeling is weaker than towards a contemporaneous necessity. Both, as now absent, are on a footing : we know that something keeps them out of present existence : but, turning to their date in the future, we are *sure* that the necessary *will be there* : we are only *not sure* that the contingent *will not be there*.¹

It is chiefly on the affections towards human actions that the illusion of contingency exercises its modifying influence : for there it assumes the form of a belief in freewill ; and love and hatred in any given case must each be greater towards a being supposed to be free than towards a necessary instrument. In the one case he appears isolated as *per se* the cause of what takes place and concentrates on himself the total feeling awakened : in the other, he is regarded as

¹ Eth. IV. ix.-xiii.

only a member of a system of causation, no part of which can be separately charged with the result.¹ To this belief in human freedom must be referred, at least in their higher degrees, the following feelings: (1) *Anger*, in the sense of desire to hurt an object of hatred, or put him out of the way :² (2) *Remorse* and *Self-approval*, i.e. sorrow and satisfaction for something personally done, with the consciousness of one's self as its cause ;—"feelings of the utmost vehemence, from the belief which men have that they are free :"³ (3) *Revenge*, or anger (as above defined), roused by injury done to us, and heightened by reciprocity of hatred.⁴

The feelings thus passed under review admit of combination in countless ways which furnish new varieties. Similar thrown together strengthen their common tendency. Opposites occasion conflict in their coincidence, and fluctuation in their succession. So far as we are left by our imagination to the play of these assailing feelings, we are in thralldom. For means of escape, if such there be, we must quit the seat of inadequate ideas, and approach the central essence of our nature.

2. FEELINGS CONDITIONAL ON RATIONAL IDEAS.

Giving imagination its discharge, we may now try to take the measure of our nature, if its remaining

¹ Eth. III. xlix. and Schol.

² Eth. III. xxxix. xl. Cor. 2, Schol., Def. Aff. 36.

³ Eth. III. xxx. Schol., li. Schol., Def. Aff. 25, 27.

⁴ Eth. III. xl. Cor. 2, Schol., xli. Schol., Def. Aff. 37.

essence were left alone; *i.e.* if there were none but adequate ideas. We may consider the characteristic effect first of the rational, then of the intuitive ideas, though Spinoza does not enable us to keep them rigorously separate.

To be rid of inadequate ideas is to stand free of external causes which limit the expression of the mind's own essence; and to leave the Understanding, unhindered by the inroad of passive states, to its pure self-activity.¹ This is only to say that its *conatus* has free play and gains its end: and as the *conatus* is itself *desire*, and its fulfilment *pleasure*, these two Primary feelings still hold their place; with this difference, however; that whereas before pleasure was the prior condition of desire, the order is now inverted, and pleasure enters as the satisfaction of desire. But the third Primary feeling—pain—disappears; since it is incident to the restriction and abatement of acting and thinking power; and, so far as the mind understands and affirms itself, there is no room for "*tristitia*."²

The autonomous essence of the mind, thus introduced upon a clear field, becomes coincident with several conceptions which, without reference to it as their interpreter, are liable to be misunderstood. It is our *Power*; for all that we do is simply its expression. It is our *Virtue*; for that is only the same, viz. what we can be and do in intelligent conformity with the laws of our nature.³ It is *Knowledge*; for it is

¹ Eth. III. lviii.

² Eth. III. lix. cf. Def. 3.

³ Eth. IV. Def. 8.

the affirmation of adequate ideas, *i.e.* existence under the guidance of reason.¹ It is *Freedom*; for it is unimpeded life out of the inner data of our own being; relatively to which it is also *Necessity*, inasmuch as we cannot have them other than they are.² It is *Self-interest*, or the quest of our own advantage; for this consists in that maintenance of our essential existence towards which the active *conatus* is directed.³ Hence, the following phrases are all equivalent varieties of the same idea: Action from our own power; Action from reason; Action from virtue; Free action; Self-conservation; Seeking our own advantage; Following the necessity of our nature. No virtue can be conceived prior to the self-conserving *conatus*; for it would have to be prior to the very nature which is to be its subject: the *conatus* is the first and sole foundation of virtue.⁴ The more a man seeks under it his own advantage, the more virtuous is he; and the less he cares for his advantage the more is he powerless.⁵ This natural right of self-love is as certain as that the whole is greater than the part.⁶

Though Spinoza, in assuming the *conatus*, has secured a form of *power* to supplement the "geometrical" cogency which was to suffice for every need, it is not always easy to adjust the relations of the two. The *knowledge* with which he identifies *virtue* is not always *power* with which also he identifies it; not even

¹ Eth. IV. xxiv. xxvi.⁴ Eth. IV. xxii. and Cor.² Tract. Pol., II. xi., V. VI. and Land, I. 238. ⁵ Eth. IV. xx.³ Eth. IV. xx. xxiv. xxvi.⁶ Eth. IV. xviii. Schol.

when it is of the required kind, viz. "knowledge of good and evil:" for he is well aware that, simply in its character of recognized truth, it cannot be depended on to counteract passion and command right action. He therefore has to insist, that this knowledge shall be more than knowledge, and invest itself with an atmosphere of feeling sufficiently intense: "A true knowledge of good and evil cannot, in virtue of its truth, control any feeling (*affectum*): but only in its character of a feeling."¹ What provision, then, does he make for its possessing this character? It is foreign to the conception of knowledge, as such: it must therefore be sought in the particular object of this knowledge, viz. *good and evil*; to the theory of which we must turn.

"Good" and "evil" express no positive quality of things, but are names of their effects relatively to the wants and susceptibilities of this or that nature: so that the same thing may be good for one being, bad for another. But the words may be used intelligently, provided the standard by which they are measured is named and they are detained within it.² Applied thus to human nature, "Good is that which we certainly know to be *useful to us*:" "Evil is that which we certainly know stands in the way of our command of some good."³ This, however, is not precise till we ask "useful for what?" and receive the answer, "for our self-conservation:" good is that which helps, bad is that which hinders, our self-maintenance

¹ Eth. IV. xiv. ² Eth. IV. Pref. last par. ³ Eth. IV. Def. 1, 2.

or active power:¹ and the marks by which they are distinguished to our feeling are pleasure and pain, respectively. The increase or diminution of active power Spinoza regards as a bodily affection: the pleasure or pain as the parallel mental phenomenon, felt but not yet known. This fact of feeling, however, cannot be there without the copresence of its own idea: if it be itself the "idea" (attendant change in consciousness) of the bodily change, it becomes in its turn (as this change in consciousness) the object of another idea (*idea ideæ*) now of the self-conscious or cognitive order: we not only have the feeling, but know that we have it: and this *knowing* is related to the *having*, exactly as the *feeling* to the *bodily change*; *i.e.* not in the way of identity, but in the way of parallelism. Here then we reach our goal; as pleasure and pain,—the indices of gain or loss in active power,—are what we mean by "good and evil," so the self-conscious idea of them is "the *knowledge* of good and evil." Only, the self-conscious "idea" must contain as its object, along with the sensory change, its proximate cause, which is involved in knowing the effect.² So we know good and evil when we know,—by the signs of pleasure and pain,—what helps and hinders our self-conservation.

Why does Spinoza,—so frugal of his words,—speak, as if by way of distinction, of a "*true knowledge* of good and evil?" can *knowledge* help being true? Substitute for "good and evil" their "self-

¹ Eth. IV. viii., Dem. ² De Intell. Emend., V. VI. and Land, I. 31.

conserving" equivalents, and the answer is plain. The *conatus* belongs to our nature in its imagination as well as in its understanding, and asserts itself in the blind passions no less than in the rational tendencies: and its success and failure, even in its misdirection, are not without their connected pleasure and pain. A vindictive man enjoys his revenge, and in it maintains and increases his particular type of nature: and if he understands how to gratify it, he has a "knowledge of good" relative to his character. But precisely on account of this individual relation, it is a *false* "knowledge of good" according to the large human standard. Spinoza's epithet excludes this case and gives notice that he is speaking of man as the subject of adequate ideas.

It is clear how "the knowledge of good and evil," thus interpreted, may have the character not only of knowledge, but of feeling. Under the form of judgment it carries the matter of emotion: for it is *pleasure or pain* at one remove,—if not in itself, in its idea, with that of its cause; and the affectional quality of the blind consciousness passes into the seeing. Or if, setting aside the pleasure or pain as a mere incident and index of *conatus* satisfied or baffled, you take this success or failure as the meaning of your "good," or "evil," then they fall into the train of *Desire*, already identified with the *conatus*. In any case, therefore, the *contents* of the judgment detain it among the primary feelings and arm it with their power to compete with rivals of the same order: and

but for this, the mere apprehension of its logical truth, as expressing a "clear and adequate idea," would be no match for any conflicting passion. On this emotional feature in the "true knowledge of good and evil" Spinoza relies for motive power to control each opposing *affectus*: whether it effects the conquest depends on the relative strength of the rival forces.¹ For the comparative estimate of their intensities he suggests no common measure. But as the passive affections are flung upon us by all the external causes to which we are exposed, while the resisting activity is the expression of our solitary essence, our rational nature struggles against odds of indefinite magnitude.²

Whatever hopes in this strife may be placed on our "knowledge of good and evil" Spinoza attaches to it as the *cause of desire*: "*The desire which springs from the knowledge of good and evil* may be restrained and quenched by many other desires arising from the affections with which we have to contend."³ Yet elsewhere he pronounces emphatically against this order of derivation, and insists upon inverting it: "it is certain that we do not strive after, will, seek, desire a thing because we deem it good; but that, *vice versa*, we deem it good because we strive after, will, seek, desire it."⁴ And he repeats the rule with more explicitness: "We have shown that nothing is desired by us because we judge it to be good: but, *vice versa*, we call *that* good which we desire, and consequently *that* evil to which we are averse: so that every one

¹ Eth. IV. xiv. ² Eth. IV. iii. ³ Eth. IV. xv. ⁴ Eth. III. ix. Schol.

judges from his own inclination what is good and bad, better and worse, best and worst. Thus the covetous man deems plenty of money the best of things, and lack of it the worst. The ambitious desires nothing so much as fame, and fears nothing so much as disgrace. To the envious nothing is more agreeable than the ill fortune, more annoying than the good fortune, of his rival. And so each one after his own inclination deems an object good or bad, useful or useless.¹

The question whether desire is cause or effect of the idea of pleasure (*i.e.* knowledge of good) is thus answered in opposite ways. The contradiction, though irresolvable, may perhaps be accounted for, if we constitute two types of Desire, conforming respectively to the two orders of origin, and suppose Spinoza, without noticing the distinction, to have in view now the one and then the other. Identify the *conatus* with Desire, and then nothing can be prior to it, and only in its satisfaction does pleasure arise. But that pleasure (or any other, if such there be) once given is attended by its idea, which is added to our nature and shares in its *conatus* hereafter; in other words, is a new desire, emerging from the felt "good" of the first. When Spinoza, in treating of the three primary *affectus*, gave precedence to Pleasure and Pain, and set down Desire as dependent on them, he cannot have been thinking of the earlier of these types; or even of the later except in the lower half of its history from the pleasure downwards: and probably he conceived of at least

¹ Eth. III. xxxix. Schol.

some pleasure, not as a product of our active essence, but as a passive incident of experience, susceptible of use as an absolute psychological *datum*. Even at the very moment of unconditionally claiming the prior and determining place for Desire as the constitutor of "good," he still concedes the existence of other "kinds" of pleasure, "*Omne genus lætitiæ—et præcipue id quod desiderio, qualecumque illud sit, satisfacit.*"¹

In thus showing how Rational ideas may become affectional and control the feelings due to the Imagination, it has been necessary to speak of "the knowledge of good and evil" as if it were a single knowledge in two parts. And single it is, so far as correlates must always be understood together. If we had only adequate ideas, we should have no conception of good and evil, and should not want the names:² for different reasons, however, in the two cases: evil would not be there, consequently not its idea: good would remain, but, for want of its correlate, would not be known in that character. With pure autonomous activity, we should have the satisfaction of increasing "perfection" without knowing anything else, and therefore without knowing it. But *tristitia*, from decreasing "perfection," would be absent alike from existence and from knowledge. It arises from inadequate ideas, which are the negation of knowledge; from external control of our proper essence, which, left to itself, would never meet it. Hence, the two terms do not stand upon the same footing. Whatever is denoted by the word *good*

¹ Eth. III. xxxix. Schol.

² Eth. IV. lxviii. lxiv. Cor.

is positive and an object of adequate cognition ; while what is denoted by the word *evil* is a mere negation, and an object of inadequate knowledge ;¹ the idea being only indirectly gained, by way of denial or restriction put upon some self-affirmation.² Thus, in Spinoza's view, evil, like error, resolves itself into defect, or privation, relative to the isolated human nature, and disappears when we look beyond the inner wants of that single nature to the compass and equilibrium of the whole.

Might we not grant Spinoza his assumption that evil is mere defect of being, yet deny his conclusion that to know it is mere defect of knowledge ? Look at it in the equivalents by which he elucidates its negative character,—Pain, the failure of desire ; Loss of essential power ; Subjection to outward causes ; Falling short of a mere conceptual standard. In all these, undoubtedly, there is a measure or *quantum* set up, in a certain subtraction from which "evil" is made to consist. But subtraction, when it takes place, is after all *a fact* no less than addition, though indicated by the opposite sign : and to know it as such, *i.e.* to have, with the idea of the measure, the perception of its being missed, is no more an ignorance, or an "inadequate knowledge," than would be the perception of its being surpassed. Compared with the *not-knowing it*, it is a positive increment of intelligence. Knowledge of privation is not privation of knowledge.

¹ Eth. IV. lxiv.

² Eth. IV. lxiii. Cor.

The attempt to attenuate and absorb evil by treating it as an illusion of relativity is carried out to its results in the Blyenbergh correspondence. It is a human inaccuracy, Spinoza there says, to speak of "Sins against God:" they are *against* nothing, if by that is meant any positive antithesis to other positive being; but are only cases of imperfect conformity with an arbitrary expectation of ours that every individual in the shape and with the definition of Man will be and do what we deem suitable to that type. Drop the preconception of the type, and the very same things that offend us in men please and amuse us,—as the fighting of bees, and the jealousy of doves. The exemplar of which they fall short is a mere abstraction of ours, which we have no right to impose as a rule of absolute judgment on any nature, human or other, which has not enough reality to respond to it. Whatever a finite object can be, that it is; and whatever it is not, it cannot be. It is idle to trouble ourselves about the cause of Sin: for Sin is non-being; and non-being wants no cause. Whatever exists, considered in itself irrespectively of anything else, includes perfection, to the extent in each object of that object's essence: for this it is that constitutes its essence.¹ Relatively to people with eyesight, a blind man has a defect: but in the nature of things absence of sight in him is just the same as in a stone, *i.e.* the measure of being decreed to both is alike complete without vision; and there is no more sense in speaking of God as the

¹ Ep. 19.

cause of non-vision in the man than in the stone. It is the same with the ethical infirmities of inferior men compared with the superior, and of the same man in his inferior moods: under the lower conditions, the better affection conceived by us as if possible is no more present than in a devil or a stone. In imagination only is it loss: in reality it is negation.¹

Spinoza has the courage to apply this principle to particular cases of crime: *e.g.* Nero's matricide, in its *positive* elements,—the external act and the intention to kill his mother,—was no wickedness; for the same features were no less present in the act of Orestes: and the other elements—his ingratitude, pitilessness, and disobedience—are all negative, and express no essence, and therefore have not, like the act and the intention, God [or aught else] for their cause.²

From these statements it will readily be seen how the assumptions of universal necessity and of the negative character of evil work together as the two principal factors of Spinoza's ethical doctrine.

The essence of man as an agent being resolved into *Ratio*, his function becomes a simple one, viz. to *understand or know*; and the mind judges nothing serviceable to itself except what conduces to this end, which gives value to all things and receives it from none. The more comprehensive the object understood, the more advantageous is the apprehension of it: so that to know absolutely infinite being, the common properties alike in the part and in the whole, *i.e.* God,

¹ Ep. 21.

² Ep. 23.

is the mind's supreme good, its highest activity, its absolute virtue.¹

A single name expresses the ethical aspect of this single function. It is *Fortitudo*; Firmness, to stand free of the passive affections, and act from the inward essence of the mind alone. If we divide it, it is not because it has parts, but because it directs itself on different objects and relations. In action mainly personal, it is *Animositas*,—courage and high spirit to resist deflecting passions. In action towards others, it is *Generositas*,—amity untainted by mean illusions and antipathies: the one word expressive of strength, the other of nobleness.² True courage no one possesses who is under the influence of any excessive desire, enthralling him to an outward object;³ or who fails to estimate dangers rightly, irrespective of their near or distant date, and purely by their certainty and relative magnitude;⁴ and therefore is not equally ready to meet or to shun them, as reason may prescribe.⁵ The desires which animate the free-spirited man, expressing his pure self-activity, are a positive pursuit of good, unalloyed by pain; simply for its own sake, and not from fear of evil or hope of external benefit.⁶ Not even the idea of death, so disturbing to many, will divert him from his intentness on the action proper to his living nature; his thoughts will dwell on anything rather than death; the wisdom of life will be his meditation.⁷

¹ Eth. IV. xxv.-xxviii. and II. xlvii. See *supra*, pp. 150, 151.

² Eth. III. lix. Schol. ⁴ Eth. IV. lxii. ⁶ Eth. IV. lxiii. and Cor.

³ Eth. IV. lxi. ⁵ Eth. IV. lxix. and Cor. ⁷ Eth. IV. lxvii.

In its social aspect, of nobleness towards others, the rational temper excludes all passions—varieties of hate—which interfere with the concord of men, such as envy, disdain, and pride; and secures the several modes of kindly feeling, as clemency, modesty, openness to friendship (curiously called *honestas*). He who is possessed by it will try to conquer hate with love, and make all men partners in true good:¹ “he who requites injuries with hate lives a miserable life indeed; but he who sets himself to lay siege to hatred with love you cannot deny to be a safe and happy warrior. With equal ease he faces a single foe or a host, and asks no aid from fortune. Yes, and those whom he conquers surrender with joy, not with beaten, but with augmented strength.”² If his lot be cast, not with enemies but with fools, he will decline, as far as may be, to receive benefits from them, which they will expect him to measure (as he cannot honestly do) by *their* rule: yet at times he must consent, lest he excite ill-will by seeming churlishness.³ “In no high degree can any but the free-minded be grateful to one another: for they alone are united by mutual services and friendship, and endeavour to benefit each other with equally zealous love:” whereas the gratitude of persons led by blind desires is rather a matter of business, or even a trap (for future favours) than real thankfulness.⁴ Moreover, the free-minded man can always be depended on for good faith: he can never

¹ Eth. IV. xxxvii. xlv. and Cor 1.

² Eth. IV. lxx. and Schol.

³ Eth. IV. xlv. and Schol.

⁴ Eth. IV. lxxi. and Schol.

act with artifice; nor will Spinoza allow of any breach of this rule, even as a ransom from death.¹ All these characteristics of true freedom are best realized by one who, instead of being his own master in solitude, lives in a civil society, where the well-being on which he is intent as his own is that of a larger self than his private nature, and by some surrender of passionate desires is secured an indefinite amount of mutual help and concord.² But the ultimate ground of rational life in its immunity from disturbance is in the knowledge of God, *i.e.* in escape from the personal standard of good, and the surrender of our partial estimates of evil to the total conception of the necessity of nature.³ "If, then, we become subject to events other than we could wish, we shall bear them with equanimity, conscious that we have done our part, and could not have avoided these things, being but a part of the universal nature and involved in its order. When this is clearly and distinctly understood, that better part of us which is called *intelligence* will accept it with absolute content, and in that content endeavour to persist."⁴

These lineaments of *Fortitudo* present the picture of a mind independent in its essence, dependent in its lot, and by the ascendancy of the former neutralizing the contrarieties of the latter. The superiority, ethical in its result, is intellectual in its source: it is the triumph of clear and adequate ideas over confused and inadequate, of Understanding over Imagination. All

¹ Eth. IV. lxxii. and Schol.

² Eth. IV. lxxiii. Schol.

³ Eth. IV. lxxiii.

⁴ Eth. IV. App. 33.

the characteristics of this virtue,—its energy, its gladness, its evenness, its disinterestedness,—are the direct expression of rational self-knowledge and appreciation of things by their eternal qualities. And all the opposites which it sets aside,—disappointment, excess, the various hatreds, time-illusions, submission to externals,—are induced by the mixed images that cheat us with the semblance of reality. Be the duration of the mind what it may, these are the marks of the slave; those, of the free.¹

3. FEELING CONDITIONAL ON INTUITIVE IDEAS.

If the first stage of apprehension beyond imagination already left behind the whole troop of passive emotions, they appear from the second still farther in the distance. In neither is the mind any longer kindled from without or disposed of by feeling which is not insight. What fervour there may be in both is but the intensity of clear ideas, in each case drawn into a focus of its own. Incandescent Rationality becomes *Fortitudo*; incandescent Intuition becomes *Intellectual Love of God*.

This crowning feature of Spinoza's ethical ideal is far, however, from shining by its own light. It is involved in the obscurity of his doctrine of intuitive knowledge, already discussed (p. 152 *seqq.*); with the additional darkness of an exposition laboriously enigmatical. But if we do not look for too much in his

¹ Eth. V. xli. ; IV. lxvi. Schol.

sublime phraseology, and are exact in applying such key to it as he has provided, a consistent interpretation of it may be found.

Spinoza has prepared the way by explaining what he means by the *knowledge* of God. "The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God," in knowing itself, its body, and external bodies as actually existing; in having these samples of the universal properties of extension and thinking. Consequently, all men know God's infinite and eternal essence, though other *communes notiones* may be more clear.¹ To have the conception of Nature as extended and ideal (or intelligible) in common with ourselves is to know God. Nay, "any particular body, actually existing," suffices to make this knowledge adequate.² This physical identification of our constitution with that of the world is not yet called the *Intellectual Love* of God, so long as it engages us only upon the geometry and logic of the two great attributes: though a theory which resolves all human action and perfection into understanding might as well use the phrase of the rational cognition as reserve it for the intuitive. A passage to something more than *knowledge* of God is first sought in the self-consciousness: "He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his affections, loves God; and the more so, the more he understands them;"³ and the "affections" here meant include, as the previous proposition

¹ Eth. II. xlvii. and Schol.

² Eth. II. xlv. xlvii.

³ Eth. V. xv.

shows, those of the body.¹ The reason assigned is simply, that in consciously understanding anything there is always a pleasurable exercise of mental power; and that where the phenomenon understood is a state of yourself referred to its cause, the pleasure becomes *love*; and, where that cause is God (under the aspect of an attribute),—*love of God*. To “refer an affection to the idea of God” is to carry it in thought from the *natura naturata* to the *natura naturans*, or “see it in its cause,” or “understand it:” and the happy consciousness of our clear idea as part of the whole truth of nature is the “love of God.” The mind, in being aware of its own intelligence, is glad, and loves the source or totality of it, viz. the necessity of nature.²

This intelligent power reaches its acme in *intuitive* knowledge; to which accordingly the Love of God pre-eminently belongs.³ This third grade of cognition, as we have seen, is characterized by seeing *individual things* in the light of those universal attributes which combine to set them up: so that from the preconception of those attributes the essences of the *res singulares* are seized, with a full perception of necessary relation. The attributes being divine, the things thus seen in them are “seen in God.”⁴ If the *res singularis* should be *yourself*, you are then the object as well as the subject of this intimate connection. And

¹ “The mind can get to refer to the idea of God all affections of the body or images of things;” i.e. to understand them as cases of molecular change within the attribute of Extension.

² Eth. III. liii. ³ Eth. V. xxv.-xxvii. ⁴ Eth. V. xxx.

you not only know the necessary step from the attributes to the individual essence, but you know that you know it; you are conscious of a nexus of ideas identical in cogency with the real relation: *i.e.* your own mind, as an organ of necessary truth, reveals the necessary reality, because it is only a function of it. This "third kind of knowledge," therefore, "depends upon the mind, as actual (formalis) cause, so far as the mind itself is eternal"¹ (*i.e.* the seat of logical laws): and as "the mind" is now a *res singularis* "seen in God," he (or it) also, and comprehendingly, is recognized as cause of the pleasure you feel in your philosophical insight, and so becomes the object of your "Intellectual Love."²

The claims made for this affection are in character with its august name. It makes us one with God, and so imparts the highest self-content or gladness in the contemplation of our active power.³ No envy or jealousy or other form of hate can mingle with it, for it is enhanced by the numbers who share it.⁴ From

¹ Eth. V. xxxi.

² Eth. V. xxxii. and Cor. Comp. xxxvi. Schol. sub fin., where the following remark (which I condense) occurs: The essence of our mind being knowledge, of which God is the principle and foundation, it is clear how our mind depends—essence and existence alike—on God;—an impressive example to show how superior is that knowledge of particular things which, as intuitive, is called "of the third kind," to the general knowledge called "of the second kind." In the First Part a *general proof* was given that of *all things* both essence and existence depend on God: but this is brought home to our convictions more forcibly, when the conclusion is drawn over again specifically from the very essence of the particular thing (the mind) affirmed to be dependent on God. ³ Eth. V. xxxvi. Schol. ⁴ Eth. V. xx.

its connection with every object, it is for ever kept alive.¹ And being an expression of the mind's nature as a necessary function of the nature of God, it is eternal, no more capable of removal than the true of becoming false.² It is the only love that is eternal; the passive affections lasting no longer than the body. The fear of death disappears before it: and the more things the mind knows in the rational and intuitive way, the greater is the part of it that abides and is untouched by fear of death.³

Without pausing at present to consider the exact purport of these phrases, we proceed to the two final oracles on this supreme excellence. "God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love."⁴ And "the mind's intellectual love to God is the very love of God wherewith he loves himself, not as infinite, but so far as expressed by the essence of the human mind considered under the form of eternity: *i.e.* the mind's intellectual love towards God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself."⁵ This new predicate of God—"intellectual love"—naturally astonishes readers who have been taught that God has neither Intellect⁶ nor Love;⁷ and that such terms, if ever applied to him, can carry as little of their proper meaning as the word *dog* when transferred from the

¹ Eth. V. xvi.

² Eth. V. xxxiii. xxxvii.

³ Eth. V. xxxviii. and Schol. The use of the word "*eternal*" in antithesis to the *temporary* character of the body and its affections contradicts Spinoza's statement that it has *no relation to time*. Here it can only mean "free from death." ⁴ Eth. V. xxxv. ⁵ Eth. V. xxxvi.

⁶ Eth. I. xvii. Schol. xxxi. Ep. 54.

⁷ Eth. V. xvii. Cor.

animal that barks to Sirius.¹ Their perplexity, however, is due to their finding, in these propositions, *two* beings that love (Man and God) both with the same object of Love (God); whereas there is only one, viz. Man, though under the two names. And of this, it must be confessed, Spinoza gives fair notice: for does he not plainly say that by God's self-love he means nothing else than Man's love towards him? The question then is, How can he call one and the same Lover *Man* in one sentence and *God* in the other? To this also he supplies an answer: he is speaking of God, "not as Infinite," not as *Natura Naturans*, but as manifested in one of the modes of the *Natura Naturata*, viz. the human mind. The affection therefore of Love is predicable of God only in virtue of its being felt by a finite nature which is an undulation of his Thinking Attribute. The further stipulation that, in this connection, the human mind shall be taken, not in its whole experience, but "under the form of eternity," simply shuts out its imagination and limits us to it as the organ of necessary truth, in which capacity alone it is at one with the necessity of nature and the subject of intuitive knowledge. After this identification of the two beings, there is no difficulty in passing the same feature (love) under either name: and it is by playing at substitutions with these equivalents that the paradoxical equations are built up which have so much puzzled interpreters of the intellectual love of God. Objectively, the *self* which God loves is the

¹ Eth. I. xvii. Schol.

human, considered as also divine : and subjectively, the *human mind* which loves is also God, in his coincidence with the essence of our nature. The apparent contradiction arises from the reader's assumption that the word "God" refers to the *natura naturans*, and the word "Man" to the *natura naturata*. When both are understood to be in the letter, and to be the same element of it, the contradiction disappears, and becomes a tautology. The deep-sounding corollary—"Hence God, so far as he loves himself, loves men ; and consequently the love of God towards men and the intellectual love of the mind towards God are one and the same,"—breaks its promise to the ear, and means no more than that the persons may be changed *ad libitum*, where no persons are distinguishable.¹

The "intellectual love of God" is no affection directed upon a conscious and responding mind; but the desire and delight of understanding things as

¹ The reasoning is correct enough in *form*; "God's love towards himself" being the middle term, identifying the other two, *viz.* "The mind's love towards God," and "God's love towards men" by its equivalence to both :

The Mind's love towards God = God's love towards himself
 ||
 = God's love towards men.

To estimate the *contents* of the reasoning, we must ask how it is made out that the middle term is tantamount to the first. It is made out by tacking on a "*quatenus*" to the word "God,"—"God, so far as he is the human mind:" so that "God's love"="the human mind's love;" and "himself"="man." With these substitutes, the equivalence is so effectually established, that all the propositions say the same thing.

determined by the necessity of nature,—the enthusiasm for truth,—the self-adaptation to the order of the world.¹ If Spinoza had in view two stages of it, corresponding to the Rational and Intuitive grades of knowledge, and marked this by reserving the epithet “intellectual” for the latter, he probably meant to distinguish the *scientific* habit of mind from the *philosophical*; both perfect in their allegiance to reality; but the one working from circumference towards centre, the other from centre towards circumference.

V. ETHICAL VALUES OF THE SEVERAL ORDERS OF FEELING.

No descriptive psychology of human affections can refrain from incidental estimates of their worth as elements of character. But Spinoza’s moral ideal needs a more direct presentation than in the scattered hints of the foregoing chapters.

The supreme *Standard* of ethical value is *Right Knowing*. In this is included all that is desirable for man, and nothing else.² This is virtue.³ This is the

¹ Involving, on the introspective side *Acquiescentia*, or *self-content*, which Spinoza elsewhere (Eth. IV. lii. Schol.) assigns to the same supreme place (summum quod sperare possumus) which is here given to the *Intellectual love of God*. Are they then the same? It seems a paradox to say so. Yet, the more closely they are scrutinized, the more do they look like the same state of mind, described at one time in the *direct* view, as what it is, at another, in the *reflex*, as contemplated in self-consciousness.

² Eth. IV. xxvi. xxvii.

³ Eth. IV. xxii. xxiii.

perfection which the mind's essence is always pressing to realize.¹ In all that tends to promote this there is a positive value; in all that hinders it, a negative or subtractive. Its most important aids are three,—viz. (1) A highly complex organism, supplying a great variety of bodily relation to other bodies; provided, however, it does not fail of the essential condition of stability,—an undisturbed ratio of motion to rest among the bodily parts.² It is by securing for us a large number of properties in common with other bodies that such an organism contributes to right-knowing: for this number is the measure of our clear and adequate ideas. (2) Pleasure (*lætitia*): for the reason, that it enhances while pain depresses bodily and mental power.³ Hence, it is commendable to make provision for a due gratification of the senses, and for a life brightened by amusements and adorned by the fascinations of art.⁴ (3) Social or concurrent life;⁵ for this reason, that while all other external objects have a mixed unlikeness and likeness to ourselves, and therefore partly hinder and partly help clearness of idea, our fellow-men have more in common with us than anything else, and are therefore in the highest degree serviceable to us: and by adding together the powers of many human beings, a vast accession of resource and a freer movement of faculty are secured.⁶ Under this third head, however, the interdependence is reciprocal: if Society is a help to

¹ Eth. IV. xxiv. ² Eth. IV. xxxviii. xxxix. ³ Eth. IV. xli.

⁴ Eth. IV. xlv. Schol. ⁵ Eth. IV. xl. ⁶ Eth. IV. xviii. Schol.

rational life, rational life, *i.e.* the control of passions, is indispensable to society. It is the feelings stirred in us by external objects that set us at variance; servitude to them is discord with each other. But so far as we act out of the essence of human nature (which is the same in us all), *i.e.* so far as we live under guidance of reason, we all move on the same lines towards what is necessarily and universally good, and so are in perfect accord: and each will be most serviceable to others, when he most seeks his own real advantage. But for the succumbing of men to conflicting passions, harmony would be spontaneous: disturbance, however, arising, means of conquering it have to be sought; and are found in the institution of the State.¹

The several orders of Feeling must be estimated by their tendency to support or weaken these three conditions. More or less, *all* the passive emotions, involving as they do inadequate ideas, detain us from right knowing. Each, occupying us with some one object, hinders our apprehension of the rest, to a degree ludicrous in the case of the lover, odious in that of the miser and the ambitious, and constituting a genuine *insanity* in them all.² The first of the three conditions (perfect organism) is forfeited by all pleasurable excitement except Cheerfulness (*hilaritas*): for this alone affects the whole body, while other varieties impair its balance by some local intensity.³ The second condition, which thus becomes subject to a material restric-

¹ Eth. IV. xxxv. Cor. 1, 2; xxxvi. xxxvii. Schol. 2.

² Eth. IV. xliv. Schol.

³ Eth. IV. xliii.

tion, is wholly banished by the entrance of pain ; which can never be anything but a hindrance, unless, accidentally, as a counterpoise to some partial pleasure.¹ Such incidental check to feeling otherwise excessive may be exercised by hope and fear : and it is their only commendation : for in themselves, and in their derivatives, Confidence and Despair, Joy and Disappointment, they indicate defect of intelligence : so that a rational man would try to free himself from them.² The third condition (social harmony) is excluded by all varieties of hate, as envy, scorn, anger, revenge, and the voluptuous passions which feed them.³ And so far as pride values others at less than their deserts, and self-contempt consoles itself by dislike of others' superiority, they belong to the family of envy and must be similarly judged.⁴ In the favouring affection with which we regard the benefactor of another there is nothing at variance with reason : but its counterpart,—indignation against the injurer,—is unconditionally bad, and is inadmissible as the source of public punishment.⁵

Tried by the same standard of Reason, other feelings, not usually disapproved, must be condemned :—Compassion, which only does ill what Reason would do well ; Humility, which, as contemplating what we have *not*, is the negation of self-knowledge and a hindrance to our acting power ; Repentance, which carries the double evil, of wrong desire and of unhappiness, both of them weaknesses ; Sensitiveness to reputation,—

¹ Eth. IV. xliii. lx.

² Eth. IV. xlvii. Schol.

³ Eth. IV. xlv. Cor. 1, Append. 19.

⁴ Eth. IV. lvii. Schol.

⁵ Eth. IV. li. and Schol.

always at the mercy of a fickle multitude, and dreading eclipse by some rival's fame. But, as not all men are accessible to rational considerations, these affections, working through hope and fear to not dissimilar results, may pass as imperfect substitutes, producing at times more good than harm.¹ Fear indeed is indispensable for governing the mass of men; so true is it that "*terret vulgus nisi metuat.*"

There remain a few of the passive feelings which directly exclude right knowledge, either of ourselves or of other objects. With self-knowledge, *e.g.*, Self-exaggeration and Self-depreciation are incompatible. Filling us with false beliefs, they are the source of great weakness: the latter, as solitary and painful, being the more corrigible; the former, fed by flatterers and pleasant to the imagination, being, on the other hand, one of the most obstinate of faults.² Self-content, it is obvious, may have adequate ground, and be consistent with the rational life. It is the acme of self-conservation, the supreme condition, secondary to nothing ulterior; and, as the end of ends, confers an inordinate fascination on the praise which maintains it, and to any disgrace which disturbs it imparts a sting that renders life barely supportable.³ Our knowledge of other objects is similarly confused by feeling: *e.g.* over-estimation and under-estimation of men is simply *ignorance* of them.⁴ And hope and fear are incident to ignorance of the order of nature.⁵

¹ Eth. IV. i. liii. liv. and Schol. lviii. Schol.

² Eth. IV. lv. lvi. and Schol.

³ Eth. IV. lii. and Schol.

⁴ Eth. IV. xlviii.

⁵ Eth. IV. xlvii.

Nothing can effectually replace knowledge. If a feeling happens to lead us right, it only does by accident what true insight would necessarily effect.¹ And when one passion is adroitly played off against another, there is no inward deliverance; as may be seen in the self-denials of the avaricious or the ambitious, which give way when no longer serving their immediate end. Without freedom from the passive affections there cannot be rational life.² And that freedom is to be won only by *Fortitudo*, as already defined in its two divisions of High Spirit and Nobleness.

VI. ETHICAL DYNAMICS.

It would be of little service to enumerate the constituents of character, and submit them to relative valuation, unless a *power* can be found vested in us, whereby the "melior pars nostri" may rise to supremacy over all else. When we look no farther than our own nature, and compare its conflicting elements, its "better part" would seem to carry this power in itself: for is it not the understanding? and do we not, according to Spinoza, "*act so far as we understand*"? while, beyond this, we only suffer *passive* states? so that it cannot be doubtful, in case of a struggle, *which* will have to succumb. Unfortunately, the combatants are not so unequally matched as this mere interior antithesis—of active and passive—would imply. If the Understanding concentrates all the inward strength of our own

¹ Eth. IV. lix.

² Eth. III. Aff. Def. 48, Expl.

nature, the Imaginative Feelings are backed by the whole energy of outward things;—an energy which indefinitely exceeds our own and often quenches it.¹ Thus the field of strife is thrown open from the human limits to the embracing world: and the issue lies between the two causalities,—the eternal in the essence of man and the phenomenal in his existence. Nor in the relation between these two is there any self-evident security for the ascendancy of either. The qualitative superiority of the first is balanced by the quantitative range of the second: from which man, as a part and product of nature, and in contact with it all round, must be played upon every moment of his life. Whether his intellectual essence will succeed in unfolding itself, or be overpowered by objects in the external scene, there is no *tertium quid* to decide; he himself cannot mediate between them, for he is identical, as agent, with the first term: nor is there in him any such function or faculty as *will*, distinct from the several adequate ideas which make up his intelligence. He is not umpire but combatant; with weapons not of his own selection against an opponent of unmeasured strength. The contest must settle itself: "*solvitur ambulando.*" Should the inward essence of the mind prevail, he will be "free;" should the outward order of nature carry the day, he will have succumbed to "necessity."

The attentive reader can scarcely fail to notice here a change in Spinoza's phraseology. In the earlier books of the *Ethics*, the explicit outcoming of what is

¹ *Eth.* IV. xv.

implicit in the essence of a thing,—Substance, Attribute, or Mode,—was taken as the type of *Necessity*, and made the base of the “geometrical method” of rigorous deduction. Here, in the fifth book, this same unfolding of the essence of man as an eternal mode of eternal nature, is set up as the type of *Freedom*, in distinction from the successive causality in the order of finite things, which now obtains sole possession of the word “Necessity.” It is obvious that nothing has occurred to render the *causa essendi* more “free” than at first, or less “necessary” than the *causa fiendi*: and the change of language cannot prevent our seeing that, in Spinoza’s view, the determination of character is a mutual adjustment of *two necessities*, capable of admixture in various proportions. Even if we reserve the word “freedom” for relative use, to mark the idea of either of them when left alone by the other, we provide for an impossible case in ethics: for Man is always an object in Nature, as well as an essence in himself; and there is in him no such thing as separate action of either causality.

The only question then of ethical dynamics assumes, in Spinoza’s scheme, this conditional form:—“*In case*” the inner necessity controls the outer, *how* does it do so? What are the particulars comprised in its subjection of the passive feelings?

The main answer,—comprehending in fact any others that may be different in form,—is:—the passive affections are subdued *when they are known*. They are incident to inadequate and confused ideas: to gain an

adequate and clear idea of such an affection is to destroy it.¹ It is like a juggler's trick, which can take us in only till we see through it. What then is implied in this substitution of distinct for confused apprehension? In presence of some object we are agreeably or disagreeably affected: occupied by it, or its image in the memory, we treat it as cause of our feeling and look on it with love or hate accordingly.² This, however, is a mistake. Our "affection" (including, as Spinoza always does, its physiological side) is referable, not to the outward thing *per se*, but to it conjointly with our own body, and more to the latter than to the former, and only to such properties as are common to both.³ In order, therefore, to know the affection (*i.e.* to see it in its cause), we must have these mixed elements disengaged from each other, and those of them which the order of nature really links together we must perceive in their necessary concatenation.⁴ Once let an affection lie thus analysed at our feet, and it is done for;⁵ just as it would be impossible to keep up a blush in order to try psychophysical experiments upon it.

We owe so much to the sanguine temper of European science in the early years of its revival, that we may well spare it our easy criticism. Yet it is instructive, from our present point of view, to notice the coolness with which Spinoza already asserts that "there is no bodily affection of which we cannot form

¹ Eth. V. iii. and Cor. ² Eth. V. v. ³ Eth. II. xvi. and Cor. 1, 2.

⁴ Eth. I. Ax. 4, 5; II. xxxviii. ⁵ Eth. V. iv. Schol.

a clear and distinct conception ;"¹ especially when we remember that under this "conception" he includes "the reduction of the affection to the idea of God," *i.e.* to its place in the necessary order of nature.² His "proof" of this "great promise," as Trendelenburg justly calls it,³ it is needless to scrutinize. Time has effectually refuted it, and shown that we are as far as ever from necessarily connecting, and almost as far from accurately co-ordinating, the physical, the physiological, and the ideal series involved in our experience of feeling. In justice to Spinoza we must add that he so far qualifies his "large promise" as to admit the lingering presence, along with the "clear and distinct conception," of inadequate ideas due to the external object's residue of *differences* from our own body after all that is common has been sifted out ; and that he finally shapes his statement thus :⁴ "Every one is able, if not perfectly yet in part, to know himself and his affections clearly and distinctly, and consequently to make sure of suffering from them less." They may be reduced to the smallest part of the mind. Even where our knowledge of the object of feeling remains thus imperfect, we may yet think of it as belonging to an infinite causal series ; and when thus stripped of its look of isolated freedom, and reduced into the line of necessity, it will lose its chief power over us : for towards that which is supposed to be free a far deeper feeling is directed than towards one under necessity.⁵

¹ Eth. V. iv. Schol. ² Eth. V. xiv. ³ Histor. Beiträge, ii. 91.

⁴ Eth. V. xx. Schol.

⁵ Eth. V. v. vi. ix. -

In support of self-analysis as an instrument of self-mastery, Spinoza recommends an habitual reflection, in tranquil hours, on maxims of rational life, and examples which enforce them; *e.g.* that hatred is conquered by love; that social friendliness brings self-content; that men, like other objects, are disposed of by necessity of nature. Such associations of ideas, once fixed by assent of reason, will rise at the needed moment, and be accompanied by the corresponding bodily acts or states, in virtue of the law of parallelism.¹ Constituting as they do a real insight into properties of things that can never be absent, they have, in their clear and permanent truth, a powerful set-off against the vehemence of any immediate impression: and though they may be overpowered by the fascination of an object actually present, they will be more than a match for one only imagined and dimmed by the haze of the past or future.²

One other subsidiary rule is added. An affection concentrated is more intense than one distributed: so that, even without direct recourse to the restraints of reason, we lighten our thralldom when yielding only to feelings which contemplate many different objects at once.³

What, then, is to set in action these remedies for the *παθήματα*? There is no spring of resistance to them, no impulse to the knowledge and love before which they retire, but the *conatus* of the mind's own essence, the pressure of its self-asserting power towards

¹ Eth. V. x. and Schol.² Eth. V. vii.³ Eth. V. ix.

its proper perfection; and the inherent satisfaction belonging to all knowledge. Insight, *i.e.* virtue, can be purchased by no external good. Blessedness is identical with virtue, not its reward. Our delight in virtue is not the effect, but the cause of our restraining the passions. This delight turns intellectual insight into love; and so, against irrational affection sets up, not simply rational *intuition*, but rational *affection*, as victor.¹

It is impossible to quit this theory of ethical dynamics without noticing its conspicuous contradiction of the principle of parallelism. It has already been pointed out that the *conatus* assumed in all things is at variance with that principle (p. 239). But here the variance becomes especially striking, because the *conatus* is planted, in order to do its work, expressly and exclusively in the *Understanding*, and is the assertion of the thinking power itself; while the task it is set to accomplish is the subjugation of affections which are fundamentally corporeal.² Bodily work is openly handed over for Thought to achieve: *knowledge* steps forth into conflict with the passions, and clears the field of them. It may be said that the defeated "affection" is a mixed phenomenon^{on}, containing, with some bodily change, also its "idea;" and that it is only the latter element which is modified by thought; while

¹ Eth. V. xlii.

² Eth. III. Def. 3. "By Affection (affectum) I understand changes induced (affectiones) in the body, whereby the active power of the body itself is increased or diminished, aided or controlled, together with the ideas of these changes;" *i.e.* not the cognitive apprehension of these changes, but the feelings which attend them.

the former undergoes a concurrent but independent modification, consistently with the rule of parallelism. And this line of defence is no doubt pre-arranged at the opening of the Fifth Book ; where it is laid down that "in precise conformity with the order and linking together of thoughts and ideas of things in the mind, are the bodily affections or images of things ordered and linked together in the body."¹ To give effect to the plea, this proposition must be read between the lines wherever Spinoza subsequently speaks of the efficiency of knowledge in "destroying," "removing," "controlling," "extinguishing," "overcoming," the "affections,"—of "all that the mind *considered in itself alone* can achieve against the affections,"² of "the power vested in the intellect alone of restraining the lusts and affections ;"³ and we are to split his single term "affections" into its two component conceptions and exclude from his meaning the bodily changes and limit it to the "ideas ;" since *that* is the point at which the mental causality is arrested, and the ulterior corporeal modifications are in no way due to the "power vested in the intellect alone," but only follow suit *proprio motu*. Can any one believe that Spinoza meant his last book to be read with this *subauditur* ? that he threw his language of causation over a gulf which he was conscious it could not cover ? Rather have we here a fresh evidence of his wavering allegiance to the rule "Neither can the body determine the mind to think, nor the mind determine the body

¹ Eth. V. i.² Eth. V. xx. Schol.³ Eth. V. xlii.

to motion or rest, or any other state, if such there be."¹ It has been already shown² that this rule is no sooner established than it is half recalled, in favour of the body's possible production of ideal effects. And we have now the inverse oblivion of the rule, in a tacit ascription of power to the mind over affections which are in part corporeal. In his treatment of the states of "passion," from whichever end he takes it up, there is no effectual separation of the material and ideal elements. The second and third books practically assign the determining place to the body, the fifth book to the mind: and if the doctrine that neither could determine the other had seriously possessed Spinoza, he could not have written them as now they stand.³

The resolving of ethical power into the self-assertion of the understanding would be intelligible in a philosophy which started with a ready-made *Ego* of given type which might forthwith vindicate its intellectual rights. But Spinoza's disqualification for using the doctrine of *essence*, elsewhere disturbing to his logic,⁴ affects his ethics with a fatal weakness. He has no human subject to begin with,—no "individual" with an "essence,"—no understanding intent on maintaining itself. This "self" on whose autonomous power he relies is not yet in existence, but waits for the touch of his compounding hand to be built up out of per-

¹ Eth. III. ii.

² P. 239, note 2.

³ See Trendelenburg's *Hist. Beiträge*, ii. 89, 90, where this criticism is forcibly presented from a somewhat different point of view.

⁴ See above, p. 150, note 2, and pp. 214-219.

petual grains of idea accruing to the initial “idea of the body.” How is it possible to speak of such a rudimentary meeting-point of two attributes as having a definite essence to abide by, and as attaining virtue by active affirmation of what that essence contains? Such a conception involves two things which Spinoza will not allow:—a unit of personal power to make the affirmation; and a constituted nature to settle what it would be at. A world-theory without agents and without ends cannot pay its way, but goes into liquidation when it has to be worked by the self-directing essences of things.

VII. THE MIND’S “ETERNAL PART.”

One predicate of the “Intellectual Love of God”—that it is “eternal”—I have reserved for separate consideration, since it takes us to the boundary between the ethical and the hyper-ethical. Its main interest lies in the question which it raises, “Did Spinoza believe in the immortality of the individual mind?”—a question which needs for its answer some reference to his successive writings.

However doubtful may be the sincerity of the Metaphysical Thoughts at their date of publication (1663), they may at least be accepted as a record of past opinion still in process of modification. And there the position is maintained that the soul, being a “substantia,” cannot perish, either of itself, or by the action of any other substance; the laws of nature ren-

dering dissolution inconceivable except in the case of *modes*, such as the animal body. The obvious reply, that the argument from substance excludes a beginning no less than an ending, is evaded by the remark that we cannot fix a date for the act of the Omnipotent in creating the soul, any more than we can deny his power of destroying it : but, confining ourselves within the limits of his natural laws, we can confidently make the negative statement, that the soul neither comes by inheritance nor is dissolved by death. The laws of nature being God's immutable decrees, nothing can be clearer than that minds are immortal.¹ Here we have probably Spinoza's earliest belief, still marked by the Cartesian features of "created substances," and the antithesis of "Nature" and "God." Nor is there any reason to suspect a non-natural sense under the familiar phrase "immortality of the soul."

In the "Short Treatise," the doctrine is cast in quite a different mould. It is founded, not on the idea of Substance, but on two new conceptions,—the limitless character of Love,—and the power of Knowledge and Love to unite the soul with its object and make it partner in the same duration, *e.g.*—

"Love, etc., is alone unlimited, and becomes more excellent the more it increases, being directed upon an infinite object. Hence it can grow, and it alone, through all eternity. And this will perhaps afford us matter hereafter for a proof of the soul's immortality, and of the way in which this can be realised."²

¹ Cog. Met. II. c. xii. Liquidissime constat mentes esse immortales.

² De Deo, etc., II. xiv., Suppl. 155.

In a later chapter the promise here hinted is thus fulfilled :

"On attentively considering what the soul is, and on what depend its change and duration, we shall easily see whether it is mortal or immortal. We have said that the soul is an Idea arising in the *Res Cogitans* from the existence of something present in Nature. Hence it follows that whatever be the duration and change of this object must also be the duration and change of the soul. And on this point we have now remarked that the soul may be united either with the body, of which it is the idea, or with God, without whom it can neither subsist nor be conceived. It is therefore easy to see (1) that if united with the perishable body only, then must it also perish ; . . . (2) but if with something else, which is unchangeable and abides, then it cannot but be unchangeable also and abide." ¹

It is obvious that an immortality, no longer involved in the soul as substance, but depending on the direction of its love, passes from necessary and universal to contingent and partial. To judge what portion of the human race it would still affect, we must find what is implied in the pre-requisite "union with God." It consists simply in *Knowledge*, in the active life of the Understanding, and a conformity of the order and products of thought with the nature of things. As opposed to this, "union with the body" is slavery to the passive affections induced by outward things.² No writer more habitually deplores the general surrender of mankind to blind emotions than Spinoza, or more severely limits his census of the elect possessors of "Intuitive" light :

¹ De Deo, etc., II. xxiii., Suppl. 209, 211.

² These positions rest on numerous passages in the De Deo, etc., Part II. See especially xxii. xxvi.

so that in amending his doctrine of the soul's hope, we cannot say that he has brightened it.

Nay, further; is it certain that the doctrine still refers to the same subject, viz. the individual soul? The "eternal and abiding duration of our understanding" is secured by that union with imperishable reality which true ideas involve,—a union so complete that the object known becomes the measure of existence for the thought that knows. This state is gained, not by first quenching the passions and then being united with God, which is as little possible as to get rid of ignorance in order then to acquire knowledge; but by *immediate* union with God (*i.e.* apprehension of truth); in other words, by free play of the inner causality of Reason, unhindered by outward influences. We thus live out of the mind's proper essence: of which two things are to be said, viz. (1) that it is not personal but human, the same in you as in me; so that when we apprehend the same realities with each other and with our neighbours, there is for all but one truth, one understanding, one will; and the separate subjects lose their difference in an identical object: and (2) that this essence of mind is an idea in the Thinking factor of the universe,—a mode of that Attribute of God: so that our whole intellectual life is truly an outcome of the Divine activity. This is the relation which renders it eternal; not necessarily in you or me or any particular *existences*; but, whatever be its organs, as an invariable *essence* involved in the nature of God. In the last chapter of the "Short Treatise," the question is forced upon the reader,

whether this is not all the immortality which Spinoza means to claim.¹ One thing is evident ;—that he has not yet withdrawn from the word “eternal” its meaning of infinitude of *Time*: so that what he claims—be it for the individual or the universal Reason—is *perpetuity*.

It is not without further modifications that the doctrine takes its final form. The “Short Treatise” shuts up the case for the soul in the definite alternative, —Union with the Body,—Union with God;—as if “the Body” and “God” were unconditionally antithetic, and as if “the Soul”—itself only “the Idea of the body”²—were not necessarily united to both. Two classes are thus formed of cases absolutely separate. In the Ethics, the line of division is run within each individual soul: so that in all of us, in several degrees, there is a part of the mind that perishes with the body, and a part that is eternal. The line is the same that separates in us the two conterminous Divine causalities, viz. the infinite and timeless ground of our *essence* (*ratio essendi*) ; and the finite and successive links which condition our *existence*. On the one side, therefore, is our rational nature which sets us at one with the reality of things ; on the other, the imagination with its en-

¹ Compare an admirable statement of the opposite opinion by Sigwart, in his *Spinoza's Neuentdecker Tractat*, pp. 81-83 and 93. M. Paul Janet also finds in the “Short Treatise” the doctrine of not only the immortality of the individual soul, but its “eternity” (*i.e.* pre-existence also) ; and the same in the Ethics, except that it is there made to rest on the distinction of adequate from inadequate ideas. *Dieu, l'homme et la béatitude*, traduit, Intr. p. xlv.

² *De Deo*, etc., App. II. Suppl. 245.

thralling emotions, the memory with its phenomenal record, and all those differences, superinduced on the universal sameness of truth, whereby one mind is distinguished from another. The whole of this lower province is submerged and vanishes in death : the upper one, which may be formulated as the "Intellectual Love of God," remains and is eternal.

But the predicate "eternal," besides being applied no longer to classify minds, but now to divide each of them, acquires also a new meaning. It is liberated from all relation to Time,¹ except to negative it entirely. Instead of expressing anything about the quantity of duration, or the absence from it of a beginning or end, it is to be withheld from things that can have a past, present, and future, however long they last : and it is to be carried out of the field of relative being, to mark absolute *necessity*, whether of existence or of thought,—in the former case, reality ; in the latter, truth,—both of which melt into one in Spinoza's "union of the mind with God."

These things being premised, the reader may attempt the riddle of the following propositions (Eth. V. xxii. and xxiii.) :—

"xxii. In God there is necessarily an idea, expressing under the category of eternity the essence of this and that human body.

"*Proof*.—Not only of the existence of this and that human

¹ Eth. II. xlv. Cor. 2. Fundamenta rationis notiones sunt quæ illa explicant quæ omnibus communia sunt, quæque nullius rei singularis essentiam explicant ; quæque propterea absque ulla temporis relatione, sed sub quadam æternitatis specie debent concipi.

body is God the cause, but of their essence ; which therefore must be necessarily conceived through the very essence of God, and that by a certain eternal necessity. This conception must necessarily be in God. Q.E.D.

“xxiii. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal.

“*Proof.*—There is necessarily in God a conception or idea expressing the essence of the human body, and therefore necessarily belonging to the essence of the human mind. Now to the human mind we ascribe no duration definable in terms of time, except in so far as it expresses the body’s actual existence interpreted by duration and definable in time : *i.e.* we do not assign duration to the mind except while the body lasts. Nevertheless, since something there is (by the foregoing proposition) which is by eternal necessity conceived through the very essence of God, this something, belonging to the mind’s essence, will necessarily be eternal. Q.E.D.

“*Scholium.*—This idea which expresses the body’s essence under the category of eternity is a determinate mode of thinking which belongs to the essence of the mind and which is necessarily eternal. Yet it is impossible for us to remember that we had existence prior to the body, since the body can have no vestiges of it, and eternity cannot be defined in terms of time or have any relation to time. But nevertheless we have in our experience a perception that we are eternal. For the mind is sensible no less of what it understands than of what it remembers ; since in the very demonstrations of truth the mind has eyes to see and observe things. Although therefore we do not remember that we existed before the body, yet we perceive that our mind is eternal, in so far as it involves the body’s essence under the category of eternity, and that this its existence cannot be defined by time or interpreted by duration. Our mind therefore can be said to last and to have existence in definite time, only so far as it involves the body’s actual existence ; and so far only has it the power of determining the existence of things in time and of conceiving them under duration.”

The aim of these propositions is simpler than it seems. They separate the "idea of the body" (which "is the first thing that constitutes the human mind") into two, viz. that of its *actual* existence as a finite phenomenon; and that of its defined nature or essence. Of these, the latter is not only in us, but in God, *i.e.* is necessarily true; the nature of the human body being what it is by reason of the attribute of Extension (constitution of Matter); and being, like every reality, attended by its idea in the attribute of Thinking. But the essences of things are eternal, being deducibles involved in the essence of God: so therefore (by the law of parallelism) are the ideas of them; and, in particular, that idea of the body's essence which belongs to, or rather is, the human mind. As identified with it, the mind is timeless; lapsing into time-relations only when associated with the other and concrete part of the idea of the body,—as an actual object present in imagination. Does this reasoning bring out any other result than this:—that when human physiology becomes an exact and deductive science from self-evident principles, the human mind will have knowledge secured against the wastes of time? It is only as identified with necessary truth that it is "eternal:" the "*oculi mentis*" are the "part" of it that is so; and they are the "*ipsæ demonstrationes*." Each "demonstration" makes but one "eternal," however many the individuals who "see" it, or the copies of Euclid that contain it: it goes home to a nature common to all, and not to the differences which mark off person from

person. It is the universal organism of reason, the system of intellectual law, expressed in our "mode of thinking," which Spinoza sets free from time-relations: and he by no means intends to constitute a population of "eternals" including as many individuals as can understand a proof. It is as if "the mental eyes," instead of being repeated in each of us, had proclaimed their unity of function by being planted, like a telescope, outside us all, yet available for all. Then, whoever came and looked and passed away, the same vision would be there.

Arguments of considerable weight, however, are adduced to show that Spinoza intended to claim for the human mind, so far as it is rational, personal self-conscious existence after death. The element which outlasts the body is the store of adequate ideas. But inseparable from every idea is the self-consciousness of it,—the idea *ideæ*; and whoever has a true idea, knows that he has it and that it is true. If therefore death spares the contents of thought, it spares the self-conscious subject of it too. Nor is this law of connection, in Spinoza's view, a psychological incident that can be limited to man and his present life; but a necessity inherent in the eternal attributes; whence it descends into man as one of their modes: "the idea of the idea must belong to God as well as the idea itself: if the idea itself belongs to God, in so far as he constitutes the human mind, *i.e.* if it is in the human mind, then the idea of it, or the self-consciousness connected with it, must also be in the human mind."¹

¹ Eth. II. xliii.

It belongs then to the essence of the human mind's adequate ideas, and must share their eternity.¹

The force of this argument entirely depends on the meaning of the phrase "human mind." If it denotes a definite *individual person*, and if the surviving ideas are *his*, so, no doubt, must be the self-consciousness of them. But if it denotes that "eternal mode of thinking" which constitutes our *nature* intelligent, then the adequate ideas may be anywhere in that nature, and their survival mean no more than that neither you nor I nor any other mortal can carry them off into death. The inseparability of self-consciousness from them proves nothing, till we know whether he who *has* it is the same as he who *had* it and is dead. Be they only a necessary truth which, embodied in nature, is *somewhere* reflected in thought, the requirements of Spinoza's language are apparently satisfied. To regard it as teaching the continuity and eternity of the same individual self-consciousness, after death as before, wherever adequate ideas exist, is to overstrain its meaning. It is difficult for a reader who carries to the Ethics the strong modern conception of *personality* to make allowance enough in his interpretation for the absence of it in Spinoza, with whom there is no mind as the subject of ideas, but only ideas that in the aggregate are verbally unified and *called* the mind.

Besides the self-consciousness attending every idea, the mind, it is further urged, is actually constituted, ac-

¹ See Camerer, Die Lehre Spinoza's, II. v. 2 b. B. p. 122, from which this argument is condensed.

according to Spinoza, by the idea of an *individual*, viz. the body: and if the body be individual, so is its idea, i.e. the mind: which therefore, in *its* idea, is conscious of itself as an individual. Now it is this very idea, viz. of the essence of the body, which Spinoza finds "in 'God' under the category of eternity;" and in the human mind as belonging to its essence, and rendering that essence "eternal." The part that is eternal is therefore self-conscious.¹ All that this argument establishes is that one of the surviving ideas is the idea of an individual; but that the individual thought of is the individual thinking, is not proved. We must not confound individuality with selfdom: every self is individual; but not every individual a self: and the essence of the human body might be conceived as an "individuum" by a thinking power which did not appropriate it, just as any of us can think of another person's body or mind as a foreign object. What constitutes it an "individuum," according to Spinoza, is a persistent ratio between motion and rest in the component molecules (he suggests 1:3);² and if such a ratio were on the list of deducibles from the constitution of matter (attribute of extension), the human organism would be determined in *essence*, as an "eternal" thing "in God," even though the finite conditions in the order of successive causality withheld it or removed it from actually *existing*. The essence of the human body as an "individual" is, to be an equilibrated system: its place under the category of "eter-

¹ Camerer, pp. 122-3.

² De Deo, etc., II. Pref. note.

nity" depends on its necessary connection with the primary attributes of nature: its idea, as a reflex of its individuality, is that of a composite proportioned system, and contributes nothing new to the unity of self-consciousness which repeats itself in every idea. Instead of finding that unity in "the idea of the body" and its reflection, Spinoza expressly insists on both of them being a complex of many ideas:¹ and so far as he provides for any theory at all of that continuous unity rests it on quite a different ground, viz. the progress *in infinitum* of idea out of idea on the same base of consciousness.²

Nor are there wanting more positive indications of the impersonal meaning of Spinoza's doctrine of undying ideas. "The love of God" (in which they are summed up) "is," he says, "the most constant of affections, and *in so far as it is referred to the body*, cannot be destroyed *except with the body itself*."³ This limitation—"referred to the body"—means, it is evident, "regarded as personal" or embodied in this or that "individual:" and the love of God, thus qualified, is admitted to perish with the body. How else then are we to regard it in order to warrant its epithet "eternal"? as "referred to mind alone," whether in this body or in that, in you or in me, in men now or then: "the more men we conceive of as united with God, by this same chain of love, the more is the love fostered." The eternal ideas are the truth which is identical in

¹ Eth. II. xiv. xv.

² See *supra*, p. 214 *seq.*

³ Eth. V. xx. Schol.

all understandings, and survives all change of its personal organs.

We are indeed expressly warned by Spinoza against reading the notion of personal immortality into his claim of "eternity" for necessary ideas. If it involved individual post-existence, it would no less involve pre-existence.¹ But from *timelessness* no inference can pass to any date or phenomenal state of things either *a parte ante* or *a parte post*. If the eternal ideas have left our consciousness a blank respecting the former, their relation to the latter is precisely the same. Their *necessary* character belongs to them simply as part of the eternal "Thinking" attribute of nature.²

It only remains to point out the important fact that the word "immortal" disappears from the Ethics in favour of "eternal," which is carefully explained to have not the same meaning; and to state, that in the correspondence and other writings of Spinoza which I have not had occasion to cite no evidence occurs either for or against the conclusion drawn in the foregoing pages, unless silence be regarded as in itself significant.

¹ Eth. V. xxiii. Schol., cf. xxxiii. Schol.

² For other modes of reaching the same general conclusion on this obscurest question of Spinoza's philosophy, see Lotsij, Spinoza's Wijsbegeerte; 5de Hoofdstuk, § 52 *seqq.* (p. 204), and a critical notice of the same, by Mr. F. Pollock in *Mind*, 1879, pp. 435-9.

CHAPTER IV.

POLITICAL DOCTRINE.

THE link between Ethics and Politics is found in the proposition that, for the free and rational life nothing is so serviceable to man as concord, or so hurtful as discord, with his fellow-man. In society an adjustment is reached of human interests and passions, and a common good secured, by methods of fear or reason which, various as they are, historical experience has probably already exhausted. No new materials, Spinoza thinks, can be expected for the construction of a theory of the State. To know what human nature always is, and what in time past it has politically done, is the only requisite. And as the root of that knowledge, we must assume at the outset that self-love is the one moving power in man, never disowned except in churches and on deathbeds, and in its several modifications of envy, pity, revenge, and desire of superiority, determining all social conduct.¹

¹ *Tractatus Politicus*, C. I., V. VI. and Land, I. 281-4. The numerical references which follow will be to this treatise, where no other is specified.

I. ORIGIN OF THE STATE.

The conception of Natural Right, from which Spinoza starts, he thus elicits from his previous philosophy. The essence or definition of any natural thing may be given, without determining whether it exists and abides or not ; only in God are essence and existence one : in all else the power to exist is from him, not at first only, but immanently. Now in him power, being absolutely free, is coincident with right : so therefore is the portion of it which is vested in each natural thing. Whoever acts according to his nature, then, is in his right, whether his act be reasonable or not : he is only exercising his self-maintaining *conatus*, which attaches not to his reason in particular, but to all his affections as well. What is good relatively to him being dependent on his nature, he is the sole judge of it ; and if he judges foolishly, still the fool holds the same commission to exist as the wise. From this identity of right with might, it follows that another has right over me so long as I am in his power ; if by coercion, my body only is his ; if by persuasion, my mind is at the service of his will : nor am I in my own right, except so far as I can dispose of myself. My mind is my own, the more I can follow reason, and, when following it necessarily, is perfectly free. This natural right is not forfeited by any verbal promise to do what I am at liberty to withhold : should

my mind change, I have the power and therefore the natural right to break the promise.¹

By the same rule, applied to larger groups, several persons uniting their wills gain proportionate increase of power, therefore of right. So far as human passions prevent this concurrence, men are natural enemies; and the power of an individual to protect himself against the rest is so small, that his right to do so is rather ideal than real; and first assumes an operative existence, as a constituent of the mutual help and common rights of the united inhabitants of the same land; their right being greater the more numerous they are; and each member's right, in the ratio of his personal power to that of the whole. In short, he has simply what is left to him by concession of the community; and beyond this, is bound to obey the public commands. This power of the multitude is *Government*. It may be vested in a Supreme Head under any one of three forms: (1) a single person charged with the care of the State (Monarchy): (2) the assembly of the Commonalty (Democracy): (3) a Select Body (Aristocracy).²

From this genesis of governed society it appears that, as in the natural state anything possible may be rightfully done, there can, then, be no such thing as sin, unless indeed against one's self; and that the agent is no more bound to be harmless than to be healthy. Till it has been defined by Government what may and what may not be done, there can be no

¹ C. II. i. xii. pp. 284-8.

² C. II. xiii.-xvii. pp. 288-9.

right and wrong, no just and unjust: they are distinguished only as obedience and disobedience to the State; prior to which all men have equal claim to all things. Property is the creation of Law alone.¹

II. RIGHTS OF THE SUPREME POWER.

Human life under government is called *Civil*: the body enjoying it is the *State*: the affairs administered are the *Commonwealth*; the individuals comprised are *Citizens*, as partners in the benefits of the State, and *Subjects*, as amenable to its institutes.

The Sovereign Right is the total natural right of the multitude with a common mind; against which each individual has no more right than belongs to his solitary force. He may do, for his own advantage, only what is allowed by the public decree, which defines what is fair and unfair, pious and impious, and must be accepted even by the unwilling. This secures a peaceful equilibrium, and gains for each far more than he surrenders. There are, however, gradations of State-rights and limits to them. They are greatest where they least neglect what is useful to all. They extend only to that which can be commanded by hope and fear; not, therefore, to inward feeling and conviction, or the procuring of acts which men would rather

¹ C. II. xviii.-xxiv. pp. 290-2. Eth. IV. xxxvii. Schol. 2; Tract. Theol.-Pol., XVI., V. VI. and Land, I. 559, 560; cf. Hobbes, De Cive, where all the foregoing doctrine may be found; in particular, vi. 9, 13, the very language of which Spinoza evidently remembered.

die than do. And they lose their force when so applied as to raise conspiracy and armed resistance. Obedience to the sovereign right can never clash with obedience to God, rightly understood. For, true Religion is comprised in three things : (1) Inward belief and feeling : (2) Benevolence to others : (3) Expression in an outward cultus. With the two first the State requirements do not interfere : and about the third no one need raise a public disturbance, seeing that it is of no moment, good or bad, for the knowledge and love of God. Every one, therefore, may look to his own private religion, and must leave "the care of the public propagation of religion to God, or to the sovereign powers that have sole charge of the well-being of the State."¹

Two States stand in presence of each other under the same conditions as two human beings prior to civil life. They are mutual enemies ; only, not being subject, like men, to sleep, age, and death, with more ability to guard against each other. Each, whilst free from fear of external power, is *sui juris* ; but becomes *alterius juris* when in need of help : each having in itself the right of war ; but requiring, for peace, the concurrence of the other. An alliance between them is binding only so long as the conditions which recommended it are unchanged : should they alter, the contracting parties must revert to the rule *Salus imperii summa lex*. And in interpreting the treaty while it lasts each State has its own jurisdiction ; and from

¹ C. III. i.-x. pp. 292-6.

incompatible decisions there is no appeal but to war. In proportion to the number of States committed to a treaty is the competency of each diminished for resort to this *ultima ratio*, and the necessity increased of deferring to the will of its allies.¹

The functions of the Supreme Power, which no private person can assume without usurpation, follow from its nature; viz. to create Rights by defining what may and may not be done; to make and interpret Laws; to determine War and Peace; to judge the actions of all, punishing offences and settling disputes; and, for these ends, to appoint officials, civil, military, judicial. In exercising these functions, is the sovereign power incapable of wrong? If by "wrong" be meant *what is against reason*, certainly not: the State's unlimited right is no guarantee against its playing the fool in the person of its Head, and does not enable it to do so without incurring the contempt of its subjects: its power, therefore its right, stops at the impossible. But if by "wrong" be meant what is contrary to Civil rights, and may come under cognizance of the national Courts, in this sense, the Sovereign Power can do no wrong. If ever the common interests prove to have been sacrificed by the surrender of Natural Rights to that Power, the surrender must be cancelled by insurrection. This is a reversion from civil right to the natural right of war; and can never occur except through incapacity in the supreme Head to exercise its right wisely for the attainment of peace and security.

¹ C. III. xi.-xviii. pp. 296-9.

It is idle to inveigh against the perversity of the subjects; where the causes of sedition are not removed, the fault lies in the constitution or administration of the State. Nor can the mere prevention of disturbance through terror be accepted as realizing the ends of government: it is at best a truce and not a peace: among a conquered people it may suffice: but nothing short of a willing obedience, rendered in hearty and hopeful trust, should content the rulers of a free nation. This contrast was probably elicited from Spinoza by Machiavelli's "Prince"; for which at the same time he suggests, as a respectable motive, the wish to point out the folly (1) of committing the safety of a people to one man, sure (unless fool enough to reckon on pleasing everybody) to be always taking precaution against domestic enemies; and (2) of assassinating a tyrant without removing the causes of his tyranny.¹ From the tone of the passage in which this somewhat anxious apology occurs, we can hardly suppose that Spinoza would have accepted Goethe's judgment on his doctrine, "Der Spinozismus, fest gehalten in der Reflexion, ist Machiavellismus."

III. MONARCHY.

Adopting as exhaustive the threefold classification of governments, Spinoza proceeds to sketch in outline an ideal construction of each. Dangerous as it is to commit to one man the common safety of all, yet, if

¹ C. IV. pp. 299-302; V. 302-304.

we measured the worth of governments by stability alone, absolute Monarchy would stand in the first place, Democracy in the last. This, however, only means that the obedience of slaves to their masters is surer than that of children to their parents; servitude being at once simpler and lower than concord. As a hereditary king may be a child or an incapable, monarchy could have no permanence, were not its rule practically in the hands of the *entourage* of the Prince; which, therefore, always supplies him with subjects of jealousy, and keeps him in dread more of his subjects, and especially of his sons, than of his enemies. Hence, he is apt to oppress the most influential, often the best, of his people. The throne must be surrounded with special provisions against these evils.

It is due, perhaps, to Spinoza's residence in Holland, and to the prominence of the Italian States in the historical memories of his age, that *Cities* cover nearly the whole ground of his political conceptions. Thus, it is according to their cities, single or grouped, with a country district round, that he would have all the *cives* divided into *clans* (*familiæ*), of given name and badge, and duly enrolled; a suitable military training up to a given age being a pre-requisite to admission. Each city must furnish and exercise its quota of horse and foot: and the General of the clan's united force be elected for a single year without being re-eligible. The land and, if possible, the houses are to be public property, the rents of which will supply the civil and military list.

One clan being marked out as that of the Regal line, the descendants of the kings shall form a body of *Nobles*, distinguished by the royal insignia. Marriage must be prohibited to the male blood relations of the reigning prince to the third or fourth degree : and no illegitimate child may have dignity or inheritance.

Supposing the clans to be at most six hundred, out of each the King shall choose from three to five citizens,—one to be a lawyer,—to serve on his *Great Council* ; one to go out annually, and the legal member to be elected in a stated year. To aid the choice, the King shall be furnished with a clan-list of qualified citizens above the age of fifty who have not yet served. The partial elections will prevent too many novices entering together. The Council is consultative ; if it is not unanimous after two or three deliberations, the King decides. For the validity of its decisions, all must be present ; members absent through illness sending substitutes ; through other causes, incurring heavy fines. With this body it rests to promulgate decrees ; to receive, for the King, petitions, letters, ambassadors ; to educate, as guardians, the Royal children, the Senior Noble acting as Regent in case of the succession of a minor ; and to look to the whole administration. The Presidency of the Council shall pass, in fixed rotation, among the clans. It shall assemble four times in the year ; and shall appoint, for daily official business, an Executive Committee of fifty, to meet in a room adjacent to the palace. In preparation for the work of the Great Council, five or six of the lawyers

shall lay the Agenda before the King, and bring back the questions for deliberation. No decision shall be taken till a subsequent meeting; and in the interval each clan's members shall separately consult upon the question at issue, and be prepared to report its single vote,—any clan unable to agree losing its suffrage. At the reassembling, the lawyers shall report the votes. Any measure supported by less than 100 shall be dropped: and among the remaining judgments, the King decides.

For *Judicial* purposes a Council shall be formed of fifty-one or sixty-one Judges; of whom no clan shall choose more than one, and that only for a year, to be replaced by the elect of other clans. The votes of the judges shall be taken by ballot; and no sentence be valid unless all are present. Similar local councils shall be appointed for each city. The confiscations and damages decreed by the courts shall be answerable for the payment of substitutes in both the General Council and the Judicial.

Soldiers are to receive no pay except in time of war, and even then only so far as actually earned by daily service. For, in the "state of nature," to which war is a return, every one tries to maintain himself safe for the sake of liberty: and so the defence of civil society by war is only what the citizens collectively have to do for their State, *i.e. for themselves*, whether they are in the field or not. The strange provision is added, that the *officers* are to have no pay, except plunder!

Ambassadors are to be taken only from the class of Nobles, and are to be supported from the public Exchequer: in contradistinction from all Court officers, who are to depend upon the Privy purse, and to be excluded from all State appointments.

The *Crown* is to be limited, in marriage, to relations and citizens. It is to descend to the eldest son, never to a daughter: and, under failure of issue, to the nearest male relation, unless married to a foreigner whom he will not divorce. The King being married to a citizen, the Queen's blood-relations shall be held disqualified for State offices.

There shall be no law about opinions, unless they are subversive of the bases of the State. And churches shall be built at the cost of the worshippers. From every citizen shall be required an absolute obedience to all laws, however absurd he may think them.¹

Most of the mechanism, whether of work or of checks, thus constructed, sufficiently indicates its own purpose: but Spinoza appends to his description of it a vindication of its adjustments, which here and there gives further insight into his mode of thought. Notwithstanding the necessity for absolute obedience, it is compatible with Monarchy to place the foundations of the State beyond Regal action. For in the original surrender of natural right, there may be a reservation of conditions approved by the will of the Supreme Power: as in the case of the "Laws of the Medes and Persians," which even the "Great Kings" could not

¹ C. VI. pp. 304-314.

touch; and of the sailors' right, afterwards owned by Ulysses himself, to save their captain from the Sirens by binding him to the mast and holding him to his command. A fundamental law is the Sovereign's will; but the Sovereign's will is not a fundamental law. In determining the bases of a State, regard must be had, not to the ideally, but to the practically best: for laws do not execute themselves, but work through human instrumentality, and must not demand what it will not supply. Efficient watch over the greater good of his subjects the King cannot keep, without counsellors numerous, various, and old enough to have interests and feelings coincident with the public well-being. If war were the chief concern, fewer would suffice; if peace were constant, no evil would arise from more. The chief domestic danger of Monarchy is obviated, by restricting the royal will to a choice among the results approved by the Great Council. And the danger of external wars is greatly lessened by reserving all fixed property for public ownership, and so throwing the energies of the nation into manufactures and commerce. And the soil of a country, as the great object of *common defence*, is rightly the object of common possession. A citizen army, with adequate frequency of change in its personnel, precludes the King from becoming an *Imperator* with a military court, saves the cost of mercenaries, and induces a general wish for short campaigns. By granting office for only a brief term, you widely diffuse the hope and the experience of public employment. In the case of

the Judges especially, the vigilance of expecting successors will favour purity of administration ; whilst their large number (like the requirement of 100 votes for any measure in the Great Council) will baffle attempts at bribery and cabal. The exaction of unpaid service evidently cannot be extended from the soldiery to civil and judicial officers ; since the functions of the latter are not the universal duties of the citizen, but the special industry and skill which the whole community purchases from a qualified portion of its members. The succession to the Crown is made hereditary, in order to mark that the election is in perpetuity, coeval with the institution of the State, and exempted from the liability to repeal which attaches to ordinary laws ; and to prevent the frequent and perilous reversion of the supreme power to the people. The restriction of the Noble class to the royal line is designed to emphasize the equality of the citizens at large. Against such wide and constant participation of the commonalty in civic affairs as Spinoza allows, objection may be raised on the ground that the plebs are ignorant and distrustful : he insists in reply that they are no worse than others, and are more likely to be distrustful, the more they are distrusted.¹ This reply is perhaps aimed at Hobbes, whose poor opinion of human nature is less impartial than Spinoza's, and concentrates itself more on the " *profanum vulgus*."²

¹ C. VII. pp. 314-330. ² De Cive, x. 14 ; Leviathan, ii. c. 25.

IV. ARISTOCRACY.

The original Natural Rights may be devolved on an elect body of persons instead of on one; and if the vacancies in this body through death are filled up by election and not by inheritance, the Government is an Aristocracy, be the number of members what it may. The fewer these Patricians are the greater will be the danger of faction. For the management of affairs not less than 100 *Optimi* will be required: and as the superiors in any society are hardly so much as three per cent of the whole, the patrician order should contain 5000. A government in such hands is more suited to an area containing, like the Low Countries, several considerable cities, than to a territory controlled from a single centre, as Rome, Venice, Genoa. It is more nearly absolute than monarchy, as its Head is never young or old or mortal, and needs no advisers, and persists with steady will. The practical limit to its power is the need of contenting its subjects: and there is little danger of tyranny over them, when the ruling body is large, and therefore a united will unattainable except by reason and right. It has, accordingly, some clear advantages, if it can be provided with the securities for peace of which monarchy admits. It is a fundamental characteristic that the governed are here not *citizens* but *subjects*, little different from settled foreigners. This affects the military system. The soldiery must have pay, as if they were strangers hired,

and should have promotion from the ranks open to them, short of the post of General-in-Chief, who should be a patrician, serving for one year. The metropolis and frontier towns, being without citizen defence, must be fortified. The same characteristic affects the agrarian system. To secure the subjects' interest in the country, its land and houses should be their private property, subject to the payment of a part of the proceeds. In organizing the State, the ends to be kept in view are : (1) to maintain the ratio of the patricians to the whole ; (2) to preserve equality among them ; (3) to secure quick despatch of business ; (4) to keep the public good paramount ; (5) to have the patrician power in excess of the popular, yet without sacrifice of liberty. These ends have not generally been well realized by the historical course of such States. Arising as colonial offshoots from democracies, they have retained the original equality of the first settlers, without extending it to the outnumbering multitude of newcomers or strangers already on the spot ; till by relative paucity and exhaustion of families they have passed into oligarchy, on their way perhaps to monarchy at last. The patriciate should never be less than a fiftieth of the population ; and should be composed largely of members from the old families, though open at thirty years of age to other natives not disqualified by foreign marriage, servile birth, or mean trades, like those of wine-sellers and brewers.

This dignified class, convened at a stated place and time, forms the *Great Council*, the fountain of authority

from which all smaller bodies derive their functions and commission. The attendance of its members is to be imperative and secured by heavy fines. It is the organ of legislation, and also appoints to all administrative offices. The duty, usually devolved on a President of rank, of securing legal order among the members, is to be discharged by a body of *Syndics*, composed of patricians (numbering two per cent of the whole) not less than sixty years of age, and being also senators. To this Syndicate the remaining members of the Council and all State-Officials are to be amenable for alleged breaches of law ; its authority being supported by a detachment of troops. A roll is to be kept of all patricians reaching the age of thirty ; and from a payment of twenty to twenty-five pounds of silver by each young man on his election, and of a quarter of an ounce yearly from every head of a family in the land, a fund is to be raised for salaries to the Syndics and Ministers of State ; into which may also be thrown the absence fines and some of the confiscations. The Syndics, without votes, shall have the first place in the Council ; shall convene it, prepare its business, and bring it forward by their Secretary : and no law can be passed or repealed without their recommendation and a majority of two-thirds or four-fifths in the Council. Government officials shall be appointed from a list prepared by a Committee of Council ; each name being separately submitted to the ballot. The Syndicate shall appoint ten or more of its members to sit daily with its President as a Court for trying State offences : and this Court

shall be changed every six months, the same persons being re-eligible not till after three or four years.¹

For *executive* purposes shall be formed from the Great Council, a *Senate*, charged with the promulgation of laws, the fortification of towns, the assessment of imposts, the issuing of military diplomas, the answering of ambassadors, and the sending them forth on their appointment by the Council. To compose this body there shall be annually chosen four hundred patricians above fifty years of age (re-eligible after two years); who, with the Syndics will take up about the whole above that limit of age. One or two per cent of the export and import duties may be assigned for their remuneration. No military office can be held by them till after two years' retirement from the body, or by any living Senator's sons or grandsons. To see that all is legally done, some Syndics should be present in the Senate without votes.

Taking a hint from the Athenian *πρυτάνεα*, Spinoza assigns to the four or six sections that make up his Senate, a rotation of Presidency completing itself in the year. From each presiding section, as its two or three months' turn comes round, a certain number of members, chosen by the Senate and Syndics, are to form, with its President and Vice-President, a Committee of about thirty, in constant session for daily business. Its members are called *Consuls*: and their function is (besides convening the Senate, if demanded) to act for it when it is not sitting. Their short term and con-

¹ C. VIII. i.-xxviii. pp. 331-341.

siderable number are provisions against corruption. Should they refer any matter to the Senate, it shall go to the vote at once if they have been unanimous. But if they bring rival proposals for decision, each shall be put in the order of its relative support, and be valid if sustained by a majority of both bodies. Should none of the proposals be thus sustained, they shall be recommitted, and brought back revised to an adjourned meeting; at which not only *Yeas* and *Nos* shall be counted, but *Doubtfuls*. If the *Yeas* are the most numerous, the measure is carried; if the *Nos*, it is lost; if the *Doubtfuls*, the Syndics shall be added to the Senate, and the votes taken again, simply between *Yea* and *No*, and a majority determine the result.

In forming the *Judiciary* in an aristocratic State, the threatening dangers are lest patricians on the bench, in fear of another at the bar, should be lenient to his crime; or, seeing a private enemy in their power, should unscrupulously crush him; or, dealing with plebeians, should do them wrong. The Genoese provided against these dangers by composing their courts of foreigners. In place of this extreme measure, it will suffice to make the judicial staff too numerous for bribery, and to change it partially every year; to take the verdicts by ballot, and subject them, in evidence of regularity, to be countersigned by the Syndics; and to leave the appointments to the bench in the hands of the Council, with the proviso that no vote shall be accepted from a patrician who has a near relation among the candidates. Besides the high courts, there

shall be a court for each city with State rights, its judges being from the local patricians. Suits other than personal, *i.e.* between municipalities, shall come to the Council for adjudication. The Judges' emoluments, strangely enough, are to depend directly and in detail on the damages awarded in civil causes and fines in criminal; on the principle that the avarice prompting to severity and the fear to leniency will balance one another. Each provincial city, besides receiving back as Judges a portion of its twenty or thirty patricians, shall send another portion (three to five) by annual choice into the Senate, with a syndic for life. The Secretaries of the several public bodies described shall be chosen (two at least for each) from the plebs, and have no votes; their term of office not exceeding five years.

The Patricians shall be all of the same religion; the chief ministers of which, authorized to baptize, consecrate, and celebrate marriages, shall be of the same order; though preachers may be from the plebs. There shall be national Churches, large and handsome: but liberty of worship shall be allowed, on condition of its betaking itself to humbler abodes. It shall be open to private persons to set up schools and colleges. The patricians shall be distinguished by a special dress and title and have precedence everywhere. If they lose their property by misfortune, the public treasury shall replace it: if by bad habits, they forfeit their rank.¹

A few simple modifications will adapt this constitu-

¹ C. VIII. xxix.-xlix. pp. 341-352.

tion to a State in which several large and scattered cities have to be moulded into one political organism. The Senate and the Judiciary form the links of union. Each city's patricians, numerous in proportion to its size, form its Council, with local legislative and fiscal powers. Between city and city the common Senate will exercise jurisdiction. The Supreme Council of the State need be convened only on great constitutional occasions to which the Senate is unequal. Before any new right is established, the Senate, through its delegates, shall consult the cities : and if they bring back the assent of the majority, the measure shall be valid. Each city shall share in the appointment of the general Senate, the supreme Judges and the military officers, by proportionate choice from its own patricians ; who shall also elect City Consuls, to act as a local Senate ; in which, if the number be small, so that the ballot does not ensure secrecy, the votes shall be taken openly. The local Judges shall be appointed by the Great Council, with appeal to the Supreme Court. For supply of the Treasury the Senate shall make requisitions from the several cities, in proportion to their size ; and the local patricians shall raise the amount as they deem best. Smaller towns and villages shall be counted in with the population of the nearest constitutional city, and be under its government. These arrangements undoubtedly involve some delay before the political parts can arrive at united action. But, on the other hand, the competition among the cities for influence in the State, and the intimate

knowledge of local needs given by a distributed municipal administration, turn the balance of advantage in favour of this form of aristocracy over the more centralized. That it did not last in Holland is due to the fact, that the Dutch gained the Republic by merely cutting off the head of the body politic, without substituting any other provision for its unity : so that, when the need came to be felt of a visible depositary of the Supreme Power, it told at once in favour of the Stadtholder.¹

It will be obvious to every reader that Spinoza's "Syndicate" is a "Custos" qui "custodiat ipsos custodes," intended to prevent the mischief which a Dictator has often been appointed to cure. He justifies his preference of its constant vigilance, over the ruder provision for periodical or occasional crises of congestion and violent remedies. The latter are natural enough on Machiavelli's theory that the disorders of the body politic are due to its mere growth and, like those of the human body, come to a head at certain stages of life, and call for artificial help to free the vital power from oppression. They come, however, not in cycles or paroxysms, but creep on day by day through minute encroachments of human passion ; and are better warded off by wholesome daily life than fiercely encountered when they have become virulent. Even were the two treatments otherwise equal, a Dictatorship is apt to fall as a prize to the proudest man : and Kingly power, once tasted, is not readily resigned.

¹ C. IX. pp. 352-9.

Against private degeneracy, however, no Syndicate can avail. But neither can the sumptuary laws so often resorted to: for no one is sufficiently hurt by the luxuries of another to care about the enforcement of such laws. The most effective check to the Sybarite tendency is to give the wealthy a better object than sensuous enjoyment, and, by placing public power within their reach, and visiting insolvency with disgrace, to substitute a worthy ambition for worthless indulgence. The affectation of foreign manners to which fashionable idleness is prone will be checked by the institution of a patrician dress. If once the citizens are animated, no longer by servile fear but by eagerness for honourable service and devotion to the law, there is no intrinsic reason why such an aristocratic State as has been sketched should not last for ever: for it is then upheld, not by reason only, but by the affections of men. External causes of ruin there may be: its internal stability is complete.¹

V. DEMOCRACY.

When the Supreme Council is co-extensive with the native and naturalized citizens, the government is a *Democracy*. Nor does it lose this character if, by fundamental law (*i.e.* will of the Society), the functions of the Supreme Power are vested in a particular class, provided that class be permanently defined,—be it by age or by station,—and not *elected*. The chance of

¹ C. X. pp. 359-364.

the trust devolving, under such restriction, on unqualified persons is certainly great,—but not perhaps greater than in many aristocracies where nepotism prevails in the elections, unchecked by regard for the public good. Spinoza, however, enters on the consideration only of primary or unrestricted democracy, where no persons at their own disposal, and living honestly under only the country's laws, are excluded from votes in the Supreme Council. By the second of these qualifying clauses foreigners are shut out; by the first, women and children. The refusal of female citizenship Spinoza regards as an ordination of nature, founded on an inherent inequality in the sexes, and especially on a tendency to dependence in women.¹

Here, unfortunately, this unfinished treatise breaks off: nor can we supply the missing sequel in any tolerable way from his other writings. Twice he repeats the general theory (essentially that of Hobbes) respecting the origin of the State,² and once pronounces the form of a Republic the best; for a reason, however, which takes no notice of aristocracy, viz. that violent and absurd decrees are less probable from a popular assembly than from a single will.³ But the ground-plan of the Democratic State which his fragment has left blank is nowhere else filled in. His general

¹ C. XI. pp. 364-6.

² Tract. Theol.-Pol., XVI. XVII. ; Eth. IV. xxxvii. Schol. 2.

³ Tract. Theol.-Pol., XVI. p. 557. The remark on the next page that the obedience of the slave is for the master's good; that of the child, for his own; that of the subject, for the common good including his own, appears to be a reminiscence of Hobbes, *De Cive*, ix. 9.

program alone receives a few additional touches, and bends itself into relation with some apparently abnormal historical constitutions.

The means of maintaining State authority against private passions were sought, among Pagans, in the *Deification of rulers*; among the Jews, in a *Theocracy*; i.e. in a surrender of natural rights, not to Society or to a Prince, but to God alone. Thus was set up a "Kingdom of God," in which doctrines of religion were identified with laws, piety with righteousness, impiety with wrong, desertion of religion with enmity to the State, and martyrdom with patriotism. Here, all were equal, till the people interposed Moses as the vicegerent of God. Had he used his right of *transmitting* his function, a mere Monarchy would have arisen. By letting the succession be determined *pro re nata*, he left the people in closer subjection. The Tabernacle was the Royal Palace with Levites as its chamberlains and Aaron as interpreter of the people's prayers and the Regal will; but without executive or military power, which remained with the twelve chiefs of the twelve tribes.¹ It was a fatal step (as always among a people with established laws) to set up a King. Previously, civil war had once occurred: subsequently, it was continual. No less fatal is it to depose a king, once made; as may be seen from the results of the English Stuart Revolution and Restoration.²

¹ Tract. Theol.-Pol., XVII. 566-574.

² *Id.* XVIII. ii. iii. 587-591.

In drawing the line between natural rights surrendered and those reserved, Spinoza really limits the latter to *inward thought and opinion*. In all else the State is absolute ; having the right to treat as enemies and put to death all who do not accept its definitions of true and right ; to punish the expression of seditious opinions, *e.g.* that the sovereign power has not legitimate right,—that men are not bound by their engagements,—that every one may live as he likes ; and also to prohibit or control any external cultus and organization at variance with its own. But, except in the case of seditious teaching, it is not without preponderant danger that this right is rigorously exercised. It is the weakness of men that they cannot hold their tongues ; and it is for the general good that their faculties should have free play. Suppression drives men, ay, and the noblest of them, to disaffection and artifice in the use of their best gifts, and tempts them to treat legal obedience as impiety towards God : so that such laws are unavailing and mischievous.¹

¹ Tract. Theol.-Pol., XX. 602-610.

CHAPTER V.

RELIGION.

WHEN a philosopher's scheme of Metaphysics and Ethics has once been determined, it would seem impossible that his relation to Religion should remain indeterminate. Yet among interpreters of Spinoza equally studious of his doctrine the utmost difference has prevailed as to the meaning of his theological language. Much of that language seemed to ring with the very tones of voices familiar and dear to the devout. Eckart and Tauler themselves could scarcely inculcate a more passionless quietism, or more impressively speak of the mind's eternal part and its union with God in love. These characteristics appealed powerfully to the mystical tendency which from time to time rebelled against the hard Calvinism of the Low Countries : and within twenty years of Spinoza's death a sect arose there, under the influence of Pontiaan van Hattem, a pastor at Philipsland, and by its fervour and freedom attracted a considerable following, and by its strange interfusion of Spinozism with evangelical

doctrine incurred the anathema of the Church.¹ And again about the beginning of this century the reaction from a mechanical Deism into romanticism in Art and Pantheism in Religion, led Herder² and Friedrich Schlegel³ and Schleiermacher⁴ to an enthusiastic sympathy with Spinoza's apotheosis of Nature; and drew from Hegel the memorable reply to the charge of impiety, that he might with better reason be accused of "akosmism than of atheism."⁵ Even Coleridge defends, while he corrects, the religious side of his philosophy. "I cannot accord," he says, "with Jacobi's assertion that Spinozism as taught by Spinoza is Atheism. For though he will not consent to call things essentially disparate by the same name, and therefore denies human intelligence to the Deity, yet he adores his *Wisdom*, and expressly declares the identity of Love, *i.e.* perfect virtue, or concentric Will, in the human being, and that with which the Supreme loves himself, as all in all. It is true he contends for Necessity: but then he makes two disparate classes of Necessity, the one identical with Liberty (even as the Christian Doctrine—'Whose service is perfect Freedom'): the other, Compulsion, or Slavery. If Necessity and Freedom are not different forms of one and the

¹ Van der Linde's *Spinoza, seine Lehre und deren erste Nachwirkungen in Holland*, pp. 144-6.

² In his "Gott; einige Gespräche über Spinoza's System," 1787.

³ *Charakteristiken und Kritiken von A. W. Schlegel und Fr. Schlegel*, B. i. (Recension des Woldemar), 1801.

⁴ Ueber die religion; especially the celebrated apostrophe to Spinoza, 2te Rede, pp. 47-8, of 4te Aufl. 1831.

⁵ Die Logik 1ter Th. B. § 50 (Werke, B. vi. pp. 109-11).

same thing, the one the *Form*, the other the Substance, farewell to all Philosophy, and to all Ethics. It is easy to see that Freedom without Necessity would preclude all Science, and as easy to see that Necessity without Freedom would subvert all Morals; but though not so obvious it is yet equally true, that the latter would deprive Science of its main-spring, its last ground and impulse; and that the former would bewilder and *atheize* all Morality. But never has a great man been so hardly and inequitably treated by posterity, as Spinoza. No allowance made for the prevalence, nay, universality of Dogmatism by the mechanic system in his age, no trial, except in Germany, to adopt the glorious Truths into the family of Life and Power! What if we treated Bacon with the same harshness?"¹ Even Ernest Renan, in his Éloge on Spinoza, finds the culminating point of his character in its religious elevation. "He was perfectly happy: so he has said; let us believe it on his word. He has done more, he has left us his secret. Listen, Sirs, Listen to the *Recipe* of the 'Prince of Atheists' for finding happiness. It is the Love of God: to love God is to live in God." "Believe him: he was the Seer of his age: no one in his time had so deep an insight into God."²

¹ From some autograph *marginalia* of S. T. Coleridge's on a copy of Paulus's Spinoza, lent to him by the late H. Crabb Robinson, and now in the Library of Manchester New College, London. Note on Eth. I. xxviii.

² Spinoza; Conférence à la Haye, le 12 Février, 1877, pp. 15-16, 9. Land adduces yet another construction put upon Spinoza's doctrine: "Some one had made the discovery that he had announced the Unity

It is no wonder that Spinoza, lifted on so brilliant a cloud of admiration, has been carried into a kind of philosophical canonization. Whether the place assigned to him by these admirers, and the type of excellence for which they award it to him, are precisely what he himself would accept as congenial and own as true, may well be doubted. It depends upon this question: whether he and they use the word "*God*" in essentially the same sense; so that the system of thoughts and feelings, of which it is the centre, is really concurrent in the two cases. To this question let us turn.

In all Religion there is a recognition of some Reality behind Phenomena. In the first instance, it is conceived as a living and quasi-human agency, directing natural objects and events in conformity with changing moods and varying needs. In this stage, there is no definite limit to the number of invisible beings supposed to people the universe: they will be counted only by the departments assigned to nature, and the tribes known among men. The conception formed of each will be in the highest degree individualized, being made up of qualities as numerous

of Substance only for the uninitiated public, and that his own conviction must be characterized as an Atomistic-automatic Pantheism." Land refers, in evidence, to a posthumous work of Karl Thomas (Herbart-Spinoza-Kant, 1875), in which it is said that in the Ethics are two irreconcilable bodies of thought, woven into one texture with intentional art,—the "Mystic-monistic Pantheism of *Spinozism*," and the "Atomistic-automatic Pantheism of *Spinoza*." It will be an ill day for the metaphysicians, when every inconsistency of theory is thus charged upon artifice of character! *Ter Gedachtenis van Spinoza*, 1877, pp. 26-7, 60.

and distinct as those which enter into the idea of a particular man. The *range* will be narrow, but the *life* full and intense. In proportion as the unity of nature, and still more of humanity, comes to be apprehended, and the separated provinces lapse into each other, the peopled heaven has its numbers thinned, and the federation of gods passes into the empire of One. This one, being co-extensive with all that is known, is in effect *Infinite* in range; and, as the condition of whatever has come to be, is beforehand with it, and therefore *Eternal*. But the conception, in every step of approach to this boundless extent, necessarily drops some of its concrete contents, viz. all that differentiated the departments now blended. To the essence of a being as ^(abstract) universal nothing can belong which first appears in its particulars. So that when, in the natural expansion of thought, we reach the ultimate Unconditioned, it would seem that all *Qualities* are left behind, and we are delivered over to a *Quantitative Infinitude*, the mere blank form of all possibility.¹ The question we have to consider is, whether we are to carry the word "God" all through this process, and still retain it at the very end. If so, we must ask nothing from it which this final stage does not supply. If otherwise, at what point short of the last, does the term insist on taking its stand?

¹ This is expressed by Spinoza in the maxim (*supra*, p. 194), "Omnis determinatio est negatio:" every predicate you assign to a subject shuts it out of something that was open to it before. From the Infinite there is no exclusion: it is therefore indeterminate. In virtue of its containing everything, it contains nothing.

To guard against any arbitrary answer to this question, we may submit it to a judge whose insight and fairness are above suspicion. "The conception of *God*," says Kant, "is generally understood to involve, not merely a blindly-operating Nature as the eternal root of things, but a Supreme Being that shall be the Author of all things by free and understanding action : and it is this conception which alone has any interest for us." And he who has it (Kant adds) is properly called a "Theist" in virtue of his belief in a "Living God."¹

By this rule Spinoza's philosophy does not fulfil the conditions of Theism. The relation of God to the totality of things he explains by three equivalents: (1) Substance and Attribute ; (2) Essence and Property ; (3) Cause and Effect : and from each of these he withholds the "freedom and understanding" of which Kant speaks. Attributes belong to their Substance by inherent necessity, and, as constituting it, differ from it only as the many from the one. Again, all the natures of derivative things flow from this or that attribute of God, precisely as the properties of a circle flow from its definition, *i.e.* without the definition understanding them, or being free to produce anything different. And though Spinoza gives us no general doctrine of Causality, he lays down (as we have seen *supra*, p. 202),—and directly applies to our present problem,—the rule, that "an effect differs from its cause precisely in that which it derives from its cause." On the

¹ Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Transcend. Elementarlehre, last Abschnitt, Rosenkranz Ed., ii. p. 492.

strength of this rule, Spinoza insists that, since God is the cause of all things, in both their essence and their existence, there can be absolutely nothing in common between their nature and His; so that if we choose to assign to Him such predicates as "intellect" and "will," these terms will be as wide of their proper meaning as the word "*dog*" when applied to Sirius, instead of to the barking quadruped.¹

¹ Eth. I. xvii. Schol. On this argument Coleridge remarks: "A slight thread this from which to suspend so mighty a weight as the non-intelligence of God! The position grounds itself on Spinoza's arbitrary conception of Cause and Effect. Now it seems easy to answer that, as Cause is an idea or mode of *our* intellect, therefore, by Spinoza's own rule, it cannot be such in God; *ergo* the consequence, *i.e.* that it must be essentially other than the Effect, does not apply" (marginal note *ad loc.*). In direct contradiction to the rule, whereby Spinoza here provides for a total difference between a cause and its effect, he elsewhere lays down the following "Axiom:" "That which has nothing in common with another thing cannot be the cause of its existence" (Appendix I. to *De Deo*, etc., Ax. 5). And this principle is assumed and variously applied in the *Ethica*, where interaction between things is made to depend on their common properties. It forms the 3d Prop. of Part I. "Where things have nothing in common, it is impossible for one of them to be the cause of the other." It is the basis of the doctrine of parallelism: "As there is no common measure of Will and Motion, neither can there be any comparison between power of mind and that of body; and the force of the one cannot be determined by that of the other" (Eth. V. Pref.) His letters more than once state the same principle in general terms: "When things have nothing in common with each other, one cannot be the cause of another" (quoted from Spinoza by Oldenburg, Ep. 3): and again (Ep. 4), "Of things which have nothing in common one cannot be the cause of the other:" "for, since in the effect there is nothing in common with the cause, all that the effect might have it would have from nothing." And yet now we are told that "the effect differs from the cause precisely in that which it derives from the cause!"

If this principle is good for the denial of Intellect and Will to God, it is obviously good for much more, and prohibits the ascription to him of anything whatever that is found in originated things. It ought to reduce us to the silence of Agnosticism. But it does not hinder Spinoza from treating "Extension" and "Thinking,"—which we certainly know by experience,—as Attributes of God, in virtue of which he is at once "res extensa" and "res cogitans," like ourselves. He is the Immanent essence of all Matter and Mind. His relation to the one is equally his relation to the other. If he is Mind, he is also Matter: but, in truth, he is neither, not having the properties which belong to them as *Modes*; but is the *prius* or inner possibility of both. To determinē Spinoza's bearing towards Religion, the important point is to find what is meant by the phrase "res cogitans;" and, in particular, whether it describes a self-conscious Being,—an Infinite Ego.

The affirmative is maintained by Trendelenburg¹ and Busolt,² and, so far as the Ethics are concerned, by Sigwart³ also; critics from whose judgments it is always hazardous to depart. They rest their opinion chiefly upon Spinoza's ascription to God of certain ideas not present in any human mind, and especially on the proposition: "In God there cannot but be an idea both of his essence, and of all the necessary consequences of

¹ Hist. Beiträge zur Phil., B. ii. 59 *seqq.*

² Grundzüge d. Erkenntnistheorie Sp., 117 *seqq.*

³ Neuentdecker Tract. 94-5.

his essence."¹ They admit that an idea, though existing only in the human mind, would still, in Spinoza's language, "be *in God*" (not indeed *quâ* infinite, but as constituting the essence of the human mind): so that this phrase does not *per se* imply a self-consciousness other than the human. But the particular idea which is here specified, viz. of God's essence and all its consequences, is possessed by no human mind or minds:² nowhere can it be found in the *Natura Naturata*: if it is "in God," it must be in him as *Natura Naturans*. And this is confirmed by the rule that ideas and their order correspond, term for term, with things and their order; so that it is impossible that there should be a real existence without an idea of it. Now, in Spinoza's view, Nature as a whole is such a real existence,—an "*Individuum*,"³—related to its contents, not as an aggregate to its parts, but as a concrete universal to its particulars; the one Substance carrying the Attributes, and the Attributes their Modes, and the Modes determining the Singulars. Of this "*Individuum*" therefore, no less than of its derivatives, there must be an Idea; which can be referred only to itself, as self-conscious subject.⁴ Of this interpretation further evidence is found in the statements that "all ideas, referred to God,

¹ Eth. II. iii. This is also quoted as conclusive by Professor Van der Wijck in his very interesting Address "Spinoza;" *i.e.* as justifying the statement, "His God is no blind productive Nature, no unconscious fecundity of things." "He denies, not that God is Mind, but that, in the human sense, God is a person" (pp. 41-2).

² Trend., *op. cit.* 60, 61.

³ Eth. II. xiii. Schol.

⁴ Busolt, *op. cit.* 122-4.

are true, and agree with their objects;" and that "ideas which in us are inadequate are adequate in God." As our ideas are often *not* true, and, if erroneous, do not turn into truth by being merely handed over to God, this can only mean that, while human minds are going wrong, the right ideas are all the while present to a universal self-consciousness.¹

This evidence would be conclusive if by an "Idea" in the "res cogitans" Spinoza always meant a *self-conscious state*; and if, on its being affirmed, our alternative was, to find it either in ourselves, or else in an Infinite Personality. But neither of these conditions holds good. It has been already shown (pp. 190-2) that, as Spinoza avowedly identified Thinker, Thought, and Thinkable, the "Idea" which attended everything might be any one of these, and need not have the self-consciousness special to the first. The same rule which assigns an Idea of itself to Nature or God, no less supplies such an idea to every rock and gas; the inference which would be absurd in the latter case cannot be obligatory in the former. Indeed Spinoza himself, on this very ground, denies even *Life* to God, unless in a sense which equally gives it to all bodies.² "Idea" does not imply self-consciousness.

Not perhaps any and every idea, it will be said: but surely *such* an idea as is here affirmed, viz. "of

¹ Trend., *op. cit.* 62.

² Cogit. Metaph. II. vi. Si vita rebus etiam corporeis tribuenda sit, nihil erit vita expers; si vero tantum iis, quibus anima unita est corpori, solummodo hominibus, et forte etiam brutis tribuenda erit; non vero mentibus, nec Deo.

God's essence and all its consequences," *does* imply it. Certainly it does: but the next move in the argument, viz. that, in default of such idea in us, the self-consciousness of it must be referred by Spinoza to a superhuman Personality, oversteps the limits of his meaning, and does not follow from his language rightly understood. An idea, he tells us, may be "in God" in two ways: either "in God as constituting the essence of the human mind" (and then it is in *man*): or "in God as infinite," *i.e.* as comprising, along with this essence, all other ideas (and then it is in *nature*, though not yet in *man*). And he expressly states how he employs these two phrases,—the qualified and the unqualified: viz. the former to designate our *adequate* ideas; the latter our *inadequate*, that as yet fall short of the truth of things: in both instances *human* conditions of thought; in the one case *actual*; in the other, with connotation of relative defect and future possibility.¹ Spinoza's phraseology, therefore, when referring

¹ Eth. II. xi. Cor. "Hence it follows that the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God. And, therefore, when we say that the human mind perceives this or that, it is tantamount to saying that God has this or that idea,—not indeed as Infinite, but as expressed in the nature, or constituting the essence of the human mind. And when we say that God has this or that idea, not as only constituting the essence of the human mind, but as having along with the human mind [the body's idea], also another thing's idea, this is to say that the human mind perceives the thing partially or inadequately." Among the many things involved in this important passage, it is clear that the "infinite intellect" refers exclusively to the Thinking Modes of the *Natura naturata*; and is not inconsistent with the denial of Intellect to God *in se*.

an idea to God, does not in any case require us to travel beyond the finite minds that have it, or may have it, and to set up a separate Absolute subject. These minds in limitless number, and in series without beginning or end, he takes together as forming an "infinitus intellectus," indefinitely competent to reflect the necessary order of the world: and true ideas not present here and now may enter there and then. This is the explanation of passages in which the context requires us to supply a self-consciousness. Where this is not the case, an "idea in God" means a *Rationale* or intelligible principle embodied in the system of things, and deducible (whether deduced or not) from the primary attributes of nature. The fact that the world is reducible to a theoretic order, and that to the Necessity of things there is attainable an answering Necessity of thought, is regarded as its inherent "idea," or "idea in God." The determining equation, into which all the relations are gathered up, is really there: latent or patent, there is provision for its coming into conscious apprehension: but it may long remain a hidden presence of truth before it is adequately overtaken by any actual intelligence. It is in this sense that Spinoza declares the idea which in us is inadequate to be adequate in God: confuse it as we may, there it lies in nature, clear and complete, if we can but get to see it right.

The very form of Spinoza's phrase in claiming for God an idea of his essence and its consequences seems at variance with the inference drawn from it. Had he been describing the contents of an Infinite and Eternal

Personality, he would have affirmed them *ἀπλῶς*, as absolute realities: "God *has* an idea;" "God *thinks* infinite things in infinite ways," etc.: these would be immutable *momenta* of the Being of beings. Instead of this, Spinoza uses only the language of *Modality*: "there *must be* in God" (*necessario datur*); "God *can* think infinite things," "God *can form* (*formare potest*) an idea of his essence and of all that necessarily follows from it."¹ Here we have the dialect, not of *ontology*, but of *genesis*: and it can be only of *finite minds* that he can affirm the *growth* or *formation* of an idea, and the "ability" to *follow it out* to its logical consequences.²

There is nothing then in the phrases so ingeniously borrowed from the vocabulary of Theism, to contradict or qualify the much plainer propositions which exclude all Divine self-consciousness and personality, and constitute a system of pure Naturalism. The denial of Intellect and Will to the nature of God has been explained away by appeal to the familiar distinction

¹ Eth. II. iii.

² In closing this argument I am tempted to cite a curious testimony unwittingly borne by Busolt against his own opinion. Defending the personal self-consciousness of Spinoza's God, he refers to Trendelenburg as an ally, in the following qualified terms: "Trendelenburg assumes the self-consciousness in the treatises above mentioned, especially in ii. 45 *fg*. In some passages Trendelenburg speaks so that one might at first,—and this is really the case on the Attribute-question,—take him as a representative of the opposite view: compare ii. 55—"The finite thoughts, of which one determines another *in infinitum*, together form the infinite understanding of God" (p. 120). This statement, which favours "the opposite view," is not Trendelenburg's but Spinoza's, in Eth. V. xl. Scholium.

between the originating intelligence which precedes its objects and the sequacious which learns them when given : and it is suggested that the latter only is excluded by Spinoza. Among several reasons, two especially forbid this interpretation—(1) Intellect and Will are related to the nature of God, on the side of the thinking attribute, precisely as Rest and Motion, on the side of extension : *i.e.* they are immediate *Modes* of their attribute, answering so exactly to the other pair as to be simply their translation into thought. As there can be no rest and motion except in particular things, so neither can there be intellect and will : and the latter can as little as the former be attributed to God *quâ* Natura naturans.¹ This statement is expressly made to cover

¹ Eth. I. xxxii. Cor. 2 ; cf. xxxi. Coleridge's manuscript note on this corollary (denying Intellect and Will to God) shows his desperate desire to save something like Theism for Spinoza : " But what entitles Spinoza to *divide* the consequence (*i.e.* intellectus) from the ground ? A cogitatione infinitâ intellectus infinitus debet sequi, imo et voluntas infinita ; ex his vero omnia alia,—quod et sacrosancta Trinitas innuit. Spinoza himself speaks of the intellectus infinitus Dei, p. 87 [*i.e.* II. xi. Cor. See *supra*, 337, note]. But if Spinoza affirms only that God is it not as the *ὁ ἐπὶ παντί Θεός*, but *ὡς ὁ πατήρ* begets or produces it, he does not essentially differ from the Catholic Church ; nay, even his denial of the Incarnation of God may be charitably interpreted as a denial of the heresy of the Sabellians and Patripassionists. Spinoza's great defect is that by commencing with two attributes exclusively, though he admits infinite (in the sense of innumerable, which I once without reason doubted), he gives no explication of Life, or the phenomena of life, as pleasure, pain, etc. And doubtless nothing can be more arbitrary than to make the Will a mode of Intellect, when it had been far more philosophical to have reversed the position, and made the Will the absolute ground. And thus indeed Spinoza may be inter-

"infinite" as well as "finite" intellect and will. (2) If Spinoza had meant to exempt originating intellect from his denial, he could not have thrown himself so vehemently into the lists against all teleology: for intellectual origination without thought thrown forward, *i.e.* without contemplated ends, is inconceivable, and disappears in an empty phrase. Creative ideas, which are prior to the things created, and involve "all that is to follow from what is now," act with a future in view: and if not with a view to the future, it can only be because the action is involuntary,—a foresight of what *must be*,—presenting, therefore, a combination, not admissible by Spinoza, of intellect without will. Whatever intellect you save to a God who acts only out of the necessity of his nature, is in no contrast with the human, but of precisely the same sort: *i.e.* it is not prior to its object; it understands what is already there (the Divine nature); and from this foresees what will ensue;—a process identical with scientific prediction. There is no room, therefore, in this doctrine, for the alleged distinction: and the denial of intellect like ours is a denial of intellect *ex toto*.

The attribute, then, of "Cogitatio" means no more than the common ground in nature of those phenomena which are not referable to the constitution of matter, preter: there are several passages that would allow us to consider Substantia *not dogmaticæ*, *i.e.* as a Thing—*Ur-sache*—but as an eternal act—*causa sui*: and thus we should have a *Will* as the *Substans*, and cogitatio and extensio (the latter being only Imaginatio objectiva et realis, the eternal act of manifestation) as its two attributes." Spinoza's name covers many strange things: but what next?

and which in man emerge into self-consciousness. To the *Natura Naturans* none of the characters of mind which a self-conscious being has can be assigned.¹

Let us suppose, however, that this question were decided the other way, and that the Spinozistic God were a self-knowing and omniscient subject. This concession would still be inadequate to meet Kant's conditions of "a God that can interest us." For, his Thinking attribute has no acting contact with that of extension; and the whole genesis and history of the material universe obey a blind causation, and are none the better for any Divine knowledge or intelligence. No idea in God can set up or modify or destroy any creature, inorganic or organic: it can only determine into existence another idea, and thence another, etc., *in infinitum*, each necessarily sequent and without alternative throughout the series. Spinoza makes it a merit of his philosophy that it treats the human mind as "a kind of spiritual automaton."² Not only does the remark apply to the total Thinking attribute of the universe, but his whole theory of God exactly presents, in its principle of parallelism, the modern doctrine of automatism. In whatever sense the *res cogitans* and the *res extensa* are ultimately one, each carries its own necessary causality, and is wholly inoperative on the other; so that each would go on the same though the other were away.

¹ Ep. 54.

² De Intell. Emend., V. VI. and Land, I. 29. "Quasi aliquod automatum spirituale."

After thus excluding *all* ideas from physical action, it was superfluous for Spinoza to establish a special disability against "the idea of the good" (*ratio boni*). But he is conscious of the resistance which he must expect from the prevalent belief in Creative and Providential design, and makes efforts more strenuous than patient to break it down. Admitting nothing to be possible except the actual, he rejects the Cartesian doctrine that even mathematical truths owe their certainty to the will of God,¹ and identifies the necessity of things with an absolute necessity in the Divine nature. That nature acts because it exists, and as it exists, and can no more do anything different than be anything different. It has no alternatives; it knows no degrees of comparison,—of better or worse,—no antitheses,—of true and false, of right and wrong; but subsists exclusively in the positive and determinate. In such a nature, all action is from the past, not for the future, which, if foreseen, is predetermined.² The estimates of good and evil, of beauty and deformity, of order and confusion, which in us supply motives to conduct, are wholly relative to our finite constitution, and have no meaning for the world as a whole.³ The preconception of such relative pleasures and pains constitutes desire and aversion in us, really impelling us in a determinate manner; but, in ignorance of this, we

¹ Descartes' *Med. Réponses aux 5mes Objections*, Cousin, ii. 287.

² *Eth.* I. xxxiii. Schol. 2, cf. II. vi. Cor. *Esse formale rerum, quæ modi non sunt cogitandi, non sequitur ideo ex divina natura, quia res prius cognovit.*

³ See *supra*, p. 256 *seqq.*

fancy ourselves free, and credit ourselves with the selection of one out of several possibilities; and then, carrying the illusion up into the nature of God, we ascribe to his selection whatever pleases us in the system of things, and excuse, on imaginary grounds, whatever shocks and repels us. But it is a mere anthropomorphic superstition thus to apply the human analogy to the Divine Being. For the universe there is no ideal standard of perfection: each of its contents is right according to its might; and if men and things are found of every grade, when measured by our rules, it is because, within the compass of infinitude, nothing can be absent which can exist at all.¹

This surrender of all things to unlimited Nature-powers, unguided by Ideas, is at once a reproduction of Lucretius and an anticipation of Haeckel, and identifies Spinoza's relation to Theism with theirs. Like Schopenhauer and Hartmann, he included Ideas among the Nature-powers, and might therefore, like these philosophers, have retained a teleology of "the Unconscious," had he not established an impassable gulf between the physical and the ideal functions of nature: but this compelled him to ignore a system of relations which

¹ Eth. I. Appendix. Coleridge says: "Hanc appendicem inter infirma Spinozæ ratiocinia audenter statuo, et quæ in omni parte indigentiam sanioris critices aperte testatur. Contra sua ipsius principia affectiones Temporis, Post et Prius, cum Ente eterno commiscet, et Sophistam contra Sophistas agit." He adds: "Nowhere does Kant manifest his superiority to all preceding philosophers more convincingly than in this question of Final Causes. *Vide* his Ground Unique of Demonstration of the Being of God, and the chapter in his *Urtheilskraft*."

constitute the very key of interpretation to the organic world. Had the Substance in which the Nature-powers coalesced been a self-conscious Superior to both, instead of a neutral abode of their duality, their mutual play and evolution might have been no blind tentatives to exhaust the permutations, but the provided conditions of an unfolding history. But by leaving as ἀρχή a mere nominal receptacle, his Nature-powers became really primary, and took their undirected and independent initiative, without either conscious or unconscious teleological activity. This position is surely a step further from Theism than that of the Frankfort pessimist.

Yet Spinoza had to make some involuntary concession to the doctrine which he assailed. What was that "*conatus*,"—that effort to assert and enlarge its nature which he claimed for every object in the world? Can it be conceived except as a force directed to the realization of an idea?—a force, not blind and neutral, running off into any channel of least resistance, but selective of a definite end? The "essence" of a thing which is credited with this "*conatus*" is not a body that pushes and pulls, but a set of co-ordinated relations, involving an immanent idea: and though of course an adequate executive causality must be there (for, to gain an end, there must be power), yet its instinctive direction on its appropriate object,—light for the eye, water for the thirsting lips, truth for the understanding,—is prophetically determined by the needs and adaptations inherent in the nature. Spinoza, with all his strength, could not break the evident ideal relation between what is and

what is to be in the scheme of things; both are built together into the structure of the world. And the attempt to ride from behind on the back of efficient causation into a dark future can succeed only by shutting the eyes to the clear fall of the light in front.

The objection to predicate of "God" anything that is found in man comes the less appropriately from Spinoza, because his own conception embodied in that word is wholly made up of human predicates; and in no system more than in his do the two natures stand in the relation of microcosm to macrocosm. The two known Attributes of Extension and Thought are simply the two factors of our own life thrown into universal form. Further, in order to learn the first, we go to school to our own body, and thence, as a base, plant out other bodies in space, and affirm as common to all what is familiar to us at home. Similarly, we become acquainted with what Thinking means by the sample of it in ourselves; and though we follow out the *res cogitans* to infinitude, we do but look in our own glass. Nay more: this very "mind" in us is itself constituted by the "idea of a single thing," viz. "our own body:" so that from the farthest excursions through the cosmos and to the "Causa sui" we are driven in to our own organism as the focus of cognition. This surely is not merely a geocentric, but an anthropocentric, projection of the All and the Divine nature. That it is so may be no just ground for reproach: but at all events, it disarms the lofty rebuke of all human analogies that mingle with religious conceptions.

The conclusion to which this review of Spinoza's position conducts us is obvious enough. If we adhere to Kant's interpretation of the word "God," it is impossible to claim Spinoza as a Theist, or even as a Pantheist: for neither as "Immanent," nor as "Transitive" and Creative, did he acknowledge "a Supreme Being the Author of all things by free and understanding action." By this criterion Jacobi was certainly justified in classing him with Atheists. The just abhorrence of intellectual persons for the "odium theologicum," and the generous rule to give no one a name which he disowns, have nearly banished this word from our modern vocabulary: and if its disuse by calm and judicial men would save it from abuse by passionate advocates, it might well be dropped. But a right use of language is a better corrector of wrong than mere disuse: and, logically, it is as little possible to spare the word *Atheist* as the cognate terms of the same group. As there are and always have been people who believe, so there are and always have been people who disbelieve, the governance of the world by a "Living God:" and we cannot dispense with a name for each. The duty of applying to no one a term which he disowns is conditioned on his not altering its meaning in order to disown it: the obligation is reciprocal, resting on a common understanding, and violated by tricks of perversion on either side. The Romans had no right to charge atheism on the early Christians for not believing in Jupiter Capitolinus. On the other hand, it is no valid disclaimer to say, "I am not an atheist, for I believe in a First Cause," if that

first cause should happen to be hydrogen, or other blind element of things. It cannot be desirable that the word "God" should be thrown into the crucible of metaphysics, and reserved for any caput mortuum that may be left when the essential constituents of its meaning have been dissipated.

It must be admitted, however, that less meaning is usually expected from the syllables—"theism"—when taken into the compound "Pantheism" than when standing as an integral word. As soon as the controversy came to turn, less upon *what* the universal power is, than upon *where and when* it is, all forms of *Immanency* found shelter under the same name, though only the highest form recognized *Mind* in the All, and others reduced the principle to *Life*, or, lower still, to physical *Motion*. Under Pantheism, with this extended signification, the system of Spinoza undoubtedly comes. Yet, if we try to place it in any one of the three members of this group, we cannot do so. By its Attribute of *Cogitatio* it seems to seek admission to the first: by that of *Extensio* to pass into the third: so that its apparent ambition is to hold the two in equipoise, and suffer neither the Ideal nor the Material to rule, except as two Cæsars, with an inaccessible Augustus (alas! a *nominis umbra*) behind. A philosophy that takes its stand on so dizzy a position is sure to lose its equilibrium: and under the breath of opposite tendencies Spinoza's overbalances itself now in one direction, and then in the other. No sooner does a mode of the *res cogitans* reflect upon itself than "idea" produces "idea *ideæ*" in *infinitem*, without any corre-

sponding multiplication on the parallel line : so that a boundless numerical preponderance accrues to the ideal side. But, on the other hand, the initial idea is in every case the "idea of a body," so that without the latter the former would not be : and thus a priority is secured to the material side as the condition of the ideal. An oscillating ascendancy is the inevitable result, and the system verges to the right under the positive magnetism of Hardenberg's genius, to the left under the negative of Clifford's. If we have rightly interpreted it, it matters little to its religious relations which way it leans : for even under a dominant immanency of the ideal attribute, it is impossible to make a religious object of a mere potentiality of Thought, without Understanding, without Will, without aim or preference, without affection or character, and without power over anything material.

The logical estimate of a philosopher, however, is one thing : the personal is quite another. Though Spinozism is anti-theistic and has no valid excuse for retaining the word "God," there may still have been something congenial to Spinoza himself in the continued use of consecrated language which could never quite lose its glow : and he may have loved to linger in a mystical penumbra of his early faith, even when the Sun of Israel had become eclipsed. Though the only "Love of God" which remained possible was "the Intellectual," it is possible enough that a mere homage to the truth of things may have transferred to itself the fervour and the peace of a deeper worship ; and that some rush of "cosmic emotion" into the vacant place may have wrung from

him those wonderful propositions in which the last book of Ethics emerges from "geometry" almost into rhapsody. Self-surrender to the order of nature is the "intellectual" side of the moral surrender into the hand of God. Spinozism contains no ground of Duty, as distinct from Prudence. Yet Spinoza's moral ideal was high and noble, loftier far than its narrow base can support: and his indignation and disgust at mean and corrupt inferences from principles affecting resemblance to his own attest an ethical purity and depth which rather leads than follows his theoretic judgment.¹ Spinozism declares self-assertion of the individual nature the spring of life and the warrant of conduct. Yet by no moralist are larger demands made than by Spinoza on forbearing and generous affections; even to the desiring for all the same good which we seek for ourselves, and the conquest of hatred by persistent love. These contrarieties between the assumptions and the conclusions of his thought may doubtless be sometimes referable to an esoteric and exoteric mode of stating his judgments: for both his personal caution and his tenderness towards others led him to this. But in his own sincere personality there was also a conflict between the clear cold intellect from which he took his start, and a certain Southern fervour, smouldering beneath the surface, but ever ready, at the touch of a gentle breath, to kindle affections and convictions beyond the control of logical restraints.

¹ See Ep. 44, in which he describes the shock he had received from a book, "*Homo Politicus*," described *supra*, p. 93.

CHAPTER VI.

BIBLICAL THEOLOGY.

THE system of thought presented in the foregoing chapters Spinoza regarded as the pure product of Reason interpreting the permanent order of Nature. It is true that the form which it took in his own mind was in part determined by his Israelitish preconceptions; without which he would hardly have designated the supreme Unity of the world by the word "God," so as to retain for his monism some colour of monotheism. But this feature, whether due to inward preference or to art, has no religious significance. What he has to offer is a Philosophy, to philosophers: and beyond this inner circle, of persons competent to think out for themselves their place and relations in the universe, he does not expect his persuasion to extend.

Around this small enclosure, however, and interlocked with it at every part, lives and moves the common throng of human beings, who also have to act and suffer, but cannot wait for a theory to do it worthily. For their guidance there must be and there are, in every society, ready-made rules of right, and encouragements

to duty, and assurances of justice, adequate to every moral emergency. This function is taken in hand by the public Religion of every community ; among Europeans, embodied in historical documents, and represented by a ministering clergy. The philosopher cannot be allowed to go apart and ignore this inheritance from the past,—this faith of the present. He is naturally asked to declare his exact attitude towards it ; his estimate of its Sacred Writings ; and the relation of its characteristic beliefs to the truth which he professes to have found. To this demand Spinoza has responded in his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*. Its doctrine of the Commonwealth has already been sufficiently presented. It remains only to notice the remarkable position of this treatise in the history of Biblical Criticism.

The advance from the old Bibliolatry to the modern mode of treating the books of Scripture was made by two marked stages. The interpreter was usually the apologist ; and desired to make the best of the text which he undertook to elucidate. He could not be unaware that, in an age sufficiently curious to need exegetical literature at all, the chief scruples would be encountered in the recital of prodigies, such as the swallowing of Jonah, and the feeding of the five thousand. The narrative being sacred and unimpeachable, he could relieve its difficulties only by putting a new construction on it, which should divest it of its marvellous form and lay bare the natural event contained within. This method marks the first stage in the

attempt to harmonize nature and Scripture. Assuming the constancy of the one and the truth of the other, it constitutes what is technically called "Rationalism;" and was long applied to scattered cases that invited it, before it was reduced to system in the Commentaries of Paulus.

The study of the Hebrew and Greek texts, however, dissolved at last the cement by which the doctrine of Inspiration had held together the whole Bible as a homogeneous Divine product; and by calling into existence a literary history of its component books removed the obligation, and the possibility, of indiscriminately accepting all their contents as true. The more closely their structure was examined, the less compatible was it found with the tradition of their date, their authorship, and their historical infallibility: so that there no longer remained any excuse for rationalizing texts which could claim no exemption from human error. Once rid of the temptation to tamper with their meaning in order to save their truth, it was wonderful how they gained in life, in distinctness, in interest, revealing unexpected relations, and opening up a human drama of deeper significance than any oracles stereotyped as Divine. Till the Scriptures could be traced, like any other literature, to the natural working of the mind, they presented, like a landscape before a half-couched eye, only a confused blotch of colour all upon one plane,—it might be in the body or out of the body,—with no perspective in the still distances, with no parallax in the moving objects, no dear identification, no familiar recognition of

anything, but a dim and mystic sense of light that gives no vision. The more they have disclosed their genesis and growth in time, the better they have emphasized their meaning for all time.

Spinoza lived before either of these stages had set in : and his distinction is, that he anticipated both. The fundamental principle of Rationalism can hardly be more distinctly stated than in these sentences :—

“Our only object is to make clear what can be securely established by Natural Reason : we then know that the Sacred Page must teach the same. For truth cannot be at variance with truth, or Scripture teach the nonsense that is palmed upon it. Were we really to find in it what is contradicted by natural light, we should refute it as freely as we do the Koran and the Talmud. But far be it from us to imagine that in the Sacred Writings anything can be found repugnant to the light of nature.”¹

By this rule we must assume Scripture as “*veritas*,” and Nature as “*veritas* ;” and, taking the latter as the better known, employ it as regulative of the meaning of the former. This would pledge us, if rigorously carried out, to read the Copernican astronomy and the modern Geology between or in the opening lines of Genesis ; to coerce inconsistent narratives (as of the Nativity in Matthew and Luke) into agreement, after the manner of the Harmonists ; to invent a fulfilment for every failed prophecy (as of the Final Advent and Judgment within the first generation) ; and to refer every miracle to adequate natural causes. Spinoza by no means commits himself to such thorough-going application of the

¹ Cog. Metaph. II. c. viii. sub fin.

rationalistic principle: he had no need to do so: for it was not his only, or his best, weapon; and, in spite of his deprecating words, he is far from leaving in abeyance his right of refuting Scripture "as freely as the Koran and the Talmud." He detects false prophecies; as in the words "Thou shalt not die by the sword, thou shalt die in peace," addressed to Zedekiah, who, after seeing his sons all killed, had his eyes scooped out, and was left to die in chains.¹ He ridicules the Harmonists, who strain their invention "to reconcile evident contradictions," with no other result than, in their worship of the letter of Scripture, to bring its writers into contempt as blunderers in thought and speech.² Still, in spite of this free handling of his text, he prefers at times to let it pass as history, and, if it be marvellous, explain it away. Thus:

(1.) In treating of the reported *Miracles*, he distinguishes between those which are mere subjective imaginations (*e.g.* Elijah's ascent to heaven in a chariot of fire), and such as may be credited with objective reality. The latter affect us with wonder simply because the phenomenon issues from the dark and hides its source; but, did we see it all, it would be found a "*res mere naturalis*." Were it otherwise, it would carry no Divine tidings: for what is foreign to Nature is foreign to God. So little repugnant is this to the historians' mode of thought, that they themselves

¹ Jer. xxxiv. 4, 5; cf. lii. 8-11; ap. Tract. Theol.-Pol. c. X.; V. VI. and Land, I. p. 512.

² Tract. Theol.-Pol. c. X.; V. VI. and Land, I. p. 511.

supply a part of the natural agency required : a twenty-four hours' east wind brought, and a west wind swept away, the plague of locusts upon Egypt: the passage of the Red Sea was rendered possible by a strong east wind through the night: and the Shunamite's son, who had been laid out for dead, did not open his eyes on life again without the prolonged warm touch of Elisha's body.¹ When it is said that God put the young Saul in Samuel's way for selection as king, the historian brings them together in the most natural way possible. The youth, after a fruitless search through the country for his father's strayed asses, is on the point of turning homewards, but is persuaded by his servant first to try what tidings he can get from the neighbouring Seer; who thus falls in with the suitable candidate he wants. The habit of referring everything to God and tracing his providence in all events gave rise to figures of speech in which, when taken literally, miracles seem to lurk. That to the thirsting captives on their return "water bursts from the rock" seems to mean more than that they find springs in the desert; that "the windows of heaven are opened," more than that there is plenty of rain; that "God hardened the heart of Pharaoh," more than that the king was obstinate. But, whatever be the language or the silence with which the cause of a marvel is treated, we are to take it as certain that it emerges in the immutable order of nature.²

(2.) The whole phenomenon of *Prophecy* also is

¹ *Op. cit.* c. VI. ; V. VI. and Land, I. pp. 445-449, 453.

² *Op. cit.* c. VI. ; V. VI. and Land, I. pp. 456-8.

referred by Spinoza to the ordinary laws of the human mind ; and, far from being regarded as one of its more exalted manifestations, is handed over to its lowest function, so as to have its home in the seat of all illusion and "inadequate ideas." The "Prophet" is a man of exceptionally vivid *Imagination*, whose apprehensions of God are not *immediate*, essence with essence, mind with mind, but through voices and images, chiefly in dreams. These sensible media, and the pictorial faculty which they exercise, afford no warrant of truth and imply no mental superiority. The "voice of God" that seems to speak is evidently not articulate language, but some natural noise, which the hearer converts into words, declaring his sense of what it means : and hence it is that the Decalogue in Deuteronomy (v. 6-21) varies from that in Exodus (xx. 2-17), though in both instances God is named as the speaker of the words.¹ The certainty given by such colloquy or vision is not intellectual, but moral ; involving intense impression, but relative always to the opinions, the capacity, the temperament of the prophet. So little did his "burden" carry in it any inherent authority, that tests were required for distinguishing the true seer from the false : and the decisive "Sign" was to be found in the correctness of his forecast and the purity of his faith. If he failed in these, if he introduced new gods and prophesied lies, he was to be put to death, though he should confirm his doctrine by signs and wonders. But if he were faithful and devout of heart, no exemption from prevail-

¹ *Op. cit.* c. VII. ; V. VI. and Land, I. pp. 478-480.

ing ignorance or prejudice was needed for his work. Joshua might misconstrue an extraordinary refraction into a stoppage of Sun and Moon; Isaiah might know nothing of the parhelion which shifted back the shadow on the dial; Solomon might try to build his circular molten sea with a diameter of 1 and a circumference of 3: and all of them might be involved in yet graver errors respecting the Divine attributes; without being disqualified for the part assigned to them in the sacred history.¹ Abraham, believing that each tribe had its tutelary Divinity, did not know that God was ubiquitous and omniscient. Moses had no idea that all human actions came from his sole decree, and deemed him only the greatest among gods: though unable to image to himself so transcendent a Being, and forbidding all material representation of him, he did not regard him as intrinsically invisible, but only supposed that the weak nature of man would be blasted by the sight. Nor did this great Prophet shrink from representing God as "jealous" and "avenging," though faithful and compassionate. On the efficacy of repentance and the freedom of the will, prophet differs from prophet; Samuel declaring that "the strength of Israel will not repent, for he is not a man that he should repent" (1 Sam. xxxii. 18); and Jeremiah (in one of his moods, for comp. xviii. 10), that "he recompenseth the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their children after them;" and Paul, that the will of man is the helpless slave of sin (Rom. vii. 10 *seqq.*); while Ezekiel pro-

¹ *Op. cit.* c. II. ; V. VI. and Land, I. pp. 398-400.

claims that "the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son;" and that "if the wicked will turn from the sins that he hath committed, they shall not be mentioned unto him; in his righteousness that he hath done he shall live" (xviii. 20-22).¹

The inference drawn from such facts is, that the spiritual enthusiasm that possessed the Prophets was no absolute light, but *ad hominem* sive *ad captum alicujus*, and was directed not to the enlargement of knowledge but to the enforcement of a righteous law; using for this end the conceptions already in existence, and appealing to admitted obligations. It spoke to hope, to fear, and all affections of the imagination, enlisting them in aid of obedience and love; but had no credentials to lay before the intellect, the sole organ for the apprehension of truth. Its whole operation plainly lies within the compass of natural laws.

Spinoza's "rationalism" stood in closest connection with his philosophy; which, pledging him to find room for every thing and event in the realm of Nature, non-suited the pretensions of the supernatural *ab initio*. It is otherwise with his judgments on the literary history of canonical books. There is nothing in his Metaphysics to determine the authorship of Deuteronomy, the date of Job, or the meaning of Daniel's "Son of Man:"—except indeed in this negative way; that, as the theory of an *inspired* set of books bespeaks for each an assigned personal origin, a critic who is free of that

¹ *Op. cit.* c. II. ; V. VI. and Land, I. pp. 400-405.

theory can approach the question of authenticity without pre-engagement of mind. This advantage of the layman over the theologian had already (A.D. 1651) been exemplified in the remark of Hobbes, that "the Pentateuch seems to be written rather *about* Moses than *by* him:"¹ and it is possible that in this hint, as in other pregnant thoughts, the philosopher of Malmsbury may have given impulse and direction to the freethinker of Amsterdam. One of Spinoza's earlier opponents,—Jacob Thomas, Leipzig Professor of Ethics, teacher and correspondent of Leibniz,—supposes him indebted rather to the eccentric Isaac La Peyrère, in whose *Systema Theologicum* (1655) several of the repetitions and contradictions in the so-called Mosaic books had been pointed out, and urged as proofs of their composite origin from different hands at different times.² It is

¹ *Leviathan*, III. c. xxxiii.

² This La Peyrère was the author of the "Preadamite" hypothesis, which supposed the earth to have been peopled before the drama of Paradise by the progenitors of all the Gentile races, and regarded Adam as the founder of only the Israelitish family. His *Systema Theologicum*, written to support this hypothesis, was condemned by the Holy Office, and consigned him to its prison. His familiarity with Hebrew literature is accounted for by his reputed Jewish origin, though in his native city of Bordeaux he passed for a Huguenot, till he finally conformed to the Roman Catholic Church. His religious versatility is satirized in the inscription upon his tomb: "*La Peyrère ici git, ce bon Israelite, Huguenot, Catholique, Præadamite. Quatre religions lui plurent a la fois.*" Diestel,—who is entitled to speak with authority,—finds merits in his *Systema* which are unjustly forgotten; and classes it with Spinoza's *Tractatus Theol.-Pol.*, as anticipating the leading features of Father Richard Simon's organic hypothesis in his *Histoire critique du Vieux Testament* (1678). See

true that La Peyrère's evidences of a post-Mosaic date for the Pentateuch are reproduced by Spinoza; *e.g.* the mention (Deut. iii. 11) of the iron bedstead of Og, king of Bashan, still preserved as an antiquity in the city of Rabbah (first conquered by David, 2 Sam. xii. 29, 30). Again, Deut. iii. 13, 14, explains why a part of Gilead which at the end of the exodus used to be called "Argob" and "Bashan" received and "*retained unto this day*" the name of "Jair's Villages." It was because possession was taken of the country by Jair, son of Manasseh. There are, however, two claimants to that name; one (Num. xxxii. 41) in the name of Moses when the district in question was assigned to the half-tribe of Manasseh (Josh. xiii. 29, 30); another, 300 years later, also of the Manasseh clan, one of the "Judges" who, ruling Israel for 22 years, "had 30 sons, who rode on 30 asses and had 30 villages which are called 'Jair's villages' to this day" (Judges v. 3, 4). Even if we take the first of these accounts, the change of local name is thrown upon the very end of Moses' career, and could not have been cited by him as an ancient thing "which continued to this day." And if the second account is preferred, it involves an anachronism of many centuries. Again, the use of earlier writings by the author of the Pentateuch is evident from Num. xxi. 14, where a quotation is made from a "Book of the Wars of Jahve," as the basis of a poetical piece. The materials for such a book were not furnished

Diestel, *Geschichte des A. T.*, p. 357, Note 27, and Ginsberg's *Einführung* to Spinoza's *Tract. Theol.-Pol.*, p. 19.

till Joshua led the way into Canaan : and the manner of citation is that of retrospect from a later age. These facts, however, which are turned to account by La Peyrère, form but a small part of Spinoza's case against the claim of the Hebrew narratives to be Mosaic or contemporary records. He shows that "the Book of the covenant" which Moses is said to have read before the people (Exod. xxiv. 7) refers only to the previous section from xx. 22; that "the Book of the Law" attributed to Moses in Deut. xxxi. 24-26, could in no case be longer than could be taken in at a hearing, and was meant therefore for something far short of the Pentateuch; that many things are found in the Pentateuch, and even in these very sections assigned to his hand, which Moses could not have written, but which must have been wrought into the narrative as late as the Captivity. He points out that, while it is impossible to mistake the many-coloured and many-dated materials that variegate and often confuse the whole, an historical and didactive purpose manifestly pervades the Pentateuch, and so links on to it in succession the books of Joshua, Judges, Ruth, Samuel, and Kings as to imply the labour of an editorial hand. As the story is carried to the death of Jehoiachin, we cannot look for the compiler before the sixth century B.C., during which the national life was for the most part suspended at Babylon. But the first half of the next century brought both the occasion and the man to call forth a republication of the half-forgotten law and history of Israel. It is to Ezra that Spinoza attributes this work (Neh. viii. 1-8).

His object was a Reformation of the relaxed religion of the nation, and, for that end, definite instruction in a law as yet uncoded and little more than consuetudinary. He began therefore with the book of Deuteronomy, which is his expanded recension of the older Mosaic fragments. And then, to confirm the interest of the people in this legislation, and their disposition to obey it, he prefixed the history of their forefathers before the Law was given, and appended the narrative of their national vicissitudes so far as they attested the faithfulness and justice of God.¹

The series of books thus put together (twelve by present reckoning, ten if Samuel and Kings be each taken as *one* instead of *two*), though made continuous at the junctures, betrays its character as an unfinished compilation from earlier materials by various unharmonized elements. The story of Hezekiah related in 2 Kings xviii. 17 *seqq.*, is evidently taken verbatim from the "chronicle of the Kings of Judah," mentioned in 2 Kings xx. 20: for it is identical with the episode in the "Visions of Isaiah" (xxxvi.-xxxix.), which we know (from 2 Chron. xxxii. 32) to have been preserved in that "chronicle." In the same way, the siege of Jerusalem and capture of Zedekiah (2 Kings xxv.), are narrated in terms of Jeremiah lii. A similar identity of text appears in 2 Samuel vii. with 1 Chron. xvii.—a book far later than Ezra; pointing doubtless to a common source in some account of Nathan's life,—different copies of which, in the two compilers' hands,

¹ Tract. Theol.-Pol., c. VIII.; V. VI. and Land, I. pp. 482-491.

explain the slight verbal variations. The marks of time scattered through the history yield, when combined, a tangle of chronology which could arise only from the disordered intertwining of numerous threads. The epochs of Jacob's family history, if reckoned from the data of Joseph's life, yield absurd results, when taken as conterminous with the corresponding divisions of his own; *e.g.* that Simeon and Levi, when boys of eleven and twelve years, put to the sword all the male inhabitants of Shalem (Gen. xxxiv. 25-30) enslaved all the rest, carried off their flocks and herds, and pillaged their city. So too, on comparing the general statement (1 Kings vi. 1) that Solomon's temple was built 480 years after the exodus, with the given sections that make up the interval, we find that the parts amount to a much larger total, even if we neglect those which are left without numerical measure: and when fair allowance is made for these also, the discrepancy is little less than two centuries. All these phenomena are readily explained by the patchwork composition of the books out of pre-existing materials, imperfectly sifted: and the vestiges of such a process are too plain to be mistaken. What, for instance, can be more obvious than the lame joint, or rather, absence of joint, in the history at Judges ii. 6? The previous book closes with the last word, the death and burial of Joshua. The book of Judges opens with an account of what was done in consequence of his death, and pursues the story up to ii. 5: when suddenly the next verses turn back to Joshua, sum up his doings, and repeat the narrative

of his death and burial. Besides rendering the inference irresistible, of a composite structure and successive redactions of the twelve books of older history, Spinoza finds in that inference, when critically scrutinized, the means of explaining the minuter various readings and marginal notes, in which fanciful commentators have been fond of discovering theological mysteries.¹

With equal acuteness Spinoza detects the internal indications of time in the later books. In Nehemiah (xi. 19) we meet with a class of Levites, never mentioned till after the rebuilding of the city, and perhaps instituted at the restoration of the temple worship by Judas Maccabæus, viz. "the Porters who kept the gates," two of whom are mentioned by name. The same names occur, as representative of the same class, in 1 Chron. ix. 17; and suggest to Spinoza a date as low as the second century B.C. Though this estimate is extreme, it probably exceeds the true limit by not more than a century and a half: for both the enumeration of six generations since Zerubbabel (1 Chron. iii. 19-24), and the reckoning of money in a currency of *darics* (1 Chron. xxix. 7), carry us within the margin of the Macedonian sway.

Of the poetical and prophetical books, Spinoza's criticism is slighter and less carefully grounded, though always appealing to substantial evidences which still require to be taken into account. The publication of the book of Psalms in its five sections he refers to the time of the second temple; assigning no other reason

¹ *Op. cit.* c. IX. ; V. VI. and Land, I. pp. 492-504.

than that Philo of Alexandria dates the appearance of the 88th psalm under the imprisonment, and of 89th after the release, of Jehoiachin at Babylon. The collection of Proverbs he allows (on the strength of xxv. 1) to be perhaps somewhat earlier, in the time of Josiah. The book of Job he regards as the translation of a Gentile poem (the age unknown) in which the bearings of human suffering on both the Providence of God and the character of man are discussed. This judgment rests on a fanciful identification of Satan's function in the court and among the Sons of God (i. 6) with that of Momus among the Olympic gods. Of the Prophetical books, which have since become the object of such fruitful study, he says little more than that they have been collected and put together from other writings,—*e.g.* "the chronicles of the kings of Judah and Israel" (2 Chron. xxxii. 32, comp. xxvi. 22), without preserving their original order or attending to their chronology, or giving more than a portion of the whole. The fragmentary character of the excerpts he makes clear by examples, of which the most striking are naturally drawn from Jeremiah and Ezekiel. Of all his critical judgments, that upon the book of Daniel was least fitted to stand the test of time. He accepted its second division,—the five concluding chapters,—as containing real prophecies of Daniel; while regarding the rest of the book as a production, taken from Chaldean sources three and a half centuries later, after the Maccabean re-dedication of the temple. And to the same hand, and almost as sections of the same work, he attributes the books Ezra, Esther, and

Nehemiah.¹ Into this particular question he had a less clear insight than Hobbes;² and both of them left the problem to be worked out half a century later by Anthony Collins; whose first handling of it rivalled in completeness his great opponent's exposure of the Epistles of Phalaris.

The merits of Spinoza's biblical criticism may be easily attenuated by making the most of his obligations to Ibn-Esra and Maimonides in the past, or by bringing his opinions to the test of a learning that was still in the future. But, if fairly tried by the standard of his own age, it is entitled to admiration for its acuteness, breadth, and originality. His insight into the gradual formation and successive redactions of the Hebrew literature led him to a habit of *historical* interpretation, for want of which the Scriptures had for ages remained a confused mass of oracles: by reading the Prophets and the contemporary narratives together, he began to find the true key to both. The light which he had gained was in great measure limited to the history of *the books*: the history of his *people* retained in his conception very much of its traditional form, modified only by the elimination of its supernatural elements, and did not disclose to him the stages of growth in the religion of Israel. He had no appreciation of the characteristic which gave that religion a unique place in the drama of the world,—its faith in a Divine idea carried out through the story of nations and the experiences of

¹ *Op. cit.* c. X. ; V. VI. and Land, I. pp. 504-510.

² *Leviathan*, ch. xxxiii.

mankind, and its consequent advance from age to age in moral depth and spiritual elevation. This was due, not wholly to defect in historical feeling, but in no slight degree to the mechanical character of his philosophy. A "geometrical" construction of the world, in which the human reason, conscience and affections, in their individual and social play, are but determinate and constant quantities with relations as invariable as those of the abscissæ and ordinates of a curve, affords no scope for the conception of indefinite qualitative progress; and, in the absence of final causation, forbids the hope of any ideal plan. He who disowns any "possible" beyond the "actual," and looks on the cosmical equilibrium as exhausting the "necessity of nature," can only resign himself to things as they are, and interpret by them both the recorded past and the imagined future: he can trust no prospective aspirations: he can expect from men no more than their life has hitherto yielded; the cycles of admissible social change, long ago spent, he supposes certain to repeat themselves with unessential variations: so that he is on the watch for no law of development through bygone ages, no lines of luminous promise in those that are to come. And so, to Spinoza, the Israelitish "Kingdom of God" was simply a particular form of government, a theocratic variety of Monarchy, the same all through, and not the haunting prophetic vision of a final dominance of truth and righteousness. The intense energy of his people, springing from faith in the moral administration of the world, meets with but little response or sympathy from him; and is re-

placed by the mood of self-renunciation and willing accord with the inevitable decrees.

To the same habit of unideal judgment we must attribute the sharp distinction which he drew between *faith* (or, as he often calls it, "Revelation") and *philosophy*: the latter alone being a matter of *knowledge intellectually* apprehended; the former an affair of *obedience* to some authority owned by the *imagination*. Only the *élite* of any society can become philosophers: for all the rest, life must be wrought out upon the other ground, and the rules of its moral order be secured not by their *rationale*, but by whatever influence at the time being best commends them to acceptance. They must be pressed home upon the will *ad modum recipientis*. The Scriptures are throughout the embodiment, not of philosophy, but of faith: their use therefore is not as an evidence of truth, but as an incentive and witness to righteousness: and what is permanent in them, instead of being stereotyped in their doctrines or their motives, is found in the true essence of all Religion, viz. the pure elements of their moral law. Thus Spinoza, with all his gentleness of nature, is betrayed into the old philosophic snare, of separating the initiated from the uninitiated, and while allowing the congregation its popular preacher, reserving the sacrament of truth for the inner circle of the elect. Again and again does this persevering pride of the schools reappear: but it has been too often rebuked and shamed away by the spiritual equality of the true Christian life for us ever to acquiesce in its return. The rule, which for so many

centuries has constituted the deepest ground of human fellowship, can never be reversed,—that the supreme truths, instead of being the monopoly of the few, are revealed to every conscience, and often better known to the child than to the scribe.

Spinoza pleads his imperfect knowledge of Greek in excuse for his cursory treatment of the Christian Scriptures. He dwells only on such features in them as confirm his general principle,—that they are nothing, and attest nothing, which does not fall within the scope of familiar natural laws. The Apostles were mainly *witnesses*, who needed only ordinary gifts for telling what they had seen and heard. In writing Epistles, they dealt in the simplest way with the occasional interests of the persons addressed; and Paul especially reasons, pleads, entreats, rebukes, apologizes, in all the moods and tenses of human persuasion; and not always in consistency with the teaching of other apostles, or even with his own at other times. When he claims to have “the word of the Lord” as his authority, his appeal is only to some recorded saying of Christ’s which bears him out. To his Gentiles he philosophizes, while his colleagues, in their national mission, rest all their pleas on the received faith and the prophetic text. This is what every sensible missionary would do: and it calls for no supernatural explanation.¹

This style of remark is commonplace enough. It is only when Spinoza approaches the person of Jesus

¹ Tract. Theol.-Pol., c. XI.; V. VI. and Land, I. pp. 514-522.

himself that his language assumes a character original and obscure. God, he assures us, communicates of his essence direct (*i.e.* without prophetic medium) to our mind :— in greatest perfection of all did this happen to the mind of Christ, who apprehended the saving will of God without word or vision, but immediately, mind with mind, in unique spiritual communion.¹ In repeating this statement further on, he adds a comment which lets in a little light upon its meaning. To Christ alone, he says, did God give revelations *not accommodated to his opinions*, but immediately to his mind; that is to say, *Christ really understood the things revealed, which, being universal, involved only notions communes et veras.*² This, then, is Spinoza's way of saying that the real essence of such things as engaged him got into the mind of Christ: he read them straight off as they are; and what he said of human life and its perfection is true. How far, in such enigmatical propositions, he speaks in accommodation to Christian feeling and prepossession, it is difficult to decide. But after every allowance it is hardly possible to doubt that the teaching and personality of the Founder of Christianity impressed him with a profound veneration. Nor is it wonderful that on that gracious figure, standing so clear of all that had alienated him from the synagogue, yet intent on a divine perfecting of life, his eyes should rest with a strange repose.

¹ *Op. cit.* c. I. pp. 380-3.

² *Op. cit.* c. IV. p. 427.

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1. The first part of the document is a list of the names of the persons who were present at the meeting.

2. The second part of the document is a list of the names of the persons who were absent from the meeting.

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